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What would the corporate world look like if directors were
liable for honest, informed decisions that turned out wrong? The
answer to that question, especially among corporate law scholars,
has been the subject of dour debate. In addressing that question,
scholars almost invariably speculate whenever they contemplate
how a stricter liability rule might work. Some years ago, in fact, in
the bondholder context, Professor William Bratton, Jr., specifically
acknowledged the speculative tenor of the debate when he painted
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an imaginary corporate governance regime in which corporate law
would regulate "management risk taking" by "constrain[ing]
management's discretion to finance, invest, and distribute assets
once [insufficient capital] was reached."'
In one industry, however, the picture that Professor Bratton
painted already has come to pass. In the banking industry, most
visibly due to last decade's savings and loan crisis, potential negli-
gence liability attends directors in practically every aspect of bank
lending.2 Indeed, the banking regime is more extreme than that
which Professor Bratton envisioned because it constrains manage-
ment discretion in solvency and near-insolvency alike? Thus, the
judiciary's response to the savings and loan debacle provides a
valuable laboratory for evaluating whether curtailing the business
judgment rule in corporate law at large would result in benefit or
harm.
This article is the first comprehensive attempt to analyze the
business judgment rule cases in banking on their facts and to con-
sider the larger import of those holdings for corporate law in gen-
eral. At first glance, it is mystifying why this analysis has not been
performed before, considering that the banking cases have been on
the books for over a century. The reason for this gap is that corpo-
rate law scholars tended to assume that the banking cases were an
oddity that was cured by federal deposit insurance, with no wider
relevance to corporate law at large.4 But in making that assump-
1. William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DuKE L.J. 92, 112.
2. See generally Patricia A. McCoy, The Notional Business Judgment Rule in Bank-
ing, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1031 (1995) (noting the increased significance of cases involv-
ing the business judgment rule in the banking industry).
3. In one sense, the bank director liability rulings are quite traditional. Depositors,
like other creditors, lack standing, due to the absence of actual damages, to sue third
parties before their banks become insolvent. See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders
in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L. 49, 81, 82 n.170 (1982) (discussing
the advantages and disadvantages of affording creditors standing to sue). In other respects,
however, the cases are thoroughly radical. The relief they afford sounds in tort, rather
than being confined to the limited contractual rights that are all that most bondholders can
expect. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. Further, the cases empower bank credi-
tors to challenge board decisions that cumulatively result in insolvency, whenever made.
Due to the long-term nature of many bank loans, losses from such loans may not materi-
alize for years. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOV-
ERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 49 (1993) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM] (noting that commercial real
estate development loans often take several years to mature). Hence, the bank cases do
not simply regulate after insolvency, but impose a unitary standard of care that applies to
solvency and near-insolvency alike. In so doing, the decisions implicitly recognize that
creditors' interests can be damaged during solvency through investment decisions that
render their claims less secure.
4. Professor Bishop, for example, assumed that the advent of federal deposit insurance
ended any need for negligence relief. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy
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tion, scholars made little or no attempt to examine the actual polit-
ical and economic underpinnings of the banking cases. Until schol-
ars explore the political economy of those cases, we cannot assume
that the banking authorities are irrelevant to corporate law.
Contrary to received wisdom, courts curtailed the business
judgment rule in banking long before federal deposit insurance was
adopted in 1933. Courts did so in reaction to profligate lending
practices that wiped out depositors and triggered bank runs. Their
rulings conferred an unprecedented negligence cause of action in
favor of depositors, who formed the most visible class of
debtholders in banks. In essence the courts that scaled back the
business judgment rule in banking were attempting to mediate the
same conflict between shareholders and debtholders that all corpo-
rations face, notably the aspect of that conflict known in the fi-
nance literature as "asset substitution."5
Asset substitution refers to the incentive that shareholders have
to replace low-risk company investments with riskier ones bearing
higher potential rates of return. This strategy is attractive to share-
holders, subject to limits. If the investment succeeds, they will reap
the higher gain in its entirety; if it fails, the most they stand to
lose is the purchase price of their stock, due to limited liability.
Conversely, asset substitution threatens debtholders such as bond-
holders and depositors, because they will be forced to absorb any
leftover losses if shareholders' equity is wiped out.
For over a century, most of the cases that curtailed the busi-
ness judgment rule in banking sought to redress asset substitution
in the form of high-risk loan decisions. Thus, far from merely
being a creature of federal deposit insurance, the banking cases
sought to respond to the same problems that all debtholders face,
both in banks and non-banking corporations alike. Why, then, did
the banking cases take a kindlier view toward debtholders than
general corporate law?
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE
L.. 1078, 1096 n.63, 1098-99 (1968) (stating that the class of cases finding a director
liable for honest negligence "has been virtually extinct, partly because of Federal Deposit
Insurance"). See also Richard B. Dyson, The Director's Liability For Negligence, 40 IND.
L. 341, 343-44, 354 (1965) (asserting that most bank director liability holdings predated
World War H); See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A
Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TMX. L. REV. 1351, 1360 n.22, 1377-78 (1989) (not-
ing that courts applied a higher standard of care to directors of banks than to directors in
other industries, even before the advent of federal deposit insurance); Kenneth E. Scott,
Fears and Phobias: Management Liability and Insurance in Thrift Insurance in Thrift
Institutions, 88 BANKING LJ. 124, 129 (1971).
5. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 127; Richard C. Green & Eli Talmor, Asset Substitu-
tion and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing, 10 J. BANKING & FIN. 391, 391 (1986).
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The answer lies, at least in part, in the fact that depositors and
their federal insurers suffer less from depersonalization than corpo-
rate bondholders. In the eyes of the law, corporate bondholders
tend to be treated as impersonal creditors who deal through con-
tract and who have market power to redress market injustices. In
contrast, courts tend to equate bank debtholders with depositors. As
such, bank debt arouses populist images of individual depositors
who entrust their savings to banks and of individual taxpayers who
put the government's full faith and credit behind insured deposits.7
While these images have not always translated into legal relief,
increasingly they have done so and to a far greater degree than for
corporate bondholders.8 That is true even though bondholders in
industrial companies do not enjoy the protection of the bank regu-
latory system. Similarly, courts have responded to the political
imperatives of the federal deposit insurance funds to an extent
never experienced by corporate bondholders, who have no such
insurance-much less an insurance fund sponsored by the federal
government.
Notwithstanding these divergent political norms, the banking
cases respond to the same asset substitution problems that all
debtholders face. When debt-to-equity ratios are high (as has in-
creasingly been the case in non-bank firms in modem times), the
economic distinction between the interests of depositors and those
of corporate bondholders is only one of degree, not of kind. That
being the case, the banking cases are in fact relevant to corporate
law.
As such, the banking cases furnish the first body of historical
data for assessing how a modified business judgment rule might
work. The question, then, is whether curtailing the business judg-
ment rule in banking was a success or whether it made bank direc-
tors unduly cautious, as many would predict.
The answer turned out to be neither. Somewhat surprisingly,
even despite the added overlay of the complex American system of
statutory bank regulation, the historical record suggests that the
banking cases underdeter, rather than overdeter, in the long run. In
part that is because bankers and lawyers regard the banking cases
6. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 103 (detailing the contractual image of the corporate
creditor); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1165, 1174 (1990) (describing bondholders' traditional categorization as contractu-
al creditors).
7. In this article, I use "populist' in a broader sense than its original 1890's Populist
Party denotation. By "populist" I mean a way of thinking that identifies debtholders or
depositors with individuals of modest means and champions their interests against the
interests of larger corporate entities with generally superior bargaining power.
8. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 150, 166-67 nn. 329-330.
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as outdated when bank failures are few and bank profitability is
high. Additionally, in banking, periods of judicial activism general-
ly precede periods of judicial backlash in which courts repudiate
earlier restrictive cases due to judicial competency concerns and
fears over stifling business innovation. Due to these cyclical down-
swings, the banking cases have not deterred irrational risks; instead,
they have done little more than react to bank crises in the imnedi-
ate past. And even at that, there are serious questions whether the
latest crop of cases has been cost-effective. Thus, far from chilling
banking innovation, the banking cases are notable mostly for their
inefficacy in combatting bank director mismanagement over the
long term. As the banking cases show, the business judgment rule
is flawed, but a strengthened state-law negligence claim in favor of
depositors, corporate bondholders, and other debtholders is not the
cure.
In Part I, I discuss the economic incentives for asset substitu-
tion in banking and the effect of federal deposit insurance and
traditional legal rules on those incentives. Part II traces the
judiciary's historical attempts to address asset substitution in bank-
ing through increased legal redress. In Part III, I evaluate the suc-
cess of those attempts. Part IV proposes a new federal claim for
bank director liability. I discuss the broader ramifications for cor-
porate law in Part V. I conclude in Part VI by considering the
larger implications of the stricter bank director liability case law
for corporate debt-equity conflicts at large.
I. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. The Classic Business Judgment Rule and its Economic Effect
In banking, as in other industries, directors who breach their
duty of care to the corporation face liability for simple or gross
negligence.' Today's formulations of the duty of care in banking
trace directly back to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1891 decision in
Briggs v. Spaulding,'" where the Court charged bank directors
with the care "which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would
exercise under similar circumstances," taking into account "the
restrictions of the statute and the usages of business."" While
9. This article uses the terms "bank," "banking," and "banking industry" to designate
all bank and bank-like financial institutions, whatever their type, including banks, savings
and loan institutions, credit unions, trust companies, savings banks, and the like.
10. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
11. Id. at 152; see also id. at 171 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that depositors have
the right to expect that bank directors will exercise ordinary due care). Accord Michelsen
v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 1943); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1366-67
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there are individual variations on the Briggs rule today from state
to state, the variations are largely minor, and a majority of states
still subscribe at least nominally to it."
(D. Utah 1993); FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1310 (N.D. Ind. 1991), affd sub
nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993); but see FDIC v. Cohen, No. 95
Civ. 683 (LLS), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2247, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1996) (noting
the Virginia statute that limits a director's liability to a "purely subjective inquiry into
whether a director acted in accordance with his good faith business judgment").
12. See generally William L. Cary and Sam Harris, Standards of Conduct Under Com-
mon Law, Present Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAW 61, 64 (1972); Marcia
M. McMurray et al., Note, A Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of
Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 607-08 (1987) (tracing
development of the duty of care owed by corporate directors in various states); McCoy,
supra note 2, at 1035 n.13 (listing cases that follow the decision in Briggs).
Courts have recently divided on whether bank directors sued for disinterested busi-
ness decisions can be liable for simple negligence. This debate has both statutory and
common-law dimensions. The most important statutory issue involves the effect of 12
U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994), which provides that officers and directors of insured depository
institutions may be held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") for gross negligence. See also 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1441a(b)(1)(B), (b)(4)(A) (1995) (applying § 1821(k) to the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion ("RTC")). Section 1821(k) goes on to state that "[n]othing in this paragraph shall
impair or affect any right of the [FDIC or RTC] under other applicable law." In cases
governed by state law, every circuit court that has considered the issue has held that §
1821(k) does not preempt state-law actions for simple negligence. See, e.g., FDIC v.
Stahl, No. 94-4684, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19011, at *16 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 1996); RTC
v. CityFed Financial Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1235, 1245-49 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. granted
sub nom. Atherton v. FDIC, 116 S. Ct. 1587 (No. 92-4281) (1996); RTC v. Chapman, 29
F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994) (dictum); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 444-45 (10th
Cir. 1992) (en bane), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 993 (1992). In cases governed by federal
common law, the circuits have split over the effect of § 1821(k). Compare RTC v.
Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 296-97 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that § 1821(k) supersedes federal
common law); FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 370-73 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Chapman, 29
F.3d at 1122-25 (same); RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1359-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (same);
RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 425 (7th Cir. 1993) (same) with CityFed Financial
Corp., 57 F.3d at 1235, 1245-49 (holding that § 1821(k) does not preclude federal com-
mon law suits for ordinary negligence). See also Douglas V. Austin & Sidney M.
Weinstein, Bank Officer and Director Liability Under FIRREA: The Need for a National
Standard of Gross Negligence, 111 BANKING LJ. 67 (1994) (analyzing the ambiguity in §
1821(k), and discussing both the majority and minority views interpreting application of
the gross negligence standard); Harris Weinstein, Advising Corporate Directors After the
Savings and Loan Disaster, 48 BUS. LAW. 1499, 1503 (1993) (arguing that a simple
negligence standard will give directors too much "management responsibility" and "erode
their independence"); Michael P. Battin, Note, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 2347 (1995) (arguing that § 1821(k) should be amended to include a
simple negligence standard); David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Liability Under
FIRREA: A New Defense for Directors And Officers of Insolvent Depository Institu-
tions-Or A Tighter Noose?, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1709-10, 1775-76 (1992) (same);
DeLisa R. Kilpatrick, Note, FDIC v. Canfield A Death Penalty for Banks and Their
Directors for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 3 GEo. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 281 (1994) (argu-
ing that a simple negligence standard will force risk-averse decisions instead of risk-neu-
tral decisions); Christopher J. Nelson, Note, Director Liability and the Insolvent, Federally
Chartered Financial Institution: A Standard Emerges, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1477 (1995) (ar-
guing that some circuits have frustrated congressional intent by "insulating directors of
federally chartered institutions from liability"); Jon Shepherd, Note, The Liability of Offi-
cers and Directors Under the Financial Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
[V/ol. 47:1
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If the unvarnished duty of care were dispositive, directors
could be liable for honest but mistaken judgment calls that fact-
finders found imprudent in the harsh glare of hindsight. Concerned
that entrepreneurial spirit might be dampened as a result, courts
grafted the business judgment rule onto the duty of care. Under the
classic definition of the business judgment rule, directors are not
liable for honest business decisions that turn out wrong, assuming
those decisions are disinterested, informed and in compliance with
all laws, corporate charter provisions, and by-laws.'3 To qualify
90 M~cH. L. REv. 1119 (1992) (concluding that § 1821(k) preempts state law only to the
extent that the state law standard of care is lower than gross negligence).
Based on the conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on April
15, 1996, on the issue of whether the wording of § 1821(k) precludes simple negligence
suits against bank directors by the FDIC under federal common law. See Atherton v.
FDIC, 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996) (granting review). The issue is complicated by the discord
in the lower courts over whether federal common law should displace state law in bank
director negligence suits in the absence of § 1821(k), and if so, should federal common
law apply to federally-chartered institutions alone or to all federally-insured banks and
thrifts. Compare Stahl, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19011, at *16 (holding that state law
applies to federally-chartered institutions) with CityFed Financial Corp., 57 F.3d at 1236
n.5 (holding that federal common law applies to federally-chartered institutions); Frates, 52
F.3d at 296-97 (same); Bates, 42 F.3d at 370-72 (same); Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122-25
(same) and Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1359 & n.2 (holding that federal common law applies to
all federally-insured institutions, whether state- or federally-chartered); Gallagher, 10 F.3d
at 419 (holding that federal common law governs federally-chartered institutions).
Wholly apart from the effect of § 1821(k), certain jurisdictions have declined to as-
sess bank directors with common law liability for anything short of gross negligence, with
some courts holding that the business judgment rule bars suits for simple negligence. See,
e.g., FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 305 (N.D. Tex. 1994); RTC v. Acton, 844
F. Supp. 307, 313-16 (N.D. Tex. 1994), affid, 49 F.3d 1086 (5th Cir. 1995); RTC v.
Hovnanian, Civ. No. 94-450 (HIS), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19359, at *16-*24 (D.N.J.
Oct. 11, 1994); RTC v. Blasdell, 930 F.Supp. 417, 423-36 (D. Ariz. 1994); RTC v. Gib-
son, 829 F. Supp. 1110, 1117 (W.D. Mo. 1993); FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp. 1541,
1546 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 200 (1847); Percy v.
Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 74-75, 78 (La. 1829); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24
(1872). But see, e.g., RTC v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp. 1140, 1150-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (hold-
ing that business judgment rule does not preclude bank director liability for simple negli-
gence; "no New York authority [applies] the Business Judgment Rule to bank directors");
RTC v. Gross, No. CIV. 93-5056, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14732, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
13, 1994) (declining to dismiss RTC simple negligence claim under Pennsylvania law).
Similarly, some courts have held that § 1821(k)'s gross negligence standard does not
incorporate the business judgment rule. See RTC v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer,
886 F. Supp. 658, 668-69 n.8 (N.D. Ind. 1995); RTC v. Gallagher, 800 F. Supp. 595,
602-03 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
The Lending Enhancement Through Necessary Due Process Act, H.R. 316, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) would have eliminated common-law simple negligence claims and
codified the business judgment rule in suits against financial institution directors. The bill
was voted down by the House Banking Committee on June 28, 1995. See House Commit-
tee Deletes D&O Relief, But D&Os See Tide Turning Their Way, BANK BAILOUT LITIG.
NEws, Aug. 2, 1995, at 1; House Panel Votes to Give D&Os Relief, but Victory Is Tenu-
ous, BANK BAILOUT LrrG. Nws, July 5, 1995, at 5; June Action Likely to be Pivotal
on Bank Bailout Issues in Congress, BANK BAILOUT LMG. NEws, June 21, 1995, at 3;
McCollum Measure Would Remedy Host of D&O Liability Concerns, BANK BAILOUT
LITIG. NEwS, Mar. 1, 1995, at 5.
13. See Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 70 (1880) (finding that bank trustees can only be
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for protection under the business judgment rule, board decisions
also must meet a minimum rationality standard by having at least
some profit potential on their face.
14
Thus, the business judgment rule, in its classic sense, permits
(but does not require) managers to engage in profit-maximizing
conduct, at least in the short term. As such, the rule has two im-
portant consequences, one which deepens conflicts between share-
holders and debtholders and one which mediates them.
First, the business judgment rule is indifferent to asset substi-
tution by shareholders at the expense of debtholders as long as the
new, riskier asset is "rational" in the sense of having some realistic
potential for gain. Under the rule, shareholders have incentives to
substitute riskier assets for safer ones, at least until financing costs
outweigh anticipated gains. Thus, the rule condones wealth trans-
fers from debtholders to shareholders by allowing boards to pursue
profit-maximizing strategies with heightened levels of risk. This
outcome was traditionally justified as necessary for business inno-
vation and corporate wealth maximization. Any resulting harm to
debtholders was dismissed as inconsequential because debtholders,
as fixed claimants, have rights that shareholders, as residual claim-
ants, do not, including full return of principal, a set rate of return,
and priority in the event of bankruptcy. 5
In contrast with this first consequence, which drives a wedge
between shareholders and debtholders, the second consequence
serves the interests of both groups. The business judgment rule
does so by subjecting economically irrational decisions (i.e., deci-
sions with no real prospect for gain) to liability for violation of the
duty of care. Obviously, economically irrational decisions endanger
corporate solvency and as such they normally are not in the inter-
ests of shareholders, debtholders, or managers. But when directors
and/or managers find it in their personal self-interest to pursue
decisions that are financially irrational from the shareholders' point
of view, the duty of care gives shareholders a negligence cause of
liable for damages if they violate a bank's charter or act fraudulently; "if they act in
good faith within the limits of powers conferred, using proper prudence and diligence,
they are not responsible for mere mistakes or errors of judgment"). See also FDIC v.
Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 131 n.13 (5th Cir. 1992); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say.
Bank, 75 F. 781, 783-85, 787-89 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896); Wynn v. Tallapoosa County Bank,
53 So. 228, 239 (Ala. 1910) (holding directors liable only for failure to exercise reason-
able care and not mere errors in judgment); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 727 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Special Term 1940); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872).
14. See Hun, 82 N.Y. at 78-79; Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 697-99 (holding bank director
liable where there was no rational basis for decision); McCoy, supra note 2, at 1037-40
(discussing cases where courts have found that bank directors' decisions fall below mini-
mum standards of rationality).
15. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1219.
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action. 6 Although debtholders traditionally have lacked standing
to sue for similar types of harm, shareholder suits vindicate both
debtholder and shareholder interests, as Professor Lawrence Mitch-
ell has pointed out."
The asset substitution debate has centered, in significant part,
on whether debtholders should receive extracontractual tort reme-
dies or be left to market constraints and contractual relief. 8 Nor-
mally, of course, increased financing costs and the desire to avoid
insolvency will provide important market constraints on irrational
risks. The business judgment rule regime tolerates asset substitution
on the assumption that such market constraints exist. But in certain
industries, and under certain market conditions in industries across
the board, such constraints can be severely dampened. In such
circumstances, the business judgment rule can accelerate asset
substitution to the point of economically irrational decisions. In
order to understand these potentially extreme incentives toward
16. As Professors Dooley and Palmiter have noted, this is why the duty of care serves
as a surrogate for the duty of loyalty. See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate
Governance, 47 BUs. LAW. 461, 471-72 (1992) (all disinterested board decisions except
those that are grossly negligent are protected by the business judgment rule); Palmiter,
supra note 4, at 1376-85 (noting that when decisions are not tainted enough to trigger
loyalty review, care review becomes meaningful). But see infra notes 190, 203.
17. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1190 (discussing the similarity of debtholders to
shareholders); see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism:
In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1837 n.48 (1992) (noting that man-
agement can do a disservice to both shareholders and bondholders alike); George C.
Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1078-79, 1111 (1995) (noting the interdependency between sharehold-
ers and depositors, and proposing a new scheme of interactive governance).
18. Compare Brudney, supra note 17, at 1838-40 (stating that contract doctrine can
give adequate relief to debtholders); David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders' Rights and the
Case for a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1023, 1025-26 (1991) (arguing against
"the imposition of a fiduciary duty for bondholders"); Stewart M. Robertson, Comment,
Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee: Controlling Managerial Discretion in the
Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 461, 462 (1988) (rejecting a fiduciary
duty on corporate management and arguing for a stricter legal framework based upon a
contractual relationship between a corporation and its debtholders); Dale B. Tauke, Should
Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate Over Corporate Bondholder
Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 8 (finding that the limited scope of the problem
makes extensive judicial intervention in the debtholder-corporate relationship unnecessary),
with Albert H. Barkey, The Financial Articulation of a Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders
with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 47, 83-
84 (1986) (concluding that a general managerial fiduciary duty should be owed to all
security holders); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L.
205, 206 (1988) (arguing that courts should impose a fiduciary duty on corporate manag-
ers); Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1168-71. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 81-86 (1986) (looking
at fiduciary duties through implicit contracting). In the general corporate arena, courts
regulate asset substitution at the margin in the form of rules against fraudulent conveyance
and the minimum rationality exception to the business judgment rule. See generally Doug-
las G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain,
38 VAND. L. REv. 829 (1985); infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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asset substitution, it is useful to consider an economic model of the
business judgment rule.
B. The Economic Problem Defined: Wealth Expropriation and
Asset Substitution
The age-old conflict between corporate debtholders and share-
holders arises from the incentives that both groups have to maxi-
mize their wealth at the other group's expense, a phenomenon
known as "expropriation. 19 Although expropriation is a two-way
street, the law has traditionally favored shareholder expropriation at
the expense of corporate debtholders in order to allow bold and
innovative business decisions that can maximize corporate wealth.
Courts countenance shareholder wealth expropriation through a
variety of doctrines, including limited liability, standing to sue, and
the business judgment rule.'
Expropriation can take different forms. On the liability side of
the ledger, shareholder expropriation can occur when a corporation
increases its borrowing because the debtholders' claims on finite
company assets increase in proportion and amount.2 As a result
of expanded borrowing, the holdings of senior unsecured
debtholders take on added risk and drop in value because there are
new and additional claims on the company's assets in the event of
insolvency.' In leveraged buyouts, debt financing results in a
wealth transfer to shareholders because debt secured by the assets
of the target company is used to finance the repurchase of publicly
held shares.
19. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 18, at 850-51 (providing examples of how
expropriation may occur in corporate setting); Bratton, supra note 1, at 136-37 (explaining
"wealth transfers" and the contracting practices that permit them); Green & Talmor, supra
note 5, at 391 (noting that managerial decisions affecting the risk of the firm are the
primary means of wealth reallocation between debtholders and stockholders); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 345 (1976); Jonathan R. Macey,
Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental
Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE U. 173, 182 (discussing shareholders' incentives to shift
resources from safe to risky investments); McDaniel, supra note 18, at 225 (same); Mitch-
ell, supra note 6, at 1213-15 (same). See generally Brudney, supra note 17 (examining
how shareholder behavior affects the interests of debtholders); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Wil-
liam A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender
Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. Cml. L. Rv. 1207 (1991) (demonstrating how threat
of bankruptcy can force debtors to accept unfavorable recapitalization in the shareholders'
favor).
20. See generally Macey, supra note 19, at 181 (discussing doctrines that protect
shareholders).
21. This article uses the terms "bondholder" and "debtholder, interchangeably in the
general corporate context to refer to holders of senior, unsecured corporate debt. In the
banking context, the term "debtholder" includes depositors.
22. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 137.
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Expropriation can also occur on the asset side of the ledger.
Shareholders can expropriate wealth from debtholders by replacing
conservative investments with investments bearing a higher risk of
loss, a phenomenon known as "asset substitution. ''2" Shareholders
have an incentive to do so because if the substitution pays off,
they will reap higher returns, while if losses occur, their liability
will be capped at their initial investments under limited liability
law. Because any remaining losses will be absorbed by the
debtholders, debtholders, as fixed claimants on company assets,
have more conservative risk preferences than company shareholders,
who will stand in line behind the debtholders if the company goes
bankrupt. As the following model shows, the greater the ratio of
debt to equity, the greater the shareholders' incentives to engage in
asset substitution.
C. Added Incentives Toward Risk
Assume that in planning their investment strategy, the directors
of a firm must choose between Decision A and Decision B in
Table 1, both of which hold out an expected $2 million gross
profit. If the board seeks to maximize shareholder wealth, which
investment should the firm's board choose?
Decision A is the riskier investment, with a 75% chance of a
$2 million profit and a 25% chance of complete loss. Because of
its higher risk, Decision A offers a higher nominal rate of return of
15%, which necessitates a lower total investment of $13,333,333.
Decision B is safer than Decision A, with an 80% chance of a $2
million profit and a 20% chance of total loss. As such, Decision B
offers a lower 10% nominal rate of return, which necessitates a
steeper $20 million investment to generate a $2 million gross prof-
it. Both decisions are financed by 10% equity and 90% debt. To
reflect the higher risk of loss, the interest rate on the debt financ-
ing for Decision A (8.25%) is 2% higher than the rate for Decision
B (6.25%).
Once the cost of servicing the debt is subtracted from the
expected gross profit, the expected net profits from Decisions A
and B are $1,010,000 and $875,000 respectively. But before they
can be realistically compared, Decisions A and B must be further
discounted for their likelihood of loss.24 After this is done, Deci-
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24. This computation, known as risk-adjusted value, is calculated as: (probability of
success x expected net profit) minus (probability of failure x equity invested). See
GEORGE J. BENSTON Er AL., PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE & SouND BANKING-PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 18-19 (Richard Schmalensee, ed., 1986). For variations on this model, see
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983) (applying the model to high risk/high return ventures); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
1996]
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sion A is the investment that is in the best interests of the
company's shareholders, because it has a risk-adjusted value of
$424,167, as opposed to $300,000 for Decision B.
TABLE I
DECISION A - ighe, Rk6 DECISION B. Lo- r Rik DECISION Al-
W h An lly6d o L- Coo qfF-dr
Expected Go Pooft 15% S 2M.000 Es o sed G Profit 10% S2.0% .C0 Epen Ge ronP0it 15% S ZO.000
Tol Funds 13.333.333 TonI Fuds 2000.0. TOW Fft0 13.333333
Eoty (10%) 1,33.333 Equty (10%) 2.00.000 Eqoy (10%) 1233.33
Debt@ 02% IZ0O. Dot @ 6.Z3% 18.000.00 Ddo@ 6.3% 12.0O0.000
Cosl of Funds @ .2.5% 990,00.I Cost of fd @ 625% 1.125.000 Col of Funds 625% 750.00
F.p-eold N. Profi 1.010)00 Eopex d N. Profit 075,000 Expd N. Pr0t 1250.0%
Espoed Net Rol 75.8% EOpecCd Ne R. 43.8% Expo No R 93.8%
of R-n, Ety of R- o Eqouy of Ro Equny
Socn Pob1d01y 0.73 757200 Soooo . 90oboh 0.8 700.00 Soooeo Pmo0babaty 0.35 937.0
Fooe Probbzih 0.25 (333333) FP 10, Pfotbsohy 0.2 (400.00) Faibo Pro0b.y 0.25 033.333)
Siok.Adjolld V.I. 424.167 Rak.Myonoed Vt)0 , 3MC(0 SkAood Vt), 604.167
Rnlk-Adjos-od R.. 31.8% RMk.Md0 S.on 15% 1 .sk-Adjod R.. 43%
of Ro'o on Equly f R-n .n Eqty of Re.-o on F4oy
The business judgment rule permits (but does not require) this
result by shielding boards that aggressively seek to maximize prof-
its with a concomitantly higher risk of loss. Thus, in its classic
form, the business judgment rule is impervious to the statistical
likelihood of any potential loss as long as the risk-adjusted value is
positive. So long as that condition is met, the rule promotes the
norm of potential profit maximization, untempered by any concern
for risk. Under such conditions, the classic form of the rule permits
boards, acting in the shareholders' best interests, to compromise
debtholders' financial security by choosing risky investments over
conservative ones.
Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 34 CoRP. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 323,
344 (1992-1993) [hereinafter Duty of Care] (illustrating the conflict between riskier invest-
ments with higher potential returns and less risky investments); Edward J. Kane, Appear-
ance and Reality in Deposit Insurance, 10 J. BANKING & FIN. 175, 178-80 (1986) [here-
inafter Appearance and Reality] (noting the asymmetric mechanism between shareholders
and debtholders for sharing unanticipated gains and losses); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary
Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489-93 (1993) (providing examples of risk-adjusted value model
and illustrating shareholders' incentives to make riskier decisions); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88
COLuM. L. REV. 1153, 1163-64 (1988) (discussing shareholders' advantage in higher risk
investments); R. Mark Williamson, Regulatory Theory and Deposit Insurance Reform, 42
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 105, 109 & n.17 (1994) (examining the risk assumption function). The
flaw with certain of those models lies in failing to account for differentials in the cost of
funds.
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D. Market Constraints and Market Failure
To some extent, of course, the market acts as a brake on risky
investments that are funded by debt. In a world with perfect infor-
mation, Decision A will carry a higher cost of funds than Decision
B because the debtholders furnishing the funds-be they bondhold-
ers, depositors, or other creditors-will normally demand a higher
rate of return to defray the increased risk that Decision A bears. If
the risk level is too high for an individual debtholder's personal
tolerance for risk, he or she can deny financing to the firm alto-
gether. This increased financing cost and the possibility of impaired
access to financing will reduce and possibly negate the difference
between the risk-adjusted values of investments such as Decisions
A and B.
In theory, if a firm wants to use debt financing for higher-risk
investments, the firm can respond to the problem of higher cost of
funds in one of several ways. The board can finance the invest-
ment entirely with equity. Alternatively, it can offer debtholders a
higher interest rate sufficient to compensate them for their added
share of risk.' Or, if either of these options is unattractive, the
board can simply select a more conservative investment.2
Under certain circumstances, however, debt financing costs
may be underpriced, distorting the risk analysis. There are at least
two significant reasons why this may be the case. First, debtholders
may find information-gathering too costly to price the firm's cur-
rent value accurately and demand an appropriate rate of return.
This is a perennial problem for bank depositors, particularly small
depositorsY
Second, even if current value could accurately be assessed,
normally it is impossible for debtholders to price the future hazard
of asset substitution (i.e., the hazard that the firm's risk profile
might increase) through disclosures about past performance.s This
25. Interest paid on corporate bonds and on bank deposits is fully deductible. See
I.R.C. § 163 (1994).
26. See BENSTON ET AL., supra note 24, at 86.
27. See Robert C. Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance
and Loan Guarantees, 1 J. BANKiNG & FIN. 3, 3 (1977); Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency
Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE UJ. 469, 514 (1992) (noting that insured
depositors have little incentive to invest in monitoring bank solvency); Williamson, supra
note 24, at 115 (noting that depositors will have difficulty ascertaining a bank's actual
degree of risk). Depositors' access to information is further impeded by federal laws that
limit or prohibit the release of financial information that is directly germane to risk, par-
ticularly examination results. See Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regula-
tion: The Policy Choices, 44 Bus. LAW. 907, 916 (1989) [hereinafter Deposit Insurance]
(noting the limited nature of disclosure in the banking industry as opposed to the securi-
ties market).
28. See Brudney, supra note 17, at 1826-27, 1849-52 (explaining that shareholders'
strategic behavior can distort current values and deprive debtholders of meaningful choice);
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second problem is not unique to depositors: it is one that all
debtholders face, depositors and bondholders alike. Further
compounding matters is the problem that asset substitution is diffi-
cult to guard against because depositors and other debtholders
almost never have a voice in (and thus a veto over) such invest-
ments before the fact.29
Thus, whenever debt financing is used, information asymme-
tries create incentives for shareholders and their boards to court
added risks. 0 In banking, however, unlike other industries, due to
the nature of demand deposits, depositors can exact stiff discipline
for such risks in the form of bank runs. The dread economic con-
sequences of this form of market discipline-bank runs, bank pan-
ics, and an ensuing shrinkage in the money supply-generate
strong political pressures to forestall such discipline." It was pre-
cisely in response to such pressure that the United States inaugurat-
ed federal deposit insurance in 1933 to defuse the threat of bank
runs made possible by demand deposits.32
Deposit insurance has had the salutary effect of bolstering
depositors' confidence in the banking system, whether their institu-
tions are risk-prone or risk-averse. The success of deposit insurance
in this respect has been such that no depositor has lost a cent in
federally insured deposits since 1933, and panics were largely
averted during last decade's bank and thrift crisis.33 That said, de-
Coffee & Klein, supra note 19, at 1218-20 (noting that information about debt securities
is often inadequate).
29. To be sure, some asset decisions by industrial corporations may be more likely to
come to investors' attention than comparable decisions by banks. Financial institution
assets are often highly liquid and can be substituted quietly without triggering required
disclosures. In contrast, in industrial settings, major asset sales may take the form of
fundamental corporate decisions such as mergers or divestitures that trigger public disclo-
sure requirements. Likewise, where assets are illiquid and large in scale, analysts are more
likely to detect attempts to substitute assets, due to the time needed for sale and the
perceived effect that asset sales might have on the going concern value of the firm. See
Robert C. Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE LJ. 1, 14-15
(1976); Swire, supra note 27, at 512-13 (banks have more ability to "shift their corporate
strategy without notice to shareholders or bondholders" than industrial companies). None-
theless, lesser asset decisions by industrial corporations will not necessarily come to the
attention of investors or analysts in advance. Over time, the accumulated toll of such
decisions can be quite significant.
30. See Gautamn Goswami et al., Debt Financing and Myopia: Cause or Consequence?,
at 2, 17 (August 1994) (unpublished manuscript).
31. See ROGER J. VAUGHAN & EDWARD W. HILL, BANKING ON THE BRINK: THE
TROUBLED FUTURE OF AMERICAN FINANCE 85 (1992).
32. Today, when a federally-insured financial institution goes into conservatorship or
receivership, the appropriate federal deposit insurance fund must compensate depositor
losses up to $100,000 per customer, per institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B) (1993).
33. See, e.g., F. Stevens Redburn, Never Lost a Penny: An Assessment of Federal
Deposit Insurance, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 687, 687 (1988). The few panics that
did occur in the 1980's happened in financial institution sectors that were not federally
insured. State-chartered savings and loan institutions in Maryland, Ohio, and Rhode Island,
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posit insurance has the highly undesirable effect of dampening
market restraints on undue bank risk. With deposit guarantees,
depositors have no incentive to research bank risk profiles. Similar-
ly, insured depositors have no reason to demand compensation for
risk in the form of higher rates of return. Previously, the
government's preference for bank resolution methods that extended
protection to large, uninsured depositors also undermined the mar-
ket discipline that wholesale depositors otherwise would have pro-
vided. 4
Of course, deposit insurance premiums could offset debt un-
derpricing problems if the premiums were properly priced. But
despite the advent of risk-based premiums that vary by institution
according to risk, it is difficult to price premiums to compensate
the deposit insurance funds accurately. Deposit insurers have not
perfected risk-rating mechanisms to measure banks' current values.
for example, suffered systematic runs on deposits when private deposit insurance systems
collapsed in those states in the early 1980's. See LAWRENCE J. WTrrE, THE S&L DEBA-
CLE 46 n.5, 135, 138 (1991) [hereinafter S&L DEBACLE] (discussion of private deposit
insurance systems failure); M. Mazen Anbari, Comment, Banking on a Bailout: Directors'
and Officers' Liability Insurance Policy Exclusions in the Context of the Savings and
Loan Crisis, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 547, 580-81 (1992); Anna J. Schwartz, Financial Stabil-
ity and the Federal Safety Net, in RESTRucruRING BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES IN
AMERICA 34, 51 (William S. Haraf & Rose M. Kushmeider eds., 1988). Similarly, in
1984 the federal government nationalized the failed Continental Illinois Bank out of fears
that Continental's large base of uninsured corporate depositors would withdraw deposits
wholesale and trigger a major systemic panic in the process. See JAMES L. PIERCE, THE
FUTURE OF BANKING 104-05 (1991).
34. See William S. Haraf & Rose M. Kushmeider, Redefining Financial Markets, in
RESTRUCTURING BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA, supra note 33, at 1, 24-
25 (moral hazard "has been compounded in recent years as bank and thrift failures have
been resolved in ways that protect even large depositors. . ."); Appearance and Reality,
supra note 24, at 175-76; Redbum, supra note 33, at 690 (stating that the protection of
uninsured depositors "induc[ed] greater risk-taking.. ."); W.F. Sharpe, Bank Capital Ade-
quacy, Deposit Insurance, and Security Values, in RISK AND CAPrrAL ADEQUACY IN COM-
MERCIAL BANKS 187, 201 (Sherman J. Maisel ed., 1981) (arguing that deposit insurance
premiums should equal or exceed the anticipated claims on the deposit insurance fund).
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA")
curtailed the FDIC's ability to protect uninsured depositors by mandating that the FDIC
use the resolution method that results in the least cost to the deposit insurance funds. 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) (1994). In particular, the FDIC may not protect uninsured de-
posits so as to increase losses to any deposit insurance fund. See id. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(i).
Under FDICIA, the FDIC can still enter into purchase and assumption agreements whose
effect is to protect uninsured deposits. The agency may only do so, however, if the insur-
ance funds sustain no additional losses. See id. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(iii). Similarly, FDICIA
made it significantly harder for the FDIC to bail out large institutions under the "too big
to fail" doctrine. Today, the FDIC may resort to open bank assistance only if two-thirds
of the FDIC's Board of Directors and two-thirds of the Board of Governors of the Feder-
al Reserve System vote to recommend such action and the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the President, determines that closure would have "serious adverse ef-
fects on economic conditions or financial stability" and that the proposed action "would
avoid or mitigate such adverse effects" Id. § 1823(e)(4)(G)(i). These provisions have not
yet been put to a practical test.
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Similarly, the future risk of asset substitution almost never can be
accurately priced and in the case of new bank products may not be
priced at all. Both of these deficiencies boost bank incentives to
increase their risk levels once premium rates have been assigned.
Additionally, the risk-rating system is the focus of constant bank
lobbying campaigns to keep premium differentials low."
How, then, does debt underpricing affect risk levels? When
the cost of funds is artificially depressed, as is generally true in
banking, the gap between the risk-adjusted values of Decisions A
and B will grow. This is evident from Decision A, in Table 1,
which shows what will happen if the firm can finance the riskier
Decision A at the same low cost of funds as Decision B due to
information deficits on the part of depositors and their insurers.
When the cost of funds for Decision A equals that of Decision B,
Decision A1 results in a risk-adjusted value of $604,167, widening
the gulf between Decisions A and B from $124,167 to $204,167.
As a result of this artificially low cost of funds, the risky Decision
A is even more attractive to the finrn than it was before. Alterna-
tively, for the same reduced differential in risk-adjusted values, the
firm can pursue even riskier investments than Decisions A and
A1.
36
Thus, by subsidizing risk-taking, debt underpricing increases
firm incentives to take risk, to the detriment of depositors and
corporate debtholders alike. Indeed, as one set of economists has
noted in the banking industry context, "the only way a bank can
take advantage of this ... subsidy is by adopting a riskier-than-
normal stance."37 This, in turn, puts pressure on more conservative
35. See EDWARD J. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
13-14, 19, 82 (1985) [hereinafter GATHERING CRISIS]; Richard C. Aspinwall, On the
"Specialness" of Banking, 7 ISSUES IN BANK REG. 16 (1983), reprinted in JONATHAN R.
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 73, 78 (1992) [herein-
after BANKING LAW AND REGULATION]; Appearance and Reality, supra note 24, at 182,
185, 186-87; Deposit Insurance, supra note 27, at 915; Sharpe, supra note 34, at 188,
201.
The mispricing problem was even more acute before the passage of FDICIA, when
deposit insurance premiums were priced at a flat rate per $100,000 of deposits with no
adjustment for risk. In FDICIA, Congress abolished flat premiums and ordered the federal
deposit insurance funds to calibrate deposit insurance premiums according to risk. 12
U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1) (1996 Supp.).
36. See BENSTON ET AL., supra note 24, at 86 (noting that banks will tend to take
greater risks when covered by deposit insurance because they "can get away with a riski-
er portfolio without increasing [their] cost of funds. . "); GATHERING CRISIS, supra note
35, at 14-15 (same); Sherman J. Maisel, The Theory and Measurement of Risk and Capi-
tal Adequacy, in RISK AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY IN COMMERCIAL BANKS, supra note 34,
at 19, 112 (describing how deposit insurance works to underprice debt); Williamson, supra
note 24, at 119 ("[an assumption that the regulators are guaranteeing the safety of a
bank's debt [at flat premium rates] lowers its cost even at extreme levels of leverage").
37. BENSTON ET AL., supra note 24, at 86; see also Peter Ritchken et al., On flexibili-
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banks to match yields offered by their riskier counterparts in order
to retain depositors. These pricing problems tilt the entire banking
industry toward added risk. 8 Nonetheless, the classic economic
model of the business judgment rule is indifferent to this height-
ened propensity toward risk.
The economic model of the business judgment rule is doubly
deficient due to its failure to consider the effect of underpriced
debt on decisions with negative risk-adjusted values. In lay terms,
such decisions have no realistic profit potential and are statistically
likely to result in losses. For example, take Decision C in Table 2,
which is Decision B with two variations. Decision C is riskier than
Decision B, with a 75% chance of success and a 25% chance of
total loss. And its cost of funds is 2% higher (8.25%) to compen-
sate for the added risk of loss. The risk-adjusted value of Decision
C is negative, a projected $113,750 loss.
Obviously, because the cost of funds is accurately priced,
rational shareholders and board members will reject Decision C
because it has a negligible chance of profit and a very real chance
of loss. Market discipline in the form of shareholder self-interest
ordinarily should insure that this type of economically irrational
decision is nixed.
TABLE 2
DECISION C- 1- 11-o,25k.naI%oo,0, DECISION D- M lH ,d Effec ofAf i l-L0, C-,, ,'I F.d,
Eopeo40 C.o,.r. 0011 O1 $ 2.0%020 Euxo ped G,-, Prfit 10% S 2000.000
T70, F-11 20.00 3 Tom) F. 2D.000.000
Eqy 05(10%) 2,400.000 Equty (10%) _ 2.000M.0
DhOSM 0.25% 18.00.C0 0D @10 5 % 18.000.0%
Cotl P -Is @ 825% 1.45.000 Co tf R.L&) @ 5.00% 900.00
ISp50 Nea Pra 515.0W0 Epect1d N,. Profit 1.100.0%O
Exp-4 Nd R.. dt R% Ery 25.8% EopO-d Nd R-. of P,-%,, E- 0.y 55.0%
S0%0 I.0S 51 ,y0.75 A - 3 50 S- P000!y 0.75 25.0%0
ft.o,- PC O aLly 025 (500.000) F0h,: PO0,v 0.20 (00.00)
PO.O.Ad.,-d V., . (113,.,) ikO- Ad V.d 525.0
PRkM,. P.y.0o d P- .00,, Eqzql -53% 1Rok-Adr-d 00% df P_- . Eqoo.y 16.%
But two different factors can skew this calculus toward eco-
nomically irrational decisions, such as Decision C, that are freight-
ty, capital structure and investment decisions for the insured bank, 17 J. BANKING & FIN.
1133, 1134 (1993) (providing a model of how shareholders select a capital structure and
investment policy in the face of underpriced debt); Sharpe, supra note 34, at 200 (dis-
cussing bank risk behavior).
38. See STAFF STUDY OF THE SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION,
REGULATION AND INSURANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., BRIEFING PAPER ON DEPOSIT INSURANCE: How IT
ORIGINATED AND How IT WORKS 78 (1990) [hereinafter STAFF STUDY].
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ed with abnormally high risk. 9 First, when the cost of funds is
substantially underpriced due to information deficits on debtholders'
part, risk-adjusted values may appear positive in the eyes of share-
holders and the board. Thus, as Decision D shows, if the company
can execute the irrational Decision C for a 5% cost of funds rather
than an 8.25% cost, the risk-adjusted value will jump to a positive
$325,000.
Second, if leveraging sufficiently increases, a negative risk-
adjusted value may appear positive to shareholders and the board
because the equity at risk is less." In Table 3, Decision E repli-
cates Decision C but increases the ratio of debt to total funds to
98 percent. When equity drops to only two percent of total fimanc-
ing, the risk-adjusted value changes from a negative number to a
positive $187,250, making Decision E rational to shareholders and
the board. That is true even though Decision E obviously presents
a negative risk-adjusted value to someone, because that someone
consists of debtholders (or, in the case of banks, uninsured deposi-
tors and the deposit insurance funds). Shareholders, nevertheless,
will view the expected return as positive; they can reap any gain
while shifting most of any losses to debtholders or deposit insurers.
This results directly from the principle of limited liability, which
caps shareholder losses at the amount of their investments, leaving
any further losses to be absorbed by debtholders and other credi-
tors.
41
39. See Ritchken et al., supra note 37, at 1134 n.2 (noting that projects with negative
net value may appear the most desirable when incentives become perverse). See also
BENSTON ET AL., supra note 24, at 19-20 (explaining that fear of bankruptcy or job loss
would encourage a bank manager to pursue higher risk strategies offering greater returns);
GATHERING CRIsIS, supra note 35, at 106-07 (describing circumstances where a high risk
venture is attractive to managers); Macey, supra note 19, at 182 n.32 (explaining that
managers may pursue projects with negative net present values if shareholders' equity
increased as a result); Maisel, supra note 36, at 59 (noting that the less adequate initial
capital is, the more an increase in risk will raise the bank's net worth).
40. See generally Green & Talmor, supra note 5, at 398 ("[Mlore debt aggravates
shareholders' incentives to take risk"); cf. Brudney, supra note 17, at 1858 ("In many
cases, debtors seek voluntary adjustment when bankruptcy is not imminent, but neither is
the economic recovery of the enterprise--the enterprise is in distress and its prospects
under its prevailing capital structure are not encouraging"); Triantis & Daniels, supra note
17, at 1111 ("While stakeholder interests in solvent firms normally coalesce around the
goal of controlling managerial slack, this convergence weakens as the financial condition
of the firm deteriorates.").
41. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fisehel, Limited Liability and the Corpora-
tion, 52 U. Ci. L. REV. 89, 103-04 (1985); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis
of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO U. 117, 126, 140-41 (1980)
(describing limited liability and moral hazard); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 1565, 1586 (1991) ("Limited liability does
not simply offset positive externalities, but rather encourages excessively risky activity.").
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TABLE 3
DECISION E - Near Insolvency
Expected Gross Profit 10% $ 2,000,000
Total Funds 20,000.000
Equity (2%) 400,000
Debt@ 8.25% 19,600,000
Cost of Funds @ 8.25% 1,617,000
Expected Net Profit 383.000
Expected Net Pate of Return on Equity 95.7%
Success Probability 0.75 287,250
Failure Probability 0.25 (100,000)
Risk-Adjusted Value 187,250
Risk-Adjusted Rate of Return on Equity 46.8%
The banking sector, of course, is the archetype of a highly
leveraged industry and is highly prone to the problems illustrated
by Decision E. In banking, shareholders' equity has historically
formed a far smaller percentage of total liabilities than in industrial
companies, with average book equity since 1960 hovering between
seven to eight percent.42 As a result, deposits, not equity, furnish
the predominant source of funds for bank loans and other invest-
ments. This high leveraging means that depositors (joined, since
42. While deposits are less than half of liabilities at certain major money-center banks,
average equity-debt ratios across the banking industry have remained much lower. See
Anthony Saunders & Berry Wilson, Bank Capital Structure: An Analysis of the Charter
Value Hypothesis 20-22, Figure 1 (N.Y.U. Salomon Center Working Paper S-94-14 1994)
(unpublished manuscript); see also FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, HISTORI-
CAL STATISTICS ON BANKING 1934-1991, at 102-05 (1993); HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY
BANK REGULATION FAILED 25-31, 45 (1991); BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, supra
note 35, at 56-58; PIERCE, supra note 33, at 76, 82 (placing stockholder equity at only
six percent of all bank funds); McDaniel, supra note 18, at 214 (explaining that the equi-
ty-debt ratio has steadily declined since the early 1900's); Merton, supra note 27, at 9-11
(discussing high debt-equity ratios of banks). Today, under the Basle Accord, U.S. banks
must have capital of at least eight percent of total risk-adjusted assets. See Hal S. Scott,
The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 885, 885-
86 (1995).
In contrast, in 1962, the ratio of debt to book equity in the non-financial services
sector averaged 58.2%. Subsequently, however, this gap began to close as debt-to-equity
ratios climbed in non-financial corporations generally in the United States. By 1984, the
average debt-to-equity ratio in non-financial companies had risen to 81.4%. See Coffee,
supra note 18, at 41-42 & Exhibit A (citing Federal Reserve Bank statistics). After 1984,
the Standard & Poor's Industrial Index continued to show a long-run rising trend. Average
debt-to-equity ratios for companies listed in the Standard & Poor's Industrial Index rose
from 42% in 1985 to 66% in 1994. See STANDARD & POOR'S ANALYSTS' HANDBOOK
220 (1995 Annual Edition); STANDARD & POOR'S ANALYSTS' HANDBOOK 192 (1989
Annual Edition); HOwARD M. BERLIN, THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKET INDEXES,
AVERAGES, AND INDICATORS 59 (1990) (noting that the Standard & Poor's Industrial
Index excludes financial companies, public utilities, and transportation companies).
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1933, by the federal deposit insurance funds) stand to absorb the
majority of any losses from bank asset activities. Thus, debt under-
pricing and leveraging perversely increase shareholders' and
directors' propensity to seek risk, at potential increased losses to
debtholders. When firmns suffer losses that result in reduced capital,
boards will have incentives to pursue increasingly risky strategies
because the equity at risk is closer to zero and the firm, will reap
higher profits and possibly escape insolvency if the risk pays
off.43 Furthermore, even" in profitable times, banks and other firms
have incentives to increase risks if they can finance those ventures
with artificially cheap funds."
To be sure, these effects can be partially offset by other mar-
ket forces. In banking, one such force consists of bank charters,
which have added value due to government rationing. Healthy
banks have countervailing incentives to avoid ruinous risks in order
to preserve the oligopolistic advantages of their charters and the
future business prospects that their charters represent.' When de-
regulation lowers entry barriers into the banking industry, however,
bank charters drop in value, reducing their effectiveness as market
constraints.' Charter values similarly drop when banks approach
insolvency, reducing the prospects for future business to zero.47
A second market constraint, as Dr. Anna J. Schwartz has
pointed out, consists of economic indicators that help reduce long-
term interest rate risk, primarily price stability and stable interest
rates. Banks make money by borrowing more cheaply than they
lend, which pressures them to pursue higher-risk investments if
43. See BENSTON ET AL., supra note 24, at 19-20; GATHERING CRISIS, supra note 35,
at 65, 103, 106-07; William K. Black et al., The Savings and Loan Debacle of the
1980s: White-Collar Crime or Risky Business?, 17 L. & POL'Y 23, 33-36 (1995) (describ-
ing the after-effects of some firms having taken extreme risks in the 1980's in pursuit of
large rewards); Stephen A. Buser et al., Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and
Optimal Bank Capital, 36 J. FIN. 51, 59 (1981) (same); Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and
Bank Financial Policy, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. 557, 561 (1984) (stating that a "go for
broke" strategy of exploiting FDIC insurance increases equity value for banks who have
suffered loan losses).
44. As Professor Reinier Kraakman has noted: "[S]hareholders can displace the expect-
ed costs of legally risky or proscribed conduct either by operating the firm with net as-
sets well below the level of its potential tort liabilities or by increasing the legal risk
assumed by the firm." Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs
of Legal Controls, 93 YALE LJ. 857, 869 (1984).
45. See ANLONG LI ET AL, REGULATORY TAXES, INVESTMENT, AND FINANCING DEcI-
SIONS FOR INSURED BANKS 2-3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland working Paper No.
9303, 1993) (describing the value, in terms of options and opportunities, of a charter to a
bank).
46. See Marcus, supra note 43, at 558 (stating that deregulation can reduce the
oligopolistic value of bank charters).
47. See Li Er AL., supra note 45, at 3; Marcus, supra note 43, at 557-58, 561 (ob-
serving that banks turn to high-volatility strategies as they approach insolvency and their
charter values decrease).
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interest on deposits rises. In the first two decades after World War
II, banks did not have to court risky assets to pay for deposits
because interest rates on deposits were statutorily capped and inter-
est rates in general stayed low. When interest rates shot up in the
1970's, however, market pressures caused Congress to abolish
interest caps, which in turn triggered a need for higher earnings,
causing bank risks to climb."
A further possible market constraint consists of managerial
fears of job loss if the firm goes under. Such fears vary, however,
according to individual managers' degrees of risk aversion.49 At
least in banking, as the 1980's showed, some managers were will-
ing to pursue high risks if the "potential rewards in the form of
growth and earnings" were sufficiently high." That proved partic-
ularly true when revenues from conservative investments were too
low to offset costs. In such straits, with possible insolvency and
job loss at hand, managers had every incentive to "go for broke"
and make reckless investments in a quest for higher gains."
In sum, the degree of asset substitution that the business judg-
ment rule permits fluctuates widely according to the efficacy of the
market constraints at work. Nonetheless, in its classic form, the
business judgment rule does not discriminate among widely dispa-
rate industry and economic conditions. To the contrary, the rule is
thoroughly indifferent to increased levels of asset substitution,
except, in theory, for economically irrational decisions. To put it
differently, under the pure form of the business judgment rule,
debtholders' interests do not count. That is so even though the rule
not only tolerates but accelerates shareholder incentives toward
wealth expropriation.
48. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 40-41. See also infra notes 146-47 and accompa-
nying text.
49. See GATHERING CRISIS, supra note 35, at 113; see also Brudney, supra note 17, at
1837 n.48 (discussing managerial risk aversion).
50. Robert E. Barnett et a]., Deposit Insurance: The Present System and Some Alterna-
tives, 94 BANKING LJ. 304, 321 (1977); see also BENsTON ET AL., supra note 24, at 85-
86 (suggesting that bankers have a greater propensity to pursue highly risky ventures
because their cost of funds is subsidized).
51. BENSTON Er AL., supra note 24, at 19-20; see also GATHERING CRISIS, supra note
35, at 113; STAFF STUDY, supra note 38, at 76-77. One set of commentators noted the
psychological dimensions of this problem:
Furthermore, might not bankers in such a situation convince themselves and
their boards of directors that the possible negative outcome [of a risky decision]
is very unlikely to occur? In addition, the banker has a moral and probably a
legal responsibility to take actions that benefit the owners. Refusal to take a
risky investment that has a positive present value could be interpreted as an
evasion of this responsibility.
BENSTON Er AL., supra, at 20.
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Given the extreme tilt toward asset substitution in the banking
industry and the periodic paucity of market constraints, one might
expect to see the business judgment rule curtailed in favor of legal
relief for depositors. 2 In fact, that has been the case. Episodically,
American courts have sought to redress the problems that informa-
tion asymmetries and leveraging create in banking by scaling back
the business judgment rule in favor of depositor relief. Moreover,
as the history of this case law shows, the banking cases cannot
simply be dismissed as a quirk of federal deposit insurance, be-
cause some of the most important cases predate federal deposit
insurance by decades. To the contrary, and in their own crude way,
the banking cases seek to address the same asset substitution prob-
lems that all debtholders face.
1I. THE HISTORICAL RECORD
At its inception in the nineteenth century, American bank
director liability law resulted in the same outcomes that one would
expect under the classic economic model of the business judgment
rule. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, however, the bank-
ing cases struck out on a divergent path. As shareholder wealth
expropriation from depositors took its toll, courts began to respond
by curtailing the business judgment rule in banking in various
ways. In doing so, the class of interests that courts protected grad-
ually widened to include depositors' interests (joined, after 1933,
by those of the deposit insurance funds).
A. The Nineteenth Century: Potential Profit Maximization
American bank director law was not always protective of
depositors. When the first reported bank director liability cases
appeared in the nineteenth century, 3 courts protected board auton-
omy and potential profit maximization, irrespective of risk. The
outcomes in those cases were quite like the outcomes that one
finds in general corporate law today. What makes the early bank-
ing cases intriguing is that the old cases today are largely relics.
52. Judge Richard Posner has argued that similar circumstances might justify regulation
of some kind:
Oddly, perhaps, the argument for direct regulation comes back into play when
the injury is not very small but very large. An injurer may not have the re-
sources to pay a very large damages judgment; and if not, his incentive to
comply with the law will be reduced-in effect he is able to shift from himself
to the victim the difference between the victim's actual cost and the maximum
collectable judgment.
RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 344 (3d ed. 1986).
53. Some of the earliest cases in that regard were Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.)
68 (La. 1829), and Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
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Over time, the judiciary responded to the asset substitution incen-
tives that the early cases spawned by curbing the business judg-
ment rule in banking.
Why did courts curtail the rule in banking to a greater degree
than in other industries? Is modem banking law solely motivated
by a narrow impulse to protect the federal deposit insurance funds,
as some scholars have assumed, or do these cases constitute a
broader judicial response to the same asset substitution that all
debtholders face? And if the latter is the answer, why give prefer-
ential treatment to depositors over bondholders? To answer those
questions, it is necessary to examine the origins of American bank
director liability law.
The early nineteenth-century bank director cases reflected a
theory of the firm and of directorial powers in which the principal
interests served were those of shareholders and directors, to the
exclusion of the interests of depositors. Nineteenth-century bank
director liability law proceeded from the premise that shareholders
invest capital in a bank with the implicit expectation of maximized
profits. This premise gave rise to three allied propositions. First, it
was assumed that shareholders either constituted the board or
delegated authority to the board to make profit-maximizing deci-
sions. Second, courts assumed that shareholders expected directors
to take the necessary risks to achieve such profits. Finally, because
shareholders stood to gain from any profits, courts concluded that
shareholders bore the corresponding risk of loss."4
This conception of shareholders' interests militated in favor of
broad board discretion, largely free from judicial supervision. When
shareholder and director interests clashed, nineteenth-century courts
almost always subordinated shareholder claims to board autonomy.
The upshot was that courts from that era rewarded, rather than
penalized, risk. Nineteenth-century courts, for example, refused to
hold directors of state-chartered institutions liable for
overconcentrations of credit to single borrowers 5 Early decisions
54. See Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 21-24 (holding directors not liable for any losses
outside of those arising from fraud or violations of charter); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, EN-
TERPRISE AND AhERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 59-61 (1991) (describing these premises in
terms of the development of contractual rights and obligations between investors and
directors of firms). For modem statements of these rationales, see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (setting forth rationales
for the business judgment rule); Dooley, supra note 16, at 466-71 (discussing theory of
shareholder delegation to board of directors); Duty of Care, supra note 24, at 344-45
(explaining how the business judgment rule can advance profit maximization); Palmiter,
supra note 4, at 1371-72 (describing the rights, expectations, and responsibilities assumed
by managers and investors when they contract with each other).
55. Compare Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 783
(C.C.D.S.C. 1896) (absolving bank directors in a shareholder suit even while criticizing
their decision to loan one-third of the bank's capital to a prominent local merchant as
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also showed lenience toward numerous practices treated harshly
today, including worthless junior liens, 6 loose appraisal practic-
es, 7  disregard of internal loan procedures, 8 and additional loans
to delinquent borrowers. Taken together, the nineteenth-century
cases displayed an appetite for bank risk that is virtually shocking
by modem mores.
The ethos of potential profit maximization at any risk level
was also evident in the numerous nineteenth century cases that
denied injured depositors the standing necessary to sue bank direc-
tors for negligent mismanagement.' The depositor standing cases
proceeded from the premise that the sole contractual relationship
depositors had was with their banks and not with the
banks' boards of directors. The necessary consequence, in the eyes
of many courts, was that depositors lacked privity of con-
"unwise and hazardous") with 12 U.S.C. § 1464(u) (Supp. 1994) (limiting loans to one
borrower); 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(i), n.2 (1995) (allowing lower state limits on loans to one
borrower to preempt federal limit if state limit is lower); id., pt. 215, subpt. A, app. (lim-
iting total loans and extensions of credit); id., § 563.93 (defining lending limitations on
savings associations); 59 Fed. Reg. 58146 (1994) (describing regulations for loans to one
borrower); 58 Fed. Reg. 64460 (1993) (containing original regulations for loans to one
borrower); Bailey v. O'Neal, 122 S.W. 503, 505 (Ark. 1909) (affirming directed verdict
for plaintiff bank depositors after bank loaned nearly half of its assets to a local lumber
company).
56. Compare Citizens Building, Loan & Say. Ass'n v. Coriell, 34 NJ. Eq. 383, 384-
88, 390-93 (Ch. 1881) (holding bank directors not negligent for insufficient junior mort-
gages) with FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1292-93, 1296-98, 1313-14 (N.D. Ind.
1991), aff d sub nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding the making
of junior liens negligent).
57. Compare Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 832 (NJ. Ch. 1889) (refusing to impose
liability for appraisal methods) with Alliance Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB,
782 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir.), modified, per curiam, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirm-
ing an agency order putting a thrift institution into receivership due in part to poorly
documented appraisals of collateral); RTC v. Rahm, 854 F. Supp. 480, 490 (W.D. Mich.
1994) (condemning inflated appraisals as negligent).
58. Compare Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 787, 789
(C.C.D.S.C. 1896) (finding no negligence for disregarding ban on loans to shareholders
who had not paid their subscriptions) with FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 129 & n.1l
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding bank director who approved a loan in violation of internal loan
procedures negligent).
59. Compare Wheeler, 75 F. at 784 (exonerating bank officers who advanced additional
funds to delinquent borrower) with Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 660
(Mass. 1935) (holding advances to delinquent borrowers negligent).
60. See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 49 S.W. 1012 (Mo. 1899); Hart v. Evanson,
105 N.W. 942 (N.D. 1895); Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405, 414-15 (Pa. 1892);
Deadrick v. Bank of Commerce, 45 S.W. 786 (Tenn. 1898); Zinn v. Mendel, 9 W. Va.
580 (1876).
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tract with, and thus standing to sue, bank directors. 6 The deposi-
tor standing doctrine neatly aligned with the view that the duty of
care only served the interests of shareholders.
The bar against depositor negligence suits was highly signifi-
cant because it assured that potential profit maximization would not
be eclipsed by the risk avoidance that many depositors undoubtedly
would have preferred. Thus, early bank failure cases accepted
shareholder wealth expropriation from depositors, in the form of
asset substitution and otherwise, as the price of potential profit
maximization.'
Similarly, the rare exceptions to leniency corroborated the
overarching goal of potential profit maximization. Those exceptions
make clear that courts normally deemed shareholder interests and
board autonomy as pre-eminent. They equated those interests with
potential profit maximization in the absence of contractual restric-
tions, and intervened only when necessary to protect those interests.
The upshot was that early bank director liability cases gave asset
substitution free rein to the detriment of depositors.
61. See Union Nat'l Bank, 49 S.W. at 1016 (holding that no privity of contract existed
between creditors and directors); Hart, 105 N.W. at 943 (same); Deadrick, 45 S.W. at
788; see also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) (holding that the relationship
between the corporation and creditors "is that of contract and not of trust").
62. The harshness of this result was tempered in part by "double liability" provisions
in state and federal statutes, state constitutions, and bank charters making bank sharehold-
ers liable to creditors for an assessment up to the amount of the par value of their stock
in the event of insolvency. See, e.g., National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665;
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History
and Implications, 27 WAKE FORES L. REV. 31, 31 & n.1, 35-37 (1992) (describing the
rise and fall of the double liability concept in the early 1900's). Beginning in the Great
Depression, double liability provisions were repealed to make it easier for banks to raise
equity financing. See 12 U.S.C. § 64a (1993); Act of September 8, 1959, Pub. L. 86-230,
§ 7, 73 Stat. 457; Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 304, 49 Stat. 684, 708 (repealed
1959); Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 22, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (repealed 1959); Macey &
Miller, supra, at 38-39 (discussing the factors contributing to the decision to repeal double
liability laws); John R. Vincens, On the Demise of Double Liability for Bank Sharehold-
ers, 12 Bus. LAW. 275, 276-78 (1957) (describing the movement away from double liabil-
ity provisions).
Double liability provisions may partly explain the judiciary's hands-off attitude during
this early period. However, those provisions do not explain that lenience in full. For one
thing, many states delayed adopting double liability and some states never adopted it at
all. See Macey & Miller, supra, at 36-37. Furthermore, in those states that did adopt
double liability, such provisions did not purport to afford full compensation to depositors
for their losses and did not, in fact, shift anywhere near the full cost of asset substitution
from depositors and other creditors onto shareholders. See id. at 57 (between 1865 and
1934, shareholder recoveries compensated 28.3% of national bank creditors' losses). Even
when double liability clauses are taken into account, then, the directorial case law of this
period still displayed a decided appetite for risk.
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1. Corporate Charters and By-Laws
The principal situation in which nineteenth-century courts
countermanded bank board decisions on the merits involved viola-
tions of corporate charters and by-laws. 3 Conversely, bank direc-
tors normally could expect to be exonerated where charters or by-
laws permitted the disputed decision, either expressly or by infer-
ence.
64
As these holdings show, where fundamental corporate docu-
ments did not explicitly define shareholders' interests, nineteenth-
century courts equated those interests with potential profit maximi-
zation and gave directors virtually limitless discretion to take risks
commensurate with high profits. Where, however, shareholders
explicitly modified those interests by imposing restrictions on prof-
it-seeking conduct through corporate charters and by-laws, courts
enforced those restrictions. Indeed, during this early period, when
the duty of care largely consisted of observance of corporate char-
ters and by-laws, there was no business judgment rule because
there was no need for it. Any disinterested decision that was not
barred by charter, by-law, or statute satisfied the duty of care.
2. Statutory Restrictions
In theory, statutory prohibitions formed a second legal con-
straint on bank director conduct in the nineteenth century. Before
1875, most state-chartered banks were organized under special
chartering statutes that mandated substantive charter restrictions.
However, this constraint was relatively weak, at least for purposes
of asset substitution concerns, because few state codes mandated
63. See Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 825, 829-30 (NJ. Ch. 1889) (imposing bank
director liability for a second mortgage that violated bank charter restrictions on loan
collateral); Citizens Building, Loan & Say. Ass'n v. Coriell, 34 NJ. Eq. 383, 397 (Ch.
1881) (holding bank directors liable for approving a loan in violation of a by-law restrict-
ing loans secured by stock). See also infra notes 65, 94-95 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing statutorily-mandated bank charter provisions).
64. See Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 454 (Tenn. 1891) (interest-free
check overdrafts were not negligent "in the absence of a by-law or order of a superior
officer"); Coriell, 34 NJ. Eq. at 397 (absolving bank directors for loans in arrears be-
cause the loans were not "in contravention of any express provision of the constitution
[notwithstanding the board's] error of judgment!'); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 20, 24
(1872) (dismissing suit against bank directors for inadequately secured loans where counsel
had advised them that the loans were permitted by the charter); Percy v. Millaudon, 8
Mart. (n.s.) 68, 75-76 (La. 1829) (stating that directors should not be held responsible for
events occurring outside the realm of prudent care, for such care is not mandated by their
banks' charters). This line of cases persisted until the Great Depression. See Castetter v.
Barnard, 183 N.E. 681, 686 (Ind. App. 1932) (absolving bank cashier for failure to collect
loan because he did not "violate] any by-law, direction, or resolution of the board of
directors"); Ford v. Taylor, 4 S.W.2d 938, 938-42 (Ark. 1928) (holding directors solely
liable for loans made in violation of board resolution).
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charter provisions on asset-side activities (such as lending) or oth-
erwise regulated those activities before 1900. Instead, state banking
codes principally dealt with entry barriers, minimum capital, report-
ing requirements, government bank examinations, and state precur-
sors to deposit insurance.' Statutory constraints thus had little
65. See generally GEORGE H. EVANS, JR., BUSINESS INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1800-1943, at 10, 24-26 (1948) (describing charters, including bank charters,
granted during the 1800's); GERALD C. FISCHER, AMERICAN BANKING STRUCTURE 179,
184 (1968) [hereinafter AMERJCAN BANKING STRUCTURE] (describing bank regulations and
charters with respect to American banks during the 19th century); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 180 (2d ed. 1985) (same); JAMS W. GILBART, THE
HISTORY OF BANKING IN AMERICA 58-59, 101-02 (Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1837)
(describing bank charters in New York during the 18th and 19th centuries); JAMES
GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND-BORROWING AND LENDING IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL
WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN 136-37 (1992) (describing New York reformers' preference for
deposit insurance over loan underwriting standards); BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND PoL-
TICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL VAR 695-96, 715-17 (1957) (de-
scribing state-mandated minimum capital requirements for banks in the 1800's); NOBLE F.
HOGGSON, EPOCHS IN AMERICAN BANKING 94, 97 (1929) (describing Massachusetts' bank
report requirements and New York's minimum capital requirements); JAMES W. HURST,
THE LEGmIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1780-1970, at 39 (1970) (listing mandatory provisions enacted by state legislatures for
inclusion in state bank charters); BENJAMIN J. KLEBANER, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANK-
NG-A HISTORY 43-46, 99-101 (1990) (describing New England charters, regulating re-
serve requirements and governmental supervision and inspectors); I FRITz REDLICH, THE
MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING-MEN AND IDEAS 92, 94-95, 199, 201-04 (Johnson
Reprint Corp. 1968) (1951) (describing bank examinations and free banking acts); II Ftrrz
REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING--MEN AND IDEAS 2, 32-40 (recounting
the history and effects of the Louisiana Banking Act of 1842); PAUL B. TRESCoTr, FI-
NANCING AMERICAN ENTERPRIsE-THE STORY OF COMMERCIAL BANKING 29-30, 91-92
(1963) (addressing bank examinations and the lack of lending requirements in the early
1800's); EUGENE NELSON WHITE, THE REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN
BANKING SYSTEM, 1900-1929, at 23-25, 34-35 (1983) [hereinafter REGULATION AND RE-
FORM] (detailing the effects of charter provisions enacted regarding banks); Allen D.
Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and Institutional Investment: Some Les-
sons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 1016-17 (1993) (stating
that the statutes had "protected directors from liability for minor infringements on special
charters"); Richard S. Grossman, Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the
Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930's, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 800, 804 (1992) (describ-
ing the slow introduction of asset regulation to the thrift industry). Only a few states had
statutes governing loans to single borrowers or placing any restrictions on real estate
loans. See Trescott, supra, at 29-30; Kenneth E. Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and
Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 687, 707-08 (1980) (noting that
state loan-to-one-borrower rules date back to the early nineteenth century). Gerald C.
Fischer noted in this regard:
[A]s the number of state banks began to increase in the 1870s and 1880s, their
operations were inhibited by out-of-date laws in some states and in others they
were subjected to virtually no regulation whatsoever. If the state authorities had
a "chartering philosophy" in this period it is almost impossible to describe
except to note that in present-day terms it would appear to have been extreme-
ly liberal.
AMERICAN BANKING STRUCrURE, supra, at 180.
Double liability provisions constituted an important exception to the general pattern
of lenience. The effectiveness of those provisions for purposes of compensation and deter-
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effect on asset decisions at state-chartered banks.
The situation was notably different for national banks, which
operated under statutory strictures as to loans to one borrower, real
estate lending and securities underwriting.' National Banking Act
violations accounted for most of the early reported cases involving
bank violations of statutory asset limitations.67 As a consequence,
with state-law constraints during this period noticeably weak or
absent, state-chartered banks gained a valuable competitive edge
vis-A-vis their national bank counterparts which labored under the
restrictions of the National Banking Act.6"
3. Prohibitions Against Fraud and Self-Dealing
The third nineteenth-century constraint on bank director con-
duct consisted of bans on bank director fraud69 and, eventually,
rence, however, remains a matter of debate, given their equivocal recovery experience. See
supra note 62.
66. Federal limits on loans to one borrower date back to 1863, when Congress barred
national banks in the Currency Act from lending more than 10% of their unimpaired
capital and surplus to a single borrower. Act of February 25, 1863, 12 Stat. 665 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1989)).
Similarly, the National Banking Act placed significant limitations on real estate loans.
Before 1900, loans secured by real estate were forbidden to national banks in New York,
Chicago, and St. Louis and permitted elsewhere only up to 25% of bank capital. Where
real estate loans were permitted, they were subject to statutory loan-to-value requirements
as low as 50%. See 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (Supp. 1994) (authorizing Comptroller to regulate
real estate loans by national banks); id., Historical and Statutory Notes (West 1989) (dis-
cussing amendments to statutorily-mandated loan to value ratios); REGULATION AND RE-
FoRM, supra note 65, at 23. Due to these restrictions, state banks had "a virtually open
field to make loans on security of real estate." Id. See also Trescott, supra note 65, at
91-92 (describing the surge in business for state banks due to the limitations imposed on
national banks).
The National Banking Act likewise was construed to bar securities underwriting. In
1897 the Supreme Court ruled that the National Banking Act barred national banks from
owning stock and, thus, barred banks from firm-commitment securities underwriting (al-
though national banks could conduct underwriting activities through their securities affili-
ates). California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 366-67 (1897) (construing the National
Banking Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 101 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1989)). See also
II MIcHAEL P. MALLoY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION at 7.13-7.15 (1994) (discussing
securities dealings by wholly-owned subsidiaries of national banks).
67. See, e.g., Yates v. Jones Nat'l Bank, 206 U.S. 158 (1907) (lending limits); Thomp-
son v. Sioux Falls Nat'l Bank, 150 U.S. 231 (1893) (same); Movius v. Lee, 30 F. 298
(C.C.N.Y. 1887), affd, 141 U.S. 132 (1891) (same). Two rare instances of state-law statu-
tory claims were Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 89 N.E. 476, 478-79, 483 (1909)
(invalidating bank contract because directors had violated statutory procedural requirements
for board approval) and Gilson v. Cambridge Sav. Bank, 62 N.E. 728, 728-29 (1902)
(same).
68. See II Redlich, supra note 65, at 124 (discussing the advantage that state banks
achieved over national banks as a result of the Act's restrictions on real estate loans and
minimum capital requirements); McCoy, supra note 2, at 1041-42, 1048-50, 1053.
69. See Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 785 (C.C.D.S.C.
1896) (stating that "in every case where such directors have been held to account, they
have been [somehow] guilty of some fraud"); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 20, 24 (1872)
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conflicts of interest.70 These constraints were adopted to prevent
directors from defeating shareholder expectations that their capital
would be put to profitable ends.
Up through the 1930's, however, some courts diluted these
constraints by refusing to hold directors liable where self-interested
decisions had profitable outcomes or even profitable prospects. 1
Thus, even with the heightened risks of self-dealing, some older
American banking decisions resolved self-dealing claims in favor of
potential profit maximization.
Those self-dealing cases epitomize the extreme laissez-faire
attitude toward asset substitution by shareholders and their boards
that permeated the early stages of American bank director liability
law. During most of the nineteenth century, potential profit maxi-
mization, not loss avoidance, was the prevailing norm. The vast
majority of courts during that period refused to interfere with lend-
ing decisions, even when such decisions were reckless and likely to
result in losses. Some courts went so far as to permit conflicts of
interest where a possible profit was to be had.
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, however, the
judiciary's blind eye to heedlessly risky bank practices helped
trigger a destabilizing series of bank failures and bank panics.
Although laissez-faire sentiment largely continued to prevail, there
were early signs by the mid-1880's, as recurrent bank panics took
(holding bank directors responsible for losses arising from fraud for their own benefit).
See also II Redlich, supra note 65, at 12 (referring to a Pennsylvania law that held bank
directors liable for "fraudulent insolvency").
70. See Wheeler, 75 F. at 785, 787; Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 450
(Tenn. 1891); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 20, 24. Self-dealing always has been a
heightened concern in bank director liability law due to the common practice of recruiting
bank directors from major borrowers and prominent businessmen. Cf I Redlich, supra
note 65, at 56, 252-53 nn.100-116 (noting that "[tihe ideal bank director [in the early
nineteenth century] seems to have been rather rare; and, as might be expected, those who
were anxious to become bank directors were impelled by the desire for capital, or profit
or prestige, or all of these") (footnotes omitted).
71. See, e.g., Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 99-101
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term 1934) (holding that business judgment rule protected loans to
bank officers and employees to purchase securities from the bank's securities affiliate,
even if the loans were "unwise and hazardous," where the purpose of the loans was to
maintain continued efficiency of the bank's personnel); Castetter v. Barnard, 183 N.E.
681, 683, 686 (Ind. App. 1932) (cashier not liable for making a bank loan to his father
that was designed to conceal his embezzlement because the loans appeared collectible
when made); Scott's Executors v. Young, 21 S.W.2d 994, 999 (Ky. 1929) (affirming
dismissal of claim against bank directors for approving unsecured loans to bank cashier
who later turned out to be an embezzler); Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 217 Ky. 471, 290
S.W. 346, 346-47 (1926) (reversing judgment against bank director who had recommended
an uncollectible loan to a manufacturer for whom he served as a director based on a
business judgment rule defense); Pocomoke City Nat'l Bank v. Crockett, 125 A. 712,
713-16 (Md. 1924) (affirming judgment for bank directors sued for lending nearly half of
a bank's assets to the bank's vice president); Wheeler, 75 F. at 781-83 (exonerating bank
directors for loaning over one-third of the bank's capital to a fellow director).
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their toll, that the judiciary's tolerance for shareholder wealth ex-
propriation from depositors was beginning to wane.
B. The Laissez-Faire Approach in Decline
By 1891, the United States had experienced no fewer than
twelve bank panics, with another panic in the wings.72 Triggered
by rumors that bank failures were imminent, depositors rushed in
an exodus to convert their deposits into currency, causing the mon-
ey supply (and consequently bank credit) to contract. As successive
waves of panic pounded the country, some courts began to second-
guess the extreme risks taken by banks and to adopt stricter legal
protections for depositors.
1. The Savings Bank Cases
The first bank director liability decisions to disavow potential
profit maximization in favor of depositor protection were cases
involving savings banks. Savings banks first appeared in America
in the early 1800's and started as philanthropic institutions de-
signed to encourage industry and thrift among the working class.73
To that end, savings banks were nominally prohibited from profit-
seeking and speculation. Instead, their only permissible role was to
"take the deposits, usually small, which are offered, aggregate
them, and keep and invest them safely, paying such interest to the
depositors as is thus made, after deducting expenses, and paying
the principal upon demand."74  To minimize investment
risks,
72. See NICHOLAS A. LASH, BANKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS: AN ECONOMIC PER-
sPECrlvE 8 (1987) (describing the bank panic of 1893); AMERIcAN BANKING STRUCTURE,
supra note 63, at 186 (same); Charles W. Calomiris, Regulation, Industrial Structure, and
Instability in U.S. Banking: A Historical Perspective, in STRUCTtRAL CHANGE IN BANK-
ING 19, 22, 26-29 (Michael Klausner et al. eds., 1993); Schwartz, supra note 33, at 38-
39, Table 2-1 (listing the years that the United States experienced bank panics).
73. See People v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 305 N.Y. 453, 461 (1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 347 U.S. 373 (1954); People v. Ulster County Sav. Inst., 20 N.Y.S. 148, 151
(Sup. Ct. Spec. Term Ulster Co. 1892) (describing savings banks as noncommercial enter-
prises intended to serve members of the community); In re Wilkins, 131 Misc. 188, 193
(1928) (differentiating between commercial and savings banks). See generally I Redlich,
supra note 65, at 209-30.
74. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 78 (1880). See also People v. Binghamton Trust Co.,
139 N.Y. 185, 192 (1893) (stating that the purpose of savings banks is to make safe
investments and secure a moderate return); Ulster County Say. Inst., 20 N.Y.S. at 150
(noting that savings banks are not profit-oriented, while commercial banks are); People v.
Franklin Nat'l Bank, 200 Misc. 557, 566-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951), rev'd on other
grounds, 118 N.Y.S. 2d 210 (1953) (describing the purpose of savings banks); Suzanne
Cutler, History, Character and Recent Difficulties of Mutual Savings Banks, in FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK ET AL., PUBUC POLICY TOWARD MUTUAL SAVINGS
BANKS IN NEW YORK STATE: PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 33, 35 (1974); see generally
ALAN L. OLMSTEAD, NEW YORK CITY MUrUAL SAVINGS BANKS, 1819-1861, at 6-19
(1986).
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savings banks were only permitted to invest in vehicles that were
permitted by law."
In some states, most notably New York, these origins dictated
a philanthropic form of governance for savings banks. Unlike com-
mercial banks, New York savings banks did not have shareholders
or boards of directors. Instead, their governance was entrusted to
trustees who owed fiduciary duties to the depositors.76 The
trustees' overriding purpose was "the protection of depositors
against the loss of hard-earned savings."' "[Tlheir principal meth-
od[s] of accomplishing that purpose [were] caution and conserva-
tism in investments." ' Moreover, New York required a mutual
form of ownership which meant that no independent equity was
available to absorb any losses. "No capital, as in the case of a
bank of deposit and discount, stands between the depositors and
loss. The loss must fall directly upon the deposits, or upon the
earnings of those deposits, to which the depositors are entitled."79
Thus, savings banks were the one species of nineteenth-centu-
ry banks in which depositors' interests were not only legally cogni-
zable, but paramount. The rhetoric of those cases makes clear that
the operative legal principle was loss avoidance, not potential profit
maximization, in claims against trustees or directors of such banks.
In Marshall v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank," for exam-
ple, the court explicitly stated: "The directors of a bank are not
trustees for the stockholders alone, but they owe an even earlier
duty to the depositors."t That duty, courts stressed, inhered in the
fact that depositors entrusted their funds to the bank for safekeep-
ing:
These defendants voluntarily took the position of trustees of
the bank. They invited depositors to confide to them their
savings, and to intrust the safe-keeping and management of
them to their skill and prudence. 2
75. See Binghamton Trust Co., 139 N.Y. at 192; Franklin Nat'l Bank, 200 Misc. at
567 (discussing state-imposed restrictions on investments by savings banks); In re Wilkins,
131 Misc. at 193 (same); cf. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OwNERs: THE
POLITICAL RoOTs OF A/mEICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 56 & n.8 (1994) (Massachusetts
prohibited its savings banks from out-of-state lending).
76. See Ulster County Say. Inst., 20 N.Y.S. at 150; Cutler, supra note 74, at 35.
77. Cutler, supra note 74, at 35.
78. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 305 N.Y. at 461.
79. Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 837 (NJ. Ch. 1889).
80. 8 S.E. 586 (Va. 1889).
81. Id., at 590 (emphasis added); see also id. at 591 ("The question arises in this case
as between the directors and depositors, and not between the directors and the stockhold-
ers... "); Gilson v. Cambridge Savings Bank, 62 N.E. 728, 728 (Mass. 1902)
("[S]avings banks [are] intended to protect the interests of depositors...
82. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 74 (1880).
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Courts showed a distinctly populist solicitude toward savings bank
depositors, because they generally were individuals of modest
means:
Each of these [director] defendants was so associated with
wage-workers that his connection with the bank tended to
induce the confidence of those people in that institution.
Mr. Sweeney superintended five or six hundred freight
handlers; Dr. O'Callaghan had a large practice among the
very people who became depositors in this bank; and Kel-
ly, Murphy, and Meehan were employers of numerous
workingmen. They each undertook to care for the deposits
of these poor people .... "
That solicitude had several objectives, all of which centered on
depositors. Some cases voiced the sentiment that working men and
women needed to be instilled with the virtues of frugality and hard
work.84 Other passages emphasized the catastrophic personal na-
ture of losses to working-class victims." One case stressed the
importance of public trust in banks, and thus implicitly in bank
system liquidity.86
The solicitude toward depositors in the early savings bank
cases was evident not only from their rhetoric but also from their
outcomes. Hun v. Cary,87 for example, which excoriated bank
trustees for building an expensive new building, involved a savings
bank.8 The same is true of Jemison v. Citizens' Savings Bank,89
which banned savings banks from dealing in securities. Marshall v.
Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank'° penalized extensions of
non-performing loans, and Gilson v. Cambridge Savings Bank'
held that loans ridden with procedural irregularities were ultra
vires.
83. Williams, 18 A. at 836 (emphasis added).
84. See Jemison v. Citizens' Savings Bank, 25 N.E. 264, 265 (N.Y. 1890) ("Savings
banks are designed to encourage economy and frugality among persons of small means..
• ."); see also Williams, 18 A. at 837 (stating that a savings bank's failure to invest
properly discourages the frugality of depositors).
85. See Williams, 18 A. at 837 ("The failure of a bank of this character entails suffer-
ing"); Jemison, 25 N.E. at 265 (savings banks "are organized with restrictions and provi-
sions intended to secure depositors against loss").
86. See Williams, 18 A. at 837 (the failure of a savings bank "produces distrust").
87. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
88. Id. For discussions of Hun's significance as one of the earliest minimum rationality
cases, see Dooley, supra note 16, at 480 n.60; Dyson, supra note 4, at 370; McCoy,
supra note 2, at 1037, 1039-40, 1058 & n.115.
89. 25 N.E. 264 (N.Y. 1890).
90. 8 S.E. 586, 591-92 (Va. 1889).
91. 62 N.E. 728 (Mass. 1902).
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Similarly, some of the savings bank cases were brought by
plaintiffs who were uniquely aligned with depositors' interests. In
Marshall v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, for example,
the plaintiffs were the failed bank's creditors.' In Hun v. Cary,
the plaintiff was the bank's receiver.93 To be sure, both suits were
filed after insolvency, when creditors' interests traditionally have
received priority. Nevertheless, these cases were significant because
they set restrictive standards that applied to savings bank directors
across the board, regardless of whether their institutions were in
good financial health or approaching insolvency. These cases were
the earliest examples where depositor's representatives were permit-
ted to regulate bank affairs prospectively, as it were, from the
grave.
The savings bank cases are important in two significant re-
spects. By conferring creditor standing, and by favoring loss avoid-
ance at the expense of board discretion, they were the first deci-
sions to clothe depositor concerns over asset substitution with le-
gally protected status through tort law. Moreover, they embraced
this result nearly a half century before federal deposit insurance
was instituted in 1933. Thus, far from being limited to protection
of the federal fisc, the earliest restrictive banking cases sought to
redress direct harm to individual depositors through asset substitu-
tion.
Why such solicitude for depositors, when corporate bondholders
received none? As a legal matter, this doctrinal departure was
possible because the avoidance of losses was legally paramount in
savings banks. More importantly, the departure was hastened by the
fact that the injured debtholders were working-class men and wom-
en who had parted with their savings solely on guarantees of a full
return. Thus, the early savings bank cases had a distinctly populist
cast not found in bondholder law at large.
The savings bank cases gave debtholder-depositors a human
face, revealing a sensitivity to the human harm caused by asset
substitution that is atypical of general corporate law as a whole. In
the century to come, this solicitude for depositors would not only
characterize the narrow sector of savings banks, but would also
come to characterize the banking sector as a whole.
92. 8 S.E. at 586.
93. 82 N.Y. at 70. See also Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824 (NJ. Ch. 1889), where a
bank receiver successfully sued a savings bank's former directors for charter violations.
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2. The Diminished Policing Power of Charters
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, changes in
state bank chartering practices also may have fueled the impetus
for tighter bank director liability standards. It is questionable
whether corporate charters and by-laws were effective constraints
on undue risk-taking at all, particularly because they rarely con-
strained asset activities directly. However, to the extent that char-
ters and by-laws did constrain asset risk indirectly, they had their
greatest force before 1875, when special chartering statutes required
the inclusion of clauses on subjects such as minimum paid-in capi-
tal, reserves, and reporting and examination requirements.94 But by
the latter half of the 1800's, charters and by-laws began to wane
as a policing force. During that period, banks convinced state legis-
latures to scrap special chartering laws for general incorporation
statutes that permitted banks to engage in all activities not other-
wise barred by law. That transition was substantially completed by
1900 and spelled the death knell for corporate instruments as effec-
tive legal constraints on bank board conduct.'
Thus, with the rise of general incorporation statutes and the
relative rarity of reported cases imposing liability for violations of
bank charters and by-laws, some courts began to conclude that
corporate governance instruments were not a convenient or effec-
tive rein on behavior." Beginning in the 1890's, courts stepped
into the breach, substituting common-law tort standards for bank
charters and by-laws as the most important basis of bank director
liability.
94. See Hurst, supra note 65, at 39; see also Evans, supra note 65, at 10, 24-26;
Klebaner, supra note 65, at 43; Boyer, supra note 65, at 1016-17 (stating that peculiar
corporations were the subject of detailed regulation). Few of those statutes restricted bank
asset activities, however. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
95. See AMERICAN BANKING STRUCTURE, supra note 65, at 180 (describing the evolu-
tion of state bank chartering); Hovenkamp, supra note 54, at 59-60 (describing the decline
of the special charter as a legal restraint on corporate officers' conduct); Hurst, supra note
65, at 69-73, 135, 138; I Redlich, supra note 65, at 187-204; Trescott, supra note 65, at
30-31. Cf. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The
removal by the leading industrial States of the limitations upon the size and powers of
business corporations appears to have been due, not to their conviction that maintenance
of the restrictions was undesirable in itself, but to the conviction that it was futile to
insist upon them.").
96. See Friedman, supra note 65, at 180. See also Hurst, supra note 65, at 39-40, 46;
Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54
U. Cm. L. REv. 1441, 1455 (1987).
One recent case has gone so far as to assert that "the business judgment rule will
protect a director even if the acts are ultra vires." FDIC v. Benson, 867 F. Supp. 512,
522 (S.D. Tex. 1994). As a proposition of law, however, that is plainly wrong: obser-
vance of corporate charters and by-laws always has been a prerequisite of the business
judgment rule, however peripheral that prerequisite is as a practical matter today.
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C. From Charter to a Common-Law Duty of Care
The late nineteenth century marked a significant shift in the
doctrinal bases of bank director liability that paved the way for
greater judicial intervention in bank board affairs. The 1880's sav-
ings bank cases had opened the breach by charging trustees and
directors with a tort duty of care, over and above their duties un-
der statutes, charters, and by-laws. Not long after, in 1891, the
U.S. Supreme Court extended the tort-based approach to directors
of national banks in the watershed case of Briggs v. Spaulding,97
decided by a 5-to-4 majority.
In Briggs, the receiver of the First National Bank of Buffalo
sued the bank's former directors for negligence. According to the
receiver, the directors were guilty of not stopping the officers from
violating lending limits and making illegal loans.98 Because the
bank was a national bank, the Briggs majority turned to the Na-
tional Banking Act for guidance on the standard of care. It deter-
mined that § 5239, which made national bank directors personally
liable for knowing violations of the Act,' did not directly apply
because the complaint did not allege that the directors acted know-
ingly or fraudulently."° Nonetheless, reasoning by analogy, the
Court concurred that the National Banking Act furnished a com-
mon-law standard of care. 0'
The majority and dissent divided over the directors' culpability
on the facts, with the dissent arguing that the directors had
breached the duty to supervise and the majority holding that they
had not."° But as to the formulation of the duty of care, the dis-
sent and the majority essentially agreed: "In any view the degree
of care to which [bank directors are] bound is that which ordinarily
prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstanc-
es .. . ,I 3
Strictly speaking, the common-law duty in Briggs derived from
an analogy to the National Banking Act and was tailored to nation-
al banks. Soon, however, Briggs began to be adopted outside of
the national bank context. By the turn of the century, state and
federal courts were applying the duty of care announced in Briggs
to state and national bank directors alike."
97. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
98. Id. at 142-43.
99. The current version is 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1989).
100. 141 U.S. at 145.
101. Id. at 146.
102. Compare id. at 166, with id. at 173 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 152; see also id. at 169-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 785
(C.C.D.S.C. 1896) (applying Briggs); Holmes v. McDonald, 226 Ill. 169, 175-76 (1907)
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Briggs, then, marked a watershed in bank director liability
standards, in which the narrow emphasis on charter and by-law
provisions gave way to a new and potentially expansive standard
of tort care."es To be sure, some earlier bank cases had language
to the effect that directors owed a duty of skill and diligence to
their banks or to shareholders."te But the outcomes in those cases
ultimately hinged on the absence of chargeable charter and by-law
violations."7 In contrast, charter and by-law violations were of
marginal importance to the reasoning of Briggs. Thus, Briggs was
the first truly modem articulation of a tort-based duty of care for
bank directors.
Precisely because of the tort rule's expansive nature, Briggs set
the stage for the business judgment rule in its modem sense. There
had previously been no need for liability-limiting devices such as
the business judgment rule, because liability for honest bank direc-
tor decisions was largely restricted to violations of statutes, charters
and by-laws. The duty of care announced in Briggs, however, was
far broader than most charter restrictions and potentially more
intrusive of board autonomy. To insure that the new tort duty of
care would not unduly impede profit-seeking by directors of banks,
post-Briggs courts fashioned the business judgment rule to curb the
expanded liability that the duty of care posed."8 Thus, the newly-
(citing Briggs); Earle v. Humphrey, 121 Mich. 518, 525 (1899) (applying the Briggs test);
Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 151 (1892) (same). See also Bowerman v. Hamner,
250 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1919) (affirming the common law rule of negligence used in cases
involving national banks); Yates v. Jones National Bank, 206 U.S. 158, 180 (1907) (ex-
pressing no opinion whether courts can apply the Briggs test to hold bank directors liable
for negligence).
105. As such, Briggs was emblematic of the larger shift in late nineteenth-century
American law from contract-based remedies to tort recovery for negligence. See MORTON
J. HORwrrz, TiH TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 13, 115-16 (1992).
106. See, e.g., Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 21 (1872) (stating that there is a strong
presumption that directors use their best skill and judgment in managing depositors' ac-
counts); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 75 (La. 1829) judging fault according to
"the exercise of that diligence and care which was necessary to a successful discharge of
[a director's] duty ...").
107. See Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 24-25 (absolving bank trustees who inadvertently
violated the charter based on advice of counsel, and finding that "[i]t is well settled that
trustees will be protected from responsibility under such circumstances"); Percy, 8 Mart.
(n.s.), at 75-76 ("It is not contemplated by any of the charters ... that [the directors]
should devote their whole time and attention to the institution to which they are appoint-
ed."). See also Ford v. Taylor, 4 S.W.2d 938, 938-42 (Ark. 1928) (quoting a common-law
standard of care but absolving directors for all loans except those made in violation of
board resolution). Cf Friedman, supra note 65, at 300 (stating that the nineteenth century
concept of negligence referred mostly "to failures to perform a specific duty--often a con-
tractual one").
108. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 54, at 62-63 (describing the debate over the
advisability of the business judgment rule prior to Briggs); see also Wheeler v. Aiken
County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 785 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896) ("No case has been cited
where directors have been held responsible to stockholders for mistakes of judgment, or
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minted business judgment rule helped preserve the status quo and
particularly the principle of potential profit maximization at any
risk.
At the same time, Justice Harlan's influential dissent in Briggs
contained the seeds of the business judgment rule's decline in the
banking industry. Under the old approach, only shareholders of the
bank had the necessary contractual privity to sue bank directors.
But by eschewing contract-based liability and holding that bank
directors could be sued for breach of a duty of care, Briggs re-
vived the question of to whom that duty was owed.
The majority opinion sought to straddle the issue without de-
ciding it, stressing that the receiver had tried the case on the theo-
ry that the directors owed a duty "not to stockholder[s] nor to
creditors, as such, but to the bank."'" In contrast, Justice Harlan
repeatedly emphasized that bank director liability rules had to take
cognizance of depositor as well as shareholder interests. " ' As
such, Justice Harlan's dissent was one of the first opinions outside
of the savings bank context (and certainly the most prominent) to
advance the assertion that the common law should serve depositor
interests in regulating asset substitution."' In this regard, Justice
want of skill . . ."); Wynn v. Tallapoosa County Bank, 53 So. 228, 239 (Ala. 1910)
(holding that a cashier is not liable "for losses [which are] the result of mere errors in
judgment . . .").
109. Briggs, 141 U.S. at 149-50.
110. This is apparent from at least two passages in the dissent:
[A] considerable part of the amount lost to the bank, and therefore to its stock-
holders and depositors, could have been saved, if [the directors] had exercised
such care in the supervision and management of the bank's business, as men of
ordinary diligence exercise in respect to their own business ...
A banking corporation, publicly avowing that its business was to be wholly
administered by executive officers, and that the directors would have nothing in
fact to do with its management, would not long retain the confidence of stock-
holders and depositors;, a fact which, of itself, shows that the abdication by
directors of their duties and functions not only tends to defeat the object for
the creation of such an institution, but puts in peril the interests of stockholders
and depositors.
Id. at 166, 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
111. The influence of Justice Harlan's opinion was such that later cases expanding bank
director liability often did so in reliance on his dissent. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hall, 63 F.
222, 227 (4th Cir. 1894); Dudley v. Hawkins, 239 F. 386, 389 (S.D. Ga. 1917); Bank of
Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 196 S.W. 803, 810 (1917); Anderson v. Bundy,
171 S.E. 501, 507 (Va. 1933).
Other cases decided during the same period contained dicta to the effect that deposi-
tors could sue bank directors for negligence. Many of those cases, in fact, involved fraud-
ulent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Solomon v. Bates, 24 S.E. 478, 480 (N.C. 1896);
Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 63 N.E. 554, 556 (N.Y. 1902); Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405,
414-15 (Pa. 1892); Dyson, supra note 4, at 354-55 (discussing cases involving fraudulent
misrepresentation). Others involved the continued acceptance of new deposits after insol-
vency in circumstances that were tantamount to fraudulent inducement to contract. See,
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Harlan implicitly recognized that absent any liability-limiting device
such as the business judgment rule, the new tort approach was
easily broad enough to accommodate depositors' interests.
The depositor interests that the dissent sought to advance were
those in avoiding asset substitution and its concomitant losses. But
Justice Harlan did not consider how these depositor interests should
be reconciled with shareholders' interests in potential profit maxi-
mization. That inevitable clash took center stage after the turn of
the century.
D. Loss Avoidance Eclipsed Potential Profit Maximization
After the turn of the century, a handful of other decisions
began to appear in which loss avoidance trumped potential profit
maximization in the banking context. Between 1901 and 1918, state
courts in Arkansas, New Jersey, and New York issued decisions
curtailing the business judgment rule in banking in certain key
respects. The most notable decisions in this regard were cases that
took their cue from the National Banking Act and that sought to
regulate securities underwriting and loans to single borrowers by
state banks as a matter of common law."2 Other decisions from
those states held bank directors negligent for loans to start-up
businesses, "3  loans to cover worthless overdrafts," 4  and loans
on dubious collateral." 5 Nearly all of these decisions specifically
acknowledged protecting depositor interests."6
Along with the savings bank cases, these cases are significant
not only for their holdings, but also for the light they shed on the
e.g., Delano v. Case, 12 N.E. 676 (IlI. 1887) (holding directors of insolvent bank negli-
gent for portraying bank as solvent); Seale v. Baker, 7 S.W. 742, 745 (Tex. 1888)
(same). Still others were depositor suits in a handful of states that permitted depositor
suits by statute. See, e.g., Hi-Pro Fish Prods., Inc. v. McClure, 224 F. Supp. 485, 489-90
(E.D. Ark. 1963) (discussing earlier cases); Forbes v. Mohr, 76 P. 827, 829 (Kan. 1904)
(suit brought by depositors against directors under statute); Bank of Mutual Redemption v.
Hill, 56 Me. 385, 388-89 (1868). Nonetheless, the dicta in those cases, taken collectively,
set the stage for increased cognizance of depositor interests by the bench.
112. For instance, Bailey v. O'Neal, 122 S.W. 503, 505 (Ark. 1909), condemned
overconcentrations of loans to one borrower. Davidge v. Guardian Trust Co., 96 N.E. 751,
754 (N.Y. 1911), and Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 89 N.E. 476, 483 (N.Y. 1909),
both forbade New York depository institutions from engaging in finm-guarantee securities
underwriting.
113. Magale v. Fomby, 201 S.W. 278, 280 (Ark. 1918). After finding the directors
negligent, the Magale court nevertheless denied recovery to the plaintiffs because their
claim was time-barred. Id.
114. Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120, 142 (NJ. Ch. 1901).
115. Bailey v. O'Neal, 122 S.W. 503, 505 (Ark. 1909).
116. See Magale, 201 S.W. at 278 (negligence suit for "the benefit of creditors and
shareholders"); Bailey, 122 S.W. at 504 (permitting depositors to recover under statute for
board negligence); Campbell, 50 A. at 124 (bank receiver awarded verdict for negligence).
See also Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 196 S.W. 803, 807-08 (Ark. 1917) (holding
bank directors liable to shareholders and depositors for negligent mismanagement).
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economic forces underlying this divergent strain of case law. As
the pre-1933 cases show, courts attempted to regulate asset substi-
tution at banks for years before federal deposit insurance was en-
acted. The stated rationale for doing so was invariably concern for
the welfare of depositors, as had been true in the savings bank
cases."17 Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, those cases pro-
vide additional proof that a populist concern for harm to individual
depositors, rather than any specific solicitude for the federal insur-
ance funds, was the original impetus for the divergent banking
cases.
At the same time, it would be misleading to contend that the
early banking cases were widely influential, at least in the short
term. Outside Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
and Virginia, the same laissez-faire attitude that permeated the
early bank director liability cases continued to hold sway, due to
liberal reliance on the business judgment rule."' It is particularly
telling in this regard that individual holdings restricting specific
types of bank practices almost never migrated across state
lines."9
117. Ostensibly, other concems, such as monitoring problems, or the avoidance of bank
runs and panics, also could have been a factor in these cases. Notably, however, none of
the pre-1933 cases ever explicitly raised those considerations. Instead, courts emphasized
the need to protect depositors' expectations that banks would safeguard their money and
vouchsafe its return. See Bank of Commerce, 196 S.W. at 810 ("When one deposits mon-
ey in a savings bank . . . thus divesting himself of the immediate control of his property,
he expects, and has the right to expect, that the trustees or directors, who are chosen to
take his place in the management and control of his property, will exercise ordinary care
and prudence in the trust committed to them.") (quoting Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.
132, 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 89 N.E. 476, 482
(N.Y. 1909) ("A banking corporation .. . invites individuals to submit to it the posses-
sion and care of their money and property"). The Gause court went on to stress that the
element of depositor trust distinguished banks from ordinary trading corporations. Id. For
these reasons, these cases held that a bank director's duty of care ran not only to share-
holders, but also to depositors and other creditors. See Magale, 201 S.W. at 279
("[D]irectors of a bank ...are liable to stockholders, as well as depositors, for its losses
from their negligence:"); Bailey, 122 S.W. at 504 (bank directors are "1liable to whom?
Manifestly to the creditors of the corporation . . . . "); Campbell, 50 A. at 124 (bank
directors "are not only trustees for the corporation, but also, though perhaps in a modified
sense, for the creditors of the corporation, who become such by depositing their money
with the bank in the ordinary course of such business").
118. See, e.g., Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366, 380 (4th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279
U.S. 839 (1929) (refusing to hold directors personally liable for loss on irregularly-dis-
counted note); McRoberts v. Spaulding, 32 F.2d 315, 316-17 (S.D. Iowa 1929) (refusing
to hold bank directors liable for speculative farm loans); Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan
& Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 784-85 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896) (using standards of community to
determine liability under business judgment rule); Wynn v. Tallapoosa County Bank, 53
So. 228, 239-41 (Ala. 1910) (bank cashier not liable for judgment errors); Scott's Ex'rs v.
Young, 21 S.W.2d 994, 998-99 (Ky. 1929) (directors who approved worthless loan to
bank employee exonerated because they relied on the employee's character and thrift);
Pocomoke City Nat'l Bank v. Crockett, 125 A. 712, 716 (Md. 1924) (directors not found
liable for "mere default or mistakes of judgment") (citations omitted).
119. Those holdings regulated bank practices ranging from securities underwriting, pre-
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This fractured state of affairs lasted until the introduction of
federal deposit insurance in 1933,20 when for the first time a ma-
jority of bank director negligence cases subordinated potential
profit maximization in favor of loss avoidance. Thus, while some
courts had responded to the asset substitution problems of individu-
al depositors early on, it was only when bank losses came to be
shifted onto a party with political muscle-the federal govern-
ment-that the business judgment rule in banking began to unravel
in any serious way.
The Depression-era cases that stressed loss avoidance over
profit maximization addressed that concern in three separate con-
texts: practices that were high-risk but potentially profitable; prac-
tices that appeared unprofitable on their face; and failed deposit
insurance schemes. The majority of those cases involved the first
problem (i.e., unduly risky practices that had some profit potential).
A signal decision in this regard was Michelsen v. Penney,12 1 de-
cided in 1943, in which the Second Circuit condemned bank direc-
tors for salvaging a junior mortgage on an office building. Accord-
ing to the court, a glut of office space made the prospects of rent-
ing the building hopeless. Rejecting the old saw that bank boards
could lend to troubled borrowers to help them grow out of their
troubles, Michelsen concluded that the risk of loss was too great to
justify salvaging the mortgage."
The 1930's cases imposed liability for a variety of other unsafe
practices as well. Several cases, for example, required bank direc-
tors to adopt loan underwriting standards as a matter of common
law, regardless of charters or by-laws. The 1935 case of Medford
Trust Co. v. McKnight," for example, was one of the first com-
mon-law cases to hold that bank directors could not lend additional
funds to delinquent borrowers. Castetter v. Barnard"4  and
mature releases of security and commercial real estate loans to overconcentrations of credit
and loans to startup ventures. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1041-42, 1045-54, 1066.
120. See Banking Act of 1933, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831 (1989).
121. 135 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1943).
122. Id. at 422-23. The New Jersey Chancery Court had reached the same conclusion in
1889 in Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 830 (NJ. Ch. 1889). Unlike Michelsen, however,
Williams was based on a charter violation and not on breach of a common-law duty of
care. Micheisen was the forerunner of today's federal banking regulations and guidelines
requiring directors to monitor real estate conditions and adjust their lending policies ac-
cordingly. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.62(c), 208.52(c), 365.2(c), 563.101(c) (1995).
123. 197 N.E. 649, 660-61 (Mass. 1935); accord Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409,
425-26 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding bank directors liable for bond financing of foreclosed
company where bonds could not be resold). But see Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883,
894 (6th Cir. 1938) (bank decision to lend additional funds to a defaulting borrower not
negligent).
124. 183 N.E. 681, 686 (Ind. App. 1932).
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Broderick v. Marcus,' 5 decided around the same time, prohibited
certain types of unsecured loans. Castetter also banned loans to
insolvent debtors and overconcentrations of loans to single borrow-
ers. 26 In addition, Medford and other Depression-era decisions
were the first reported cases to second-guess bank appraisals and
require their expanded use. All of these cases entailed judicial
assessments of risk and the ensuing judgment that risk levels were
too high to merit protection under the business judgment rule.
The celebrated 1940 case of Litwin v. Allen" addressed the
principle of loss avoidance in the second context, involving invest-
ments that were seemingly unprofitable on their face. There, a New
York court censured a trust company's directors for buying 5.5%
subordinated debentures on the condition that the issuer could buy
back the securities at cost within the first six months. The purchase
was negligent, in the judgment of the court, because the trust com-
pany assumed the risk of loss during the six-month option period
with no prospect for gain.'29 Litwin's analysis is undeniably ques-
tionable in this regard, as the debentures did in fact pay inter-
est. 3 As a theoretical matter, however, it would seem that the
court correctly recognized that assets will waste unless they are
invested in vehicles with at least some potential for earnings or
appreciation. In that sense, then, Litwin was fully consistent with
the new stress on loss avoidance that appeared in the 1930's.
The last group of Depression-era cases that imposed liability
advanced the goal of loss avoidance by using the business judg-
ment rule offensively to protect failed deposit insurance schemes.
Thus in O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co.," a New York court
held that bank directors who had voted to join a private deposit
insurance consortium had not engaged in ultra vires conduct. The
fact that the consortium had gone insolvent, causing the bank in
question to fail, was irrelevant: bank boards had broad authority to
address concerns over depositor losses.'32
125. 272 N.Y.S. 455, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
126. 183 N.E. at 686. Specifically, the court imposed liability for a loan to insolvent
businessmen that equalled almost one-third of the bank's capital. Id.
127. See Michelsen, 135 F.2d at 421-23 (holding directors negligent for acquiring title
to property without obtaining a disinterested and honest appraisal); Medford, 197 N.E. at
658-59, 664 (noting the importance of appraisals in determining financial ability); Litwin
v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 709-728 (Sup. CL 1940) (finding no negligence where direc-
tors relied upon thorough and conservative appraisal).
128. 25 N.Y.S. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
129. Id. at 696-99.
130. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1039 and authorities cited therein.
131. 289 N.Y.S. 252, 270-72 (Sup. CL 1936), affd, 1 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1937), aff d, 16
N.E.2d 302 (N.Y. 1938).
132. Id. at 272.
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Depression-era cases that absolved bank directors on business
judgment rule grounds were relatively rare. Generally, when courts
granted bank directors lenient treatment, they did so for reasons
that still merit business judgment rule protection today. While a
smattering of other cases countenanced practices that now would
not be tolerated, almost all of those cases curtailed the business
judgment rule in other significant respects.' Thus, the Great De-
pression witnessed a decided tilt toward loss avoidance in bank
director negligence cases.
In hindsight, this transformation was hardly surprising, given
the changed political and financial calculus ushered in by economic
hardship and federal deposit insurance. The economic effect of the
business judgment rule was to allow "bolder"--and potentially
riskier-business decisions with a higher potential rate of return
than a regime without such deference to board decisions. But, with
the onslaught of the Depression, thousands of bank failures, federal
deposit insurance, and a powerful new federal interest in risk
avoidance, the profit-maximization rationale was too indifferent to
risk to persist in an undiluted form.
By no means was this development inevitable. The class of
losses that Congress shifted to federal deposit insurers in 1933 was
the same class of losses that had been absorbed by individual
depositors prior to 1933.3s Moreover, both were incapable of de-
manding higher compensation to defray the risk of loss--depositors
due to information deficits and the federal government due to flat
premium rates. Yet courts proved decidedly more inclined to im-
133. For example, Milburn v. Martin, 76 S.W.2d 952, 954-55 (Ark. 1934), and Gallin
v. National City Bank, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 96-102 (Sup. Ct. 1934), declined to hold bank
directors responsible for declines in collateral value because the loans in question had
been adequately secured when made. Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir.
1931), absolved directors from negligence for selling foreclosed property at a loss. Simi-
larly, Gallin, 273 N.Y.S. at 104-07, and Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518, 525 (6th Cir.
1936), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937), embraced the proposition that hold-
ing foreclosed properties in lieu of sale does not amount to negligence. All three princi-
ples remain good law. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1055-58, 1069 (discussing cases).
134. Compare Castetter v. Bamard, 183 N.E. 681, 686 (Ind. App. 1932) (permitting
renewal of loans without security) and Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677, 720-21
(Sup. Ct. 1940) (allowing inadequately secured loans, pre-funded interest clauses, and
advances to defaulting borrowers) with supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text. The
only case from that period whose overall outcome was more favorable to bank directors
than comparable cases would be today was Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 894 (6th
Cir. 1938), which sanctioned new loans to borrowers already in default.
135. This is implicit in the fact that almost all of the Depression-era cases awarding
recovery against bank directors did so in the name of depositors. See Michelsen v. Pen-
ney, 135 F.2d 409, 412 (2d Cir. 1943) (depositor suit against board chairman for negli-
gence); Castetter, 183 N.E. at 688 (suit by receiver); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight,
197 N.E. 649, 654-55 (Mass. 1935) (suit by state commissioner of banks for the benefit
of depositors); Broderick v. Marcus, 272 N.Y.S. 455, 457 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (suit by receiv-
er).
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pose liability when the federal fisc was at stake than when the
victims were individual depositors. It was only when the risk of
loss was shifted from politically unorganized individual depositors
to the politically powerful federal government that the majority of
courts subordinated shareholder interests and elevated loss avoid-
ance to a legally protected plane.
E. A Deceptive Lull
Despite the significant contraction of the business judgment
rule in banking in the 1930's and 1940's, that contraction did not
progress in a linear fashion. To the contrary, the same downswing
cycle that marked the earlier restrictive cases set in after World
War II.
After 1945, numerous doubtful lending practices-including
delinquent loan renewals, non-existent underwriting standards, and
absent internal controls--continued to receive protection under the
business judgment rule.'36 In addition, very few restrictive state
law cases migrated across state lines during that period. As early
as 1889, for example, Massachusetts and New Jersey courts recog-
nized the dangers of real estate construction loans by savings banks
and sought to control those risks by banning or restricting such
loans.'37 Nonetheless, no other state adopted those holdings before
the 1980's, and those cases did little to deter disastrous real estate
loans in other states. Likewise, notwithstanding two 1889 cases
penalizing directors for renewing loans in arrears,'38 virtually no
other decision replicated those holdings before the 1980's. As had
happened in the decades leading up to the Great Depression, those
cases had minimal deterrent effect because other jurisdictions sim-
ply ignored them.'39 State courts had incentives to favor their
home-state institutions in this regard, because most losses from
overly risky bank activities would be borne by the federal deposit
insurance funds and not by the states.
136. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1066, 1073-77.
137. See Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 659-60 (Mass. 1935) (holding
directors negligent for excessive construction loans); Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 830
(NJ. Ch. 1889) (imposing liability for risky construction loans); see also Michelsen v.
Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1943) (penalizing bank bailout of insolvent land
development company).
138. See Williams, 18 A. at 838; Marshall v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, 8
S.E. 586, 587-88, 591-92 (Va. 1889).
139. See Gerald T. Dunne, The Liability of Bank Directors Under the New Federal
Common Law or Swift v. Tyson Resurgent, 8 FoRUM 286, 293 (1972) (noting that only a
minority of courts have not substantially abandoned a hard-lined fiduciary standard for
bank directors); McCoy, supra note 2, at 1047-49, 1066 (discussing isolated effect of
early restrictive holdings).
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Notwithstanding this rift in the case law, neither Congress nor
the courts seriously questioned bank director liability rules until the
late 1980's. Instead, as the banking industry entered a long period
of stability after 1945 and bank failures became a relative rari-
ty," t the effectiveness of those rules was not called into serious
question. In the next thirty years bank director duty of care cases
slowed to a trickle, 4' and it seemed self-evident that the liability
rules worked. 4
Only later did it become apparent that this seemingly perma-
nent stability was the product of a unique set of factors (mainly
low inflation and low interest rates) that prevailed during the
1950's and 1960's. During that period, banks and thrifts did not
have to fret about losing deposits to non-bank competitors, because
few (if any) investments offered comparable liquidity, and low
interest rates held down yields. At the same time, banks could
make money on low-risk loan portfolios because blue-chip compa-
nies flocked to them for their short-term borrowing needs. The
cautious mores of post-World War II bank managers, who had
grown up during the Depression and had come of age in an era
that fostered risk aversion, further reinforced bank tendencies to-
ward conservatism.
Thus, the economic conditions of the 1950's and 1960's creat-
ed unique market constraints on bank risk. In tandem with those
conditions, the regulatory climate placed additional dampers on
risks. The advent of deposit insurance made it easier than ever for
banks to lure deposits. 43 Similarly, Regulation Q boosted bank
earnings by capping the interest paid on bank accounts and keeping
the cost of funds low144
But in the 1970's, this vaunted stability began to fray as infla-
tion heated up and non-bank competitors eyed the profitable pre-
140. See GARTEN, supra note 42, at 48, 56.
141. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 1096 n.63, 1098-99 (asserting that bank director lia-
bility cases had become "virtually extinct" due to New Deal reforms such as federal de-
posit insurance and also the increased experience of bank directors). Among the few nota-
ble duty of care cases during this period were McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums,
Ltd., 491 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1974), First Nat'l Bank v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339 (N.D.
Ill. 1970), and Neese v. Brown, 405 S.W.2d 577, 581-83 (Tenn. 1964).
142. See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Duty of Care:
Riddles Wisely Expounded, 41 DEFENSE LJ. 519, 545-46 (1992) (maintaining that "the
duty of care is an effective check against management negligence" in the banking area
because "there exists a very substantial body of case law upholding suits against bank
directors for violation of the duty of care").
143. See ROE, supra note 75, at 96.
144. Under the Banking Act of 1933, as amended, and Regulation Q, banks and thrifts
could not pay interest on demand deposits and could only pay interest on time and sav-
ings accounts up to rates specified by the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371b, 1425b(a), 1828(g)(1), 1832 (1988), repealed
by Pub. L. 96-221, title V, § 29, Mar. 31, 1980, 94 Stat. 168; 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1979).
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serves of banks and thrifts. On the asset side, as interest rates
soared and bank loans became prohibitively costly, corporate bor-
rowers fled commercial banks for the burgeoning markets in com-
mercial paper and bonds. In a classic example of asset substitution,
some money-center banks replaced that business with high-risk
loans to developing nations and energy concerns. On the liability
side, Regulation Q's interest caps suddenly became a handicap, as
individual and corporate depositors moved their deposits out of
banks into short-term bonds and newly-innovated money market
funds.14s
Congress' efforts to lift Regulation Q's interest caps triggered
new, adverse consequences of their own. In an attempt to halt
deposit outflows, Congress phased out interest rate caps on bank
and thrift deposits in the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980."4 But it soon became apparent
that Congress should have revised lending policies first, to permit
banks and thrifts to diversify their assets before they started to pay
market rates for deposits. The interest cap phase-out soon triggered
a wave of financial institution insolvencies as low-yield portfolios
generated too little income to pay the new, higher rates on depos-
its.
147
In a desperate attempt to rescue banks and thrifts from their
interest risk woes, Congress and the Reagan Administration then
deregulated the asset side of the ledger in the Garn-St. Germain
145. For further descriptions of the changed economic climate in the banking industry
during this period, see JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 17-
19 (1991); BENSTON Er AL., supra note 24, at 26-28; GARTEN, supra note 42, at 10-13;
GATHERING CRISIS, supra note 35, at 15 (describing risky loans to energy industry and
developing countries); PIERCE, supra note 33, at 6-7, 67-71; BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM,
supra note 3, at 29-31 (discussing interest rate effects on banks); L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN,
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 17 (1993) (discussing problem of inflation with respect to thrifts
and banks); VAUGHAN & HILL, supra note 31, at 3, 37; Michael Klausner & Lawrence J.
White, Bank Regulatory Reform and Bank Structure in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BANKING,
supra note 72, at 1, 7; Redbum, supra note 33, at 691-92; Schwartz, supra note 33, at
48-49.
146. Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 201-210, 94 Stat. 142-45 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
3501-3509 (1988)); see also Nicolle Fundette, How A Good Idea Went Wrong: Deregula-
tion and the Savings and Loan Crisis, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 643, 648-49 (1995) (describing
the phaseout process).
147. Banks were crippled in this regard because it was difficult to raise the interest
charged on corporate loans when their corporate borrowers were fleeing. Thrifts faced an
identical interest squeeze because their long-term, fixed-rate mortgage portfolios did not
generate enough income to pay higher interest rates on deposits. See generally R. DAN
BRUMBAUGH, JR., THE COLLAPSE OF FEDERAL INSURED DEPoSITORiEs-THE SAVINGS AND
LOANS AS PRECURSOR 11, 25, 31 (1993); GARTEN, supra note 42, at 13; SEIDMAN, supra
note 145, at 21-22 (discussing thrifts and their relationship to interest rates); VAUGHAN &
HILL, supra note 31, at 4; Fundette, supra note 146, at 649; Lawrence H. White, Why Is
the U.S. Banking Industry in Trouble? Business Cycles, Loan Losses, and Deposit Insur-
ance, in THE CRISIS IN AMRICAN BANKING 1, 18-19 (Lawrence H. White ed., 1990).
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Depository Institutions Act of 1982." On the bet that high-yield
loans would enable weakened financial institutions to grow out of
their troubles, Congress allowed thrifts to expand beyond their
traditional asset base of residential mortgages and to make com-
mercial real estate development loans. Gain-St. Germain also al-
lowed financial institutions to make loans at 100% of collateral
value and without personal recourse.49 Gain-St. Germain's effect
was to encourage developers and other entrepreneurs to capture
depository institutions and operate them as their own personal
financing arms.5  Unlike their predecessors, moreover, this new
generation of financial institution managers had neither the memory
nor the conservative ethos of the Great Depression.
In the meantime, state regulators in California, Texas, and
Florida deregulated asset powers for state-chartered thrifts even
beyond the expanded powers of their federal counterparts.' Tex-
as permitted thrift institutions chartered in that state to invest up to
100% of their assets in real estate equity holdings, in contrast with
the limits on direct investments in service corporations by federal-
ly-chartered thrifts, which were capped at three percent of as-
sets. 2  For its part, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
("FHLBB") turned a blind eye to state deregulation, based on the
wrong-headed belief that state law took precedence over feder-
al. 15 3
Still other deregulatory changes boosted the already high pro-
pensity toward financial institution risk. One such change was
Congress' decision in 1980 to increase deposit insurance from
$40,000 to $100,000 per account and to permit an unlimited num-
ber of accounts per investor, each insured up to $100,000.154 An-
148. Pub. L. 97-320, Title IV, Part A, § 403(a), 96 Stat. 1510.
149. See id; see also BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 3, at 34, 48-49 (listing the
most significant provisions of the act); Fundette, supra note 146, at 650 (listing several
new areas into which S&Ls were permitted to invest- beyond residential real estate).
150. Fundette, supra note 146, at 650.
151. See, e.g., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 35, at 174; BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM, supra note 3, at 40.
152. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT FAILURES: COSTLY FAILURES RESULTED
FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 25 (1989); see also NORMAN
STRUNK & FRED CASE, WHERE DEREGULATION WENT WRONG 68-73 (1988) (describing
experience with lax state regulations on direct investments).
153. See General Accounting Office, supra note 152, at 75; Savings and Loan Policies
in the Late 1970's and 1980's, Hearings before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 75, 88-89 (1990) (statement of Edwin Gray); id.
at 89-91 (statement of Paul Volcker); Final Oversight Hearings on the Savings and Loan
Industry in the 100th Congress, Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, 129 (1988) (statement of Richard T. Pratt);
Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 670 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1987), affd, 856
F.2d 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
154. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1993). See also BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note
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other was FHLBB's decision in 1981 to reduce thrift capital re-
quirements to three percent of liabilities and to relax regulatory
accounting principles, so as to make even this reduced requirement
meaningless.' In the meantime, the failure to regulate brokered
deposits allowed huge amounts of volatile, high-cost deposits to
flood into institutions, where they chased too few good loans. 6
Taken together, these developments added up to a recipe for
disaster. Even before asset deregulation, the flight of corporate
borrowers and the erosion of deposit bases had given banks and
thrifts incentives to acquire high-risk, high-yield assets. By the time
deregulation began in earnest in 1981, many financial institutions
had seriously depleted their capital, making them desperate to
gamble on the highest possible returns in an attempt to regain
solvency. In their battered state, banks and thrifts had little (if any)
financial cushion to protect them in case a market downturn caused
their borrowers to default.5 7 It was precisely then, with traditional
market constraints gone, that regulatory constraints on risk were
most important. Instead, deregulation unlatched the barnyard door.
In the mid- to late-1980's, when the market for commercial
real estate collapsed, banks and thrifts were glutted with real estate
loans that went into default. 151 In a futile effort to stem thrift
losses, FHLBB and the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corpo-
ration ("FSLIC") adopted a conscious policy of regulatory forbear-
ance, excusing thrifts from meeting the already low three percent
capital benchmark and permitting insolvent institutions to stay
open. But forbearance had the pernicious effect of enabling trou-
3, at 6 (explaining how the increase led to heightened instability).
155. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (H.R.
1278): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation
and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 220 (1989) (statement of M. Danny Wall); Problems of the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1989) (statement of the ABA); Final Oversight
Hearings on the Savings and Loan Industry in the 100th Congress, Hearings Before the
Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 158, 158
(1988) (statement of Edwin Gray); Deposit Insurance Reform and Related Supervisory
Issues: Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 491 (1985) (statement of James R. Barth); BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM,
supra note 3, at 35-39.
156. See 12 U.S.C.S. § 1464, History (app.), at 763-64, 774-76 (Lawyers Coop. 1992)
(discussing the regulation of brokered deposits); BRUMBAUGH, supra note 147, at 36-38;
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 3, at 47; Redburn, supra note 33, at 694.
157. See GARTEN, supra note 42, at 11-15, 58-59, 68-71, 83 (describing the weakened
financial state of the bank and thrift industries in the early 1980's); BLUEPRINT FOR RE-
FORM, supra note 3, at 43-45 (noting that many S&Ls entered deregulation in the 1980's
in a state of insolvency).
158. See BARTH, supra note 145, at 24-30, 40; BRUMBAUGH, supra note 147, at 25;
VAUGHAN & HILL, supra note 31, at 35-38; S&L DEBACLE, supra note 33, at 7-8, 12,
18-22; Klausner & White, supra note 145, at 7.
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bled thrifts to continue to make bad loans even after insolvency,
when no more of their own capital was at risk.59 An avalanche
of bank and thrift failures ensued, triggering an unprecedented
wave of director liability suits.
Thus, what the economic model predicted from the marriage of
high leveraging, information asymmetries, and the business judg-
ment rule eventually came to pass. The trigger was the disappear-
ance in the 1970's and 1980's of market constraints (most notably
low interest rates and competitive buffers) that the law had long
taken for granted, combined with ill-timed deregulation. Significant-
ly, the fact that courts had curtailed the business judgment rule in
banking in prior decades did not prevent the massive financial
institution losses of the 1980's. The enormity of those losses and
the impotency of the old, restrictive cases propelled the courts to
throw the business judgment rule in banking to the wind.
F. From Common Law to Code
The bank and thrift crisis of the 1980's precipitated cutbacks to
the business judgment rule in banking on a scale hitherto
unimagined. In the 1980's and early 1990's, courts second-guessed
financial institution decisions with respect to a new range of loan
activities that had previously gone unquestioned. As a result, bank
and thrift directors now face common-law negligence liability for
loans that are inadequately secured,"6 for overreliance on risky
types of collateral, 6' for pre-funded interest clauses,'62 for fail-
159. See, e.g., BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 3, at 32-33, 46; CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, RESOLVING THE THRIFT CRISts 14-16 (1993); Savings and Loan Policies
in the Late 1970s and 1980s: Hearings before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 44, 48-49 (1990) (statement of Richard T.
Pratt); Federal Regulation of Direct Investment by Savings and Loans and Banks, and
Condition of the Federal Deposit Insurance Funds: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 289 (1985) (statement of
George Benston); H.R. REP. No. 953, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1984). The U.S. General
Accounting Office recently estimated total losses from the savings and loan crisis to equal
nearly one half trillion dollars. See GAO, FINANCIAL AUDIT-RESOLUTION TRUST
CORPORATION'S 1995 AND 1994 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 9-21 (GAO/AIMD-96-123 July
1996); Richard W. Stevenson, G.A.O. Puts Cost of S. & L. Bailout at Half a Trillion
Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1996, § 1, at 34.
160. See RTC v. O'Connell, No. 94 C 4186, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3999, at *9 (N.D.
II1. Apr. 1, 1996) (refusing to dismiss a claim of gross negligence stemming from loans
lacking adequate security); RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480, 491 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
(denying summary judgment where there was a disputed issue of fact whether appraisals
supported size of loan); FDIC v. Robertson, No. Civ. A. 87-2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9292, at *13-*14, *16, *20 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989) (holding a bank director
negligent for making renewals of inadequately secured loans). Although the RTC in Rahn
was able to get to trial on this issue, the director defendants eventually won a jury ver-
dict on all counts. See Michigan Jury Shuts Out RTC in $7 Million D&O Case, BANK
BAILOUT LITIG. NEWS, Sept. 13, 1995, at 10.
161. See FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1290-91, 1313 (N.D. Ind. 1991), affld
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ures to perfect security, '63  and for rollovers of delinquent
loans."6 In addition, for the first time ever, irrespective of stat-
utes or by-laws, courts held financial institution directors liable for
defective internal controls."es The most important recent holdings
in this regard penalize directors for eschewing or ignoring loan
underwriting standards,"6 for not analyzing borrower credit pro-
sub nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding directors liable where
loan was secured by a bulldozer that would depreciate too quickly); Robertson, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9292, slip op. at *5-*6, *8-*9, *16, *19-*20 (holding bank directors liable
where items accepted as security for loans included stock in closely-held corporations and
partnership interests, the values of which were never investigated); Omnibank v. United
Southern Bank, 607 So.2d 76, 87 (Miss. 1992) (finding liability where collateral for a
loan included property owned by the mother of the borrower in Kentucky and an inheri-
tance, neither of which were verified).
162. See FDIC v. Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. 869, 876 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that
extending "additional funds to pay the interest on past due credit" was potentially negli-
gent); FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184, 1191 (D. Md. 1984) and subsequent opin-
ion at 622 F. Supp. 132, 133 (D. Md. 1985), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.
FSLIC v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1987) (denying partial summary judgment where
defendants were charged with "deducting interest and fees from [undisbursed] loan funds
rather than requiring the borrowers to pay those charges").
163. See Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. at 876 (denying summary judgment for defendant
directors where evidence showed directors failed to perfect bank's security interests); Stan-
ley, 770 F. Supp. at 1313 (finding liability where two loaders were pledged as security
for a loan, and lender did not file a security agreement on them until two weeks after
the loan was purchased); Robertson, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, slip op. at *7-*8, *17-
*18 (holding bank officer liable for failing to perfect security interests).
164. See FDIC v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (5th Cir. 1994); Robertson, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9292 (slip op.), at *14-*19 (finding liability for renewing a loan where no
reduction in principal had been made). See also Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. at 875-76 (hold-
ing loan rollovers potentially negligent).
165. In this regard, bank director liability law had lagged behind general corporate law,
which had already defined monitoring duties to include the adoption of adequate internal
controls.
166. See FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding directors
liable for new loan policy that "cut the Board of Directors out of loan approval matters");
FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 129 & n.l1 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding bank director liable
for disregarding loan procedures that he had previously drafted); O'Connell, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3999, at *8 (holding directors liable for gross negligence due to their disre-
gard of prudent banking standards in their loan procedures); RTC v. Franz, 909 F. Supp.
1128, 1130, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (denying motion to dismiss count of gross negligence
concerning losses sustained in funding construction loans, when none of the defendants
had established written policies for such loans); RTC v. Gladstone, 895 F. Supp. 356,
361, 369 (D. Mass. 1995) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment for ignor-
ing internal lending policies); RTC v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 886 F. Supp.
658, 668-70 & n.8 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (denying summary judgment for directors on claim
of grossly negligent conduct where evidence showed that the directors "recklessly ignored"
internal loan procedures); RTC v. Fortunato, No. 94 C 2090, 1994 WL 478616, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1994) (holding that gross negligence claims for failing to follow thrift
procedures properly withstood motion to dismiss); FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F.
Supp. 1545, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (denying motion to dismiss where it was alleged that
directors failed "to establish proper monitoring procedures"); FDIC v. Brown, 812 F.
Supp. 722, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (refusing to allow director's motion for summary judg-
ment on allegation of gross negligence in performance of duties); Robertson, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9292, slip op. at *3, *13-20 (holding bank director liable for loans that
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files,67 and for lax administration of loans and other invest-
ments. "'8 Thus, in banking, the common-law duty of care has sig-
nificantly reduced board discretion to approve bank loans.
As drastic as these latest holdings are, they have been overtak-
en by events in the executive branch and on Capitol Hill. In the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
("FDICIA"), Congress directed federal bank regulators to adopt
uniform, code-based rules regulating many of the same loan prac-
tices that once were entrusted exclusively to the courts and that
once qualified for the business judgment rule 6 9 FDICIA's
violated bank lending policy in multiple respects). But see RTC v. Blasdell, 917 F. Supp.
417, 426 (D. Ariz. 1994) ("[E]nacting deficient policies, however, falls well short of act-
ing grossly negligent.").
167. See RTC v. Eason, 17 F.3d 1126, 1133 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that jury instruc-
tion to consider whether directors had informed themselves of all relevant information,
including credit profiles, when deciding to make loans, was proper); O'Connell, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3999, at *9 (finding gross negligence where directors issued loans without
obtaining credit appraisals); Franz, 909 F. Supp. at 1130 (denying motion to dismiss
where RTC alleged that thrift directors failed to adequately analyze borrower data); FDIC
v. Abel, 92 Civ. 9175, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18159, at *21-*25 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
1995) (holding officers negligent for failing to analyze borrowers' credit profiles);
Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. at 875-77 (same); Gladstone, 895 F. Supp. at 360-61, 369
(same); RTC v. Gravee, No. 94 C 4589, 1995 WL 75373, at *1, *5 (N.D. I1. Feb. 22,
1995) (denying motion to dismiss gross negligence claim for failing to verify loan infor-
mation); RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480, 491 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that defen-
dants were required to properly analyze relevant information in making loan decisions);
RTC v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351, 355, 360 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (denying defendant's motion
to dismiss negligence count for failing to analyze borrowers' credit profiles); RTC v.
Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (D. Utah 1993) (same); Robertson, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9292, slip op. at *3, *13-20 (imposing liability for extending loans without current
borrower information).
168. See Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. at 875-77 (denying summary judgment on counts con-
cering lax loan administration); RTC v. Fleischer, 826 F.Supp. 1273, 1279 (D. Kan.
1993) (declining to dismiss claims of wrongful bank director brokerage activities); Robert-
son, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, slip op. at *14-19 (holding director liable for failing to
establish payment schedules or monitor timely repayments); see generally McCoy, supra
note 2, at 1066 (criticizing cases that failed to penalize failures to perfect security inter-
ests).
169. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 1828(o) (1994). In the Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 318, 108 Star. 2160,
2223-24 (1994), Congress amended FDICIA to permit federal regulators to issue those
standards either as regulations or as guidelines. See Congress Allows FDICIA Safety &
Soundness Rules To Be Guidelines: OCC Looks at Flexible Standards, BANK BAiLoUr
LrrIG. NEWS, Dec. 21, 1994, at 1-3.
In a few areas that were originally regulated under common-law bank director liabili-
ty standards, codified standards had been instituted decades earlier. The principal examples
included securities underwriting by banks, commercial real estate lending by national
banks, and loan-to-one-borrower requirements. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1041-42,
1046-47, 1050-52. Apart from loan-to-one-borrower standards, however, the overwhelming
bulk of loan underwriting practices by state-chartered institutions before the passage of
FDICIA was regulated solely under the common law. See generally id. at 1036-77; Scott,
supra note 65, at 707-08. It is that gap that FDICIA sought to fill.
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most significant impact in this regard involves a requirement that
regulators adopt comprehensive regulations and guidelines on real
estate loans by insured banks and thrifts.70 The regulations and
guidelines appeared in final form in December, 1992, and apply to
federally insured banks and thrifts across the board.'
The December 1992 regulations and guidelines make heavy
incursions into bank lending, the traditional domain of the business
judgment rule in the banking industry, in two distinct ways. First,
the regulations require bank and thrift directors to adopt detailed
underwriting standards, violations of which are punishable by agen-
cy sanction." Second, the regulations and guidelines furnish a
codified standard of care whose breach is actionable as negligence
per se in common-law suits for damages."7 Courts have been
overwhelmingly receptive to the incorporation of such federal stat-
utes and regulations into the common-law duty of care.'74 The
only point at which courts have balked, and then only a few, has
been over the propriety of assessing damages for violations of
internal agency guidelines, regulatory agreements, and recommenda-
tions found in examination reports.'75
170. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 1828(o) (1994) (requiring bank regulators to adopt uniform
federal regulations and guidelines on real estate loans).
171. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1996); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app.
A; id. pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A; 59 Fed. Reg. 29482 (1994) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§
34.41-34.47, 208.18, 225.61-225.67, 323.1-323.7, 545.32, 545.103 and 564.1-564.8). Under
the new rules, banks and thrifts must establish loan origination and approval procedures,
monitor compliance with those procedures, analyze all relevant credit factors, establish
standards for the use of pre-funded interest, and draft procedures for loan administration,
loan extensions, and loan forbearance. See also 61 Fed. Reg. 50951 (1996) (updating OTS
lending rates; 61 Fed. Reg. 43948 (1996) (revised interagency asset quality guidelines).
172. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (detailing sanctionable conduct).
173. See, e.g., FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1433 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing cas-
es); RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp. 1457, 1465-66 (D. Colo. 1993) ("In a per se
claim, the standard of care is determined by statute, regulation or ordinance"). While the
express words of the 1992 regulations only address real estate loans, many of the safe-
guards the rules require could apply by analogy to other types of loans.
174. See FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that supervi-
sory agreement and FHLBB appraisal standards furnished evidence of standard of care);
RTC v. Aseher, No. Civ. A. 92-B-424, 1994 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 1827, at *23 (Feb. 14,
1994), modified on other grounds, No. Civ. A. 92-B-424, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2699
(Feb. 25, 1994) (same); RTC v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351, 354-55, 360 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(denying motion to dismiss where directors allegedly abdicated their managerial responsi-
bilities by violating state and federal loan regulations).
175. Compare FDIC v. Benson, 867 F. Supp. 512, 524 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing
negligence claims against bank directors who allegedly disregarded examination reports)
with FDIC v. Stahl, 39 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir. 1996) (district court improperly granted
defendant directors' JNOV motion where defendants disregarded criticisms in examination
reports and made loans in violation of supervisory agreement); RTC v. O'Connell, No. 94
C 4186, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3999, at *8 (N.D. I11. Apr. 1, 1996) (denying motion to
dismiss where director defendants allegedly failed to take corrective actions after repeated
criticisms by regulators); Ascher, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1827, at *23 ("[nlegligence per
se claims may be based upon the violation of FHLBB . . . Memorandum R41-b . . .");
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What makes the shift toward federal codification intriguing is
that nearly all of the standards in the December 1992 real estate
regulations and guidelines have their origins in common-law hold-
ings.'76 The fact that the common law already condemned many
of the same practices as negligent did not stop Congress or the
federal banking agencies from regulating those same practices
through code-based statutes and regulations.
Federal codification of the duty of care has several distinct
advantages over the old system of common-law regulation. Sup-
planting state common-law rules with federal rules that had uni-
form, national application helped redress the historically spotty
nature of state court policing of bank lending."v Federal bank
regulators in that regard have made a concerted effort to increase
Norris, 830 F. Supp. at 354-55, 360 (refusing to dismiss negligence claims for ignoring
examination reports). Cf. In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 930-31 (3d Cir. 1994) (violating a
policy statement does not form the basis for regulatory sanctions); RTC v. Lutz, 914 F.
Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (ignoring accountants' warnings that proposed loans
were too large and risky constituted gross negligence; granting summary judgment).
Holding a bank director liable for violations of informal agency guidelines may pose
serious notice concerns where the guidelines were not disseminated to the director or
where the law treats guidelines as non-binding. This may pose a growing problem now
that Congress has amended FDICIA to permit federal regulators to issue safety and sound-
ness standards as guidelines rather than regulations. See supra note 169 and accompanying
text.
In the case of examination reports and regulatory agreements, however, such notice
concerns are generally weak. Federal examination reports, for example, are explicitly ad-
dressed to bank directors and notify them of deficiencies that need to be redressed. Direc-
tors have even less justification to assert lack of notice of regulatory agreements such as
supervisory agreements and voluntary cease-and-desist orders because directors must per-
sonally sign those agreements. For this reason, a majority of courts properly holds that
examination reports and regulatory agreements can furnish a standard of care. See, e.g.,
Stahl, 89 F.3d at 1520; Bierman, 2 F.3d at 1433 & n.9 (citing cases); Home Savings
Bank, F.S.B. v. Gillam, 952 F.2d 1152, 1158-60 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming grant of sum-
mary judgment where forbearance agreement was violated); cf FDIC v. Daniel, No. 1:92-
CV-347, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6940, at *10 & n.7 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 1995) (denying
defendants' motion for summary judgment on gross negligence claim where examination
reports put defendants on notice that they were engaging in imprudent banking practices).
176. Modem cases, for example, penalize the failure to adopt internal underwriting stan-
dards as negligent. Notwithstanding this common-law development, federal bank regulators
adopted detailed loan underwriting requirements in the 1992 real estate lending regulations
and guidelines. Other topics where recent cases and the rules converge include the perfec-
tion of security interests, the collection and analysis of borrowers' financial data, and the
treatment of pre-funded interest. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1063-66, 1073-76.
177. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 1828(o) (Supp. 1993) (authorizing federal regulation of
real estate loans); Brudney, supra note 17, at 1845 n.71 (citing federal banking regulations
and noting that "when the temptations for stockholders to gamble especially riskily with
bondholders' funds approach the unacceptable, Congress has imposed restrictions .... ").
Federal rules and statutes that apply to federally-insured state banks and thrifts preempt
any state rules that are less demanding. See Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, 670 F. Supp. 449, 454 (D.D.C. 1987), aff d, 856 F.2d 1558,
1562 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (FHLBB direct investment rule pre-empted similar state rule for
federally-insured state thrifts).
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uniformity by promulgating the regulations on a joint interagency
basis.""
The rush toward increased federalization of bank director stan-
dards also has been fueled by the fact that federal bank agencies
have replaced shareholders, depositors, and state court receivers as
the dominant plaintiff in bank director liability litigation. The vast
majority of reported bank director negligence cases since 1945 has
been brought by the FDIC, or its one-time sister agency, the Reso-
lution Trust Corporation ("RTC"), either in their corporate capaci-
ties or as conservators or receivers.' One important by-product
of this phenomenon is that the principal forum for bank director
liability cases has shifted from state courts to federal courts, due to
the federal question jurisdiction and removal powers that agency
lawsuits confer. 8
As a result, the de facto authority for defining the scope of the
business judgment rule has decisively shifted from state courts and
bankers to federal bank regulators. In their dual roles as law-givers
and plaintiffs, federal bank regulators now promulgate the rules
that later provide the standard of care in professional negligence
suits against directors. In doing so, federal bank regulators supply
the banking expertise that courts formerly felt they needed (but
lacked) in order to pare back the business judgment rule. The
judiciary's deference to agency expertise is such that many courts
regularly draw on the new, regulator-shaped law, even while main-
taining the facade that state common law is the rule of decision.
The incorporation of codified federal standards into the stan-
dard of care has obvious ramifications for the debate over whether
state law or federal common law should provide the rule of deci-
sion in failed bank litigation. The Supreme Court settled this issue,
at least nominally, in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,' where it
178. Nevertheless, uniformity is relative at best. Even where federal banking agencies
agree on uniform standards, they may disagree on how those rules are to be interpreted
and administered.
179. See WILuAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS 352-56 (4th ed. 1988) (describing agencies' powers to sue); Dunne, supra
note 139, at 296-97 (describing FDIC dominance in bank director liability suits); The
Directors & Officers Dilemma: Liability, 41 RISK MANAGEMENT 72 (July 1994). See also
Harmsen v. Smith, 542 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1976) (actions against directors and others for
harm to a failed institution belong to the institution and its receiver, not to shareholders,
unless the shareholders can show personal injury); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 144 (3d
Cir. 1973). The RTC went out of business on December 31, 1995 under agency sunset
provisions and transferred its caseload docket to the FDIC. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(m)(1).
180. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2) (Supp. 1993) (conferring federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion in all FDIC actions).
181. 114 S. CL 2048, 2056 (1994). The issue arose in the context of an argument by
the defendant law firm that under California law, the guilty knowledge of the thrift's
officers had to be imputed to the thrift, and to the FDIC as receiver, so as to preclude
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held that state law rather than federal common law provides the
rule of decision in FDIC professional negligence cases. Nothing in
O'Melveny, however, disturbed the traditional state law precept that
violations of statutes and regulations are actionable as negligence
per se. To the extent that courts hold violations of codified federal
standards actionable as negligence per se under state law, it is
irrelevant whether state law or federal law nominally furnishes the
rule of decision.1
82
But the greatest significance of the new federal, code-based
standard of care lies in solidifying the shift away from the nine-
teenth-century norm of potential profit maximization at any cost. In
contrast with the past, now the guardians of the purse-federal
bank regulators-are redefining the dividing line between the duty
of care and the business judgment rule in banking. Their interest in
safeguarding the federal deposit insurance funds helps assure that
concerns for loss avoidance will remain at the fore (at least to the
extent that regulators do not embark on deregulation). Federal
regulators, moreover, have extra muscle to reshape the law, both
by virtue of their ability as regulators to promulgate standards of
conduct and their ability as plaintiffs to press for incorporation of
those standards into the common law.
In sum, bank director negligence law has experienced a funda-
mental shift in the last hundred years of a type scarcely imaginable
in general corporate law today. In contemporary bank director
negligence law, debtholder interests, comprised principally of the
interests of depositors and the deposit insurance funds, have largely
eclipsed shareholder interests. As this experience shows, the busi-
ness judgment rule is predicated on embedded economic as-
sumptions, particularly low debt-equity ratios and accessible pricing
information, that may or may not obtain in particular industries or
proof of reliance on outside counsel's advice. Id. at 2052.
182. The rule of decision issue lives on in the current debate over the effect of 12
U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1989) and the issue of whether the gross negligence standard in that
section preempts simple negligence standards under state law. As previously noted, lower
courts are deeply divided over whether state law or federal common law applies to feder-
ally-chartered institutions and the Supreme Court recently agreed to examine this issue on
certiorari. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. To the extent federal common law
would apply to federally-chartered institutions, courts would likely find violations of feder-
al statutes and regulations actionable. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
Apart from the effect of § 1821(k), for the reasons just discussed, O'Melveny has
had a negligible effect on the duty of care in negligence per se cases. But O'Melveny can
make a difference with respect to other elements of a negligence claim such as causation
and reliance, as well as affirmative defenses. In O'Melveny and the other case that created
an inter-circuit conflict with O'Melveny, FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1992), the rule-of-decision debate centered on the element of detrimental reliance. Com-
pare O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2052, with Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 170-71 (affirming
summary judgement for accounting firm charged with negligent auditing of failed S&L's
books, due to lack of detrimental reliance).
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under certain economic conditions. The banking experience similar-
ly shows that where those assumptions do not hold, and where
debtholders are consequently harmed, courts may react by curtailing
the business judgment rule, particularly where broad-based political
interests are at stake. But that is not to say that the banking exper-
iment succeeded. To the contrary, the checkered history of the
century-long transformation in banking raises questions about the
efficacy of this form of common law regulation.
III. THE NEW DUTY OF CARE APPRAISED
Bank director negligence law, as it stands today, is a strange
and baffling amalgam. State law provides the nominal rule of deci-
sion, but federal, code-based standards largely define the duty of
care. Additionally, federal agencies filing suit in federal courts
prosecute the overwhelming majority of such claims.
This anomaly is not without its consequences. While forging
the duty of care from federal standards may appear to be a triumph
of debtholder interests and federal law, any victory may well be
pyrrhic. That is because bank director negligence law remains
burdened with old tort law doctrines from the original, shareholder-
oriented era. These antiquated doctrines have increasingly been
used to defeat receivership claims.
For example, bank directors have had increased success in
getting negligence claims dismissed as time-barred under disparate
state statutes of limitations that may have run before a federal
receiver is even appointed.'83 Even more significantly, there is an
emerging trend to restore the business judgment rule to its original
breadth so as to excuse, at least for civil negligence purposes,
breaches of federal standards of bank director care.'84 These latest
183. See RTC v. Gaudet, Civil Action No. 92-2661 Section "E"(5), 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1106, at *20 (Jan. 29, 1996); Magistrate Rejects FDIC View That Claim
'Accrues' on Default, BANK BAI.OUT LMG. NEws, Mar. 18, 1996, at 1, 6 (discussing
unreported opinion in RTC v. Falk, No. 92-591-CIV-FERGUSON (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20,
1996)); Adverse Domination: A Survey of Recent Decisions, BANK BAILOUT LMGIT. NEWS,
Apr. 26, 1995, at 10; FDIC and RTC Challenge BBLN Tally of PL Cases, Claim Win-
ning Records on Merits, BANK BAILOUT LITIG. NEWS, Oct. 26, 1994, at 1-3 (citing cases)
[hereinafter BBLN Tally]; D&Os Win Virginia Case Based on Cocke, And Texas Case
Based on State Regulator's Control, BANK BAILOUT LriTG. NEWS, Dec. 2, 1993, at 1-3;
James T. Pitts et al., FDICIRTC Suits Against Bank and Thrift Officers and Direc-
tors-Why Now, What's Left?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2109-2112 (1995).
184. See FDIC v. Castetter, C.A. No. 94-55974, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14799, at *2-
*4 (9th Cir. June 3, 1996), modified, Civ. Act. No. 94-55974, U.S. App. LEXIS 22366
(9th Cir. Aug. 28, 1996) (under California law, business judgment rule protects bank
directors who make informed business decisions); Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
870 F.2d 1168, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that unsecured loans fell within the
business judgment rule); FDIC v. Cohen, 95 Civ. 683 (LLS), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2247, at *3, *30-*33 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1996) (business judgment rule barred negligence
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cases reflect growing judicial discord over the extent to which the
business judgment rule in banking has been curtailed, with some
courts taking the view it has not been curtailed at all. Indeed, the
track record of RTC monetary recoveries against bank directors
was so poor that some have questioned whether the RTC's aggre-
gate recoveries were cost-effective.'85
and gross negligence claims for loans made without safe procedures); RTC v. Acton, 844
F. Supp. 307, 310-16 (N.D. Tex. 1994), affd, 49 F.3d 1086 (5th Cir. 1995) (granting
summary judgment for directors despite evidence of lending limit violations); RTC v.
Blasdell, 730 F. Supp. 417 (D. Ariz. 1994) (granting summary judgment for defendant
directors despite evidence of lax lending policies); FDIC v. Benson, 867 F. Supp. 52,
520-22 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (business judgment rule protects failures to correct lax loan
practices that were flagged in supervisory agreements and examination reports); Noble v.
Baum, No. CV 89 0265 920 S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1231, at *2, *7, *40-*41
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 6, 1991) (business judgment rule protected bank loans that lacked
borrower equity); BBLN Tally, supra note 183, at 3-8 (listing unreported cases). See also
STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON GENERAL OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, 104TH CONG., 1ST SEss., STAFF
REPORT ON RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION'S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY PRO-
GRAM-DALLAS, TEXAS REGIONAL OFFICE 42, 48, 276-77 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter
PLS REPORT] (noting testimony of RTC Associate General Counsel Thomas L. Hindes
that "federal court rulings were going against RTC on the negligence cases"); Pitts et al.,
supra note 183, at 2102-06 (citing cases from various jurisdictions adopting widely dispa-
rate standards of care). Cf. RTC v. Scott, 929 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (granting
summary judgment for defendant director on gross negligence claim despite evidence of
missing appraisals).
Additionally, some states have enacted statutes limiting potential personal liability for
officers and/or directors of financial institutions or imposing penalties on thrift plaintiffs
who unsuccessfully bring simple negligence suits. See Cohen, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2247, at *29-'33 (discussing VA. CODE § 13.1-690); RTC v. Fleischer, 897 P.2d 497,
498 (Kan. 1995) (discussing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5831 (Supp. 1994)); RTC v.
Miramon, Civ. A. No. 92-2672, 1994 WL 605906 (E.D. La. Nov. 3, 1994) (assessing
liability against the RTC under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:786(F)); Acton, 844 F. Supp. at
315 n.5 (discussing the Texas legislature's enactment of House Bill 1076, providing that
officers and directors may only be held liable for gross negligence); Matthew G. Dor6,
Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional Malpractice Claims, and Defenses
Based on Management Misconduct, 1995 COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 124, 179 n.190 (listing
new state statutes applying gross negligence standard to actions brought by the FDIC);
Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers
of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross Negligence Regardless of Wheth-
er Section 1821(k) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169, 194-
208 (1994) (same); Utah Legislature Passes Gross Negligence D&O Standard, BANK
BAILOUT LrnIG. NEWS, Mar. 25, 1993, at 6 (discussing restrictive Utah and Louisiana
legislation); James J. Hanks, Jr. & Tracy A. Bacigalupo, State Legislative Responses to
the Director and Officer Liability Crisis, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPRESENTING
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF FINANCIAL INSTrrTUnoNs 79 (1991). See generally Theodore
D. Moskowitz & Walter A. Effross, Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Lia-
bility, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 897, 912-17 (1993).
185. See PLS REPORT, supra note 184, at 1, 3 ("Of a $26 billion loss to taxpayers
from failed S&Ls in Texas, RTC recovered only $35 million from the officers and direc-
tors of these S&Ls," amounting to less than "$1.50 . . . for every $1,000 in losses.");
AMERICAN ASS'N OF BANK DIRECTORS, RTC Surrs AGAINST SAVINGS INSTrTUTION DI-
RECTOR AND OFFICERS: ARE THEY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 33-37 (1995); June Action
Likely to be Pivotal on Bank Bailout Issues in Congress, BANK BAILOUT LITIG. NEWS,
June 21, 1995, at 4; Jeff Gerth, Report on S. & L. Supervision Draws Criticism by Offi-
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As these throwback cases make clear, the business judgment
rule's very elasticity makes it a potential doctrinal trump card for
code-based duties of care. The classic business judgment rule is
absolutist in nature: it negates the duty of care for any good-faith,
disinterested banking decision that has even a negligible chance of
profit, irrespective of risk. Thus, any attempt to scale back the rule
is bound to spawn confusion about where liability falls, raising
both fears that business innovation will be chilled and that deter-
rence will be inadequate.
Some maintain that the minimum rationality test used in Hun
v. Cary86  and Litwin v. Allen," 7  which effectively prohibits
routine business decisions with no potential for profit on their face,
preserves certainty while providing needed regulation.' In the
banking industry, however, that did not prove true. After 1940,
because it was so hard to pinpoint with accuracy decisions lacking
profit potential, courts began to discard the minimum rationality
test in banking, at least as it applied to routine decisions."9 Thus,
far from fostering certainty, it was lack of certainty that doomed
the minimum rationality test.
Intriguingly, that did not cause courts to retreat from regulating
bank asset decisions as a matter of common law. To the contrary,
the duty of care eventually mushroomed to cover a wide variety of
bank decisions with obvious profit potential. The rather extensive
case law in this regard shows that, far from considering the mini-
mum rationality test too intrusive, many courts considered it too
anemic an antidote to the tilt toward risk that the business judg-
cials, N.Y. Taias, June 20, 1995, at B8 ("Government studies have shown that while
most of the intentional misconduct by savings and loan insiders took place in Texas,
involving more than $2 billion, the agency has recovered only $36 million from former
officers and directors of failed Texas institutions."); BBLN Tally, supra note 183, at 1;
Weinstein, supra note 12, at 1502 (apart from a few large settlements, "there is a serious
question whether the government's ultimate recoveries will exceed the millions of dollars
that are now being spent on the process"); but see RTC Reports $517 Million In PLS
Recoveries, BANK BAILOUT LrIG. NEws, Dec. 26, 1995, at 1, 4; RTC Report Shows $64
Million Recovered from D&O Cases, $36 Million in Criminal Restitution, BANK BAILOUr
LITIG. NEws, July 5, 1995, at 1 (RTC report shows "an overall recovery to cost ratio in
excess of $4.53 recovered for every $1 expended"). Cf. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
THRIFr FAILURES--ACTIONS NEEDED TO STABILIZE RTC's PROFESSIONAL LIABILrTY PRO-
GRAM, GAOIGGD-93-105 12 (1993) (discussing RTC's record of financial recoveries and
criticizing weaknesses in its professional liability program).
186. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
187. 25 N.Y.S. 667 (Sup. CL 1940).
188. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 442-45 (1993).
189. The court's inability to recognize the potential profitability of the subordinated
debenture transaction in Litwin highlighted the difficulties of such endeavors. See McCoy,
supra note 2, at 1038-39 (discussing the difficulties judges experience in conducting f'man-
cial analyses in cases following Litwin); supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Litwin).
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ment rule creates. In recent banking cases, courts have awarded
debtholder relief not only for economically irrational decisions
where debtholder and shareholder interests merge, but also for
potentially profitable decisions where debtholder and shareholder
interests clash."' This increased judicial activism has spawned
concerns that the pendulum swung too far.
What are the successes and pitfalls of this experiment? In the
short term, the new, stricter case law has had some success in
scaling back senseless bank risks. The new cases outlaw practices
such as new loans to delinquent borrowers or premature releases of
collateral that banks are hard-pressed ever to defend. Similarly, the
new cases have had a distinctly heuristic effect, with risk manage-
ment programs taking on new priority.
At the same time, the liability juggernaut raises the obvious
question of whether the new, stricter law will make bank directors
too risk-averse. The data suggest that in the short term this has
been a problem. During the early 1990's and up through early
1994, there was a well-publicized shrinkage of bank credit, and
increased numbers of worthwhile loan prospects were turned
down. 9' Likewise, there is evidence from that period that bank
director recruitment became more difficult, as damage awards
mounted and D&O liability coverage for receivership suits dried
up. 92
190. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1040-46 (discussing recent banking cases).
This turn of events also similarly sheds light on the argument that the duty of care
is nothing but a cipher for duty of loyalty concerns. See Dooley, supra note 16, at 471-
72 (the business judgment rule largely shields disinterested decisions); Palmiter, supra note
4, at 1376-85 (discussing the duty of care in relation to the duty of loyalty); cf. Bishop,
supra note 4, at 1099 ("The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations
have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a
search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack."). That may be true
for decisions that are economically irrational both from shareholders' and debtholders'
perspectives, because management self-interest is normally the only plausible reason for
such decisions. But, in cases involving board decisions that are plainly in shareholders'
interests (because they are potentially profitable) but that expropriate wealth from
debtholders, the duty of care vindicates an entirely different interest in regulating wealth
distribution among shareholders and debtholders. See also infra note 203 (discussing a
stricter duty of care standard).
191. See Keith Bradsher, Bank Regulators Taking Close Look at Lending Risks, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1995, at Cl (noting credit crunch in the early 1990's); Steven Greenhouse,
Fed Chief Links Tight Credit to Slowdown, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at D1 (discussing
the reluctance of banks to lend money); Bruce G. Stevenson, Lending Boom Echoes Past
Mistakes, Am. BANKER, May 19, 1995, at 18.
192. See Anbari, supra note 33, at 553-56; Robert E. Barnett, Directors Must Be Man-
agers As Their Responsibilities Mount, AM. BANKER, May 27, 1993, at 4; Mark A.
Hoffman, D&O rates increasing for many types of risks; Financial institutions particularly
hard hit, Bus. INS., Oct. 21, 1991, at 75; Jeffrey Kutler, Local Advisory Boards: Cure or
Band-Aid?, AM. BANKER, Dec. 18, 1992, at 1; Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J.
Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of
Legal and Practical Issues, 51 Bus. LAw. 573, 606 (1996); Michael Quint, Bank Direc-
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In the long run, however, it is questionable whether the newer
case law will continue to make bank directors too risk-averse. The
credit crunch of the early 1990's was so short-lived that federal
bank regulators formed a task force in April 1995 to monitor in-
creased loan portfolio risks.'93 Similarly, bank D&O carriers are
dropping regulatory exclusion clauses from their professional liabili-
ty policies, making it easier to fill vacancies on bank boards of
directors.'94 Thus, the evidence would seem to suggest that the
duty of care in banking is again in the downswing of its historical
cycle. If that is the case, the newest cases are as likely to recede
into irrelevance as to induce undue caution.
To be sure, the latest cycle of bank director liability cases has
unique characteristics that may give these cases added longevity.
The latest set of stricter cases may be less subject to erosion than
before, because the quantity of such cases is significantly greater.
In addition, the FDIC, the predominant plaintiff in such cases
today, has used its jurisdictional and removal powers to switch the
principal venue from state to federal courts. Similarly, as banks
diversify the asset side of their ledgers away from loans and to-
ward other activities, directors may become apprehensive about
new, uncharted bases of exposure. The possibility that shareholders
might use the latest precedents during solvency to challenge failed
business decisions after-the-fact could also make directors unduly
cautious.
But there is little empirical evidence of long-term, undue risk
aversion, in contrast with growing evidence that the newer, stricter
case law is entering into a historic cycle of decline. Congress has
given federal regulators the go-ahead to water down safety and
soundness standards by recasting them as guidelines rather than
regulations. Similarly, the same judicial concerns responsible
tors Face Rising Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1992, at Dl; Barbara A. Rehm, Fear of
Lawsuits Makes It Harder To Lure Directors, AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1991, at 1;
Weinstein, supra note 12, at 1504; see generally THE WYATT COMPANY, 1994 WYATT
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABIaITY SURVEY 42 & Table 28 (1994) [hereinafter WYATr
SURVEY].
193. See Bradsher, supra note 191, at 1 (discussing increased federal regulatory interest
in lending risks); see also FDIC, REPORT ON UNDERWRITING PRACTICES, FEBRUARY 1995
TO FEBRUARY 1996 1-2 (Feb. 1996) ("[I]n just over ten percent of the institutions being
examined, recent lending standards were characterized as having 'more-than-normal' risk.").
194. See, e.g., Experts Watching Bank D&O Exposure with Interest-Conditions Could
Spawn Host of Claims, Observers Say, Bus. INS., Nov. 21, 1994, at 55; James C.
Lawson, Taming Risk in a World Full of Perils; No More Insurance Woes for D&Os,
U.S. BANKER, Dec. 1994, at 38; Monteleone & Conca, supra note 192, at 605-06 (dis-
cussing the effects of regulatory exclusion clauses); Terrence O'Hara, Recruiting Directors
May Be Getting Easier, AM. BANKER, Aug. 30, 1993, at 6; see generally WYATr SUR-
VEY, supra note 192, at 13, 14 at Table 4, 19 at Tables 8A and 8B.
195. See supra note 170 (noting a federal statute requiring uniform regulations).
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for past declines have reared their heads again, in the form of con-
cerns about judicial competence, undue risk aversion by bank
boards, and the competitiveness of home-state institutions. In all
likelihood, the latest counter-trend of permissive cases represents a
judicial backlash against the perceived excesses of the FDIC and
RTC, both in terms of excess agency power (in their dual capaci-
ties as lawgiver and litigant) and excess agency aversion to
risk.
196
Thus, the banking cases present a paradox. When they are
viewed from a linear perspective, debtholders' rights appear to be
continuously expanding. However, this image ignores the fact that
the banking cases cyclically fall into prolonged periods of judicial
backlash and disuse, not to be revived until the next banking crisis
comes along. 97 After the initial savings bank cases during the
bank panic epidemic of the 1880's and 1890's were decided in
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia, all other
states save one-Arkansas-ignored those holdings and strictly
enforced the business judgment rule before the Depression. During
the Depression, cases curtailing the business judgment rule
resurged, but those holdings fell into virtual disuse between 1945
and 1975 because bank failures were rare. The 1980's bank and
thrift crisis triggered the latest cycle of strict cases, but a judicial
backlash to those holdings can already be discerned.
Given their short shelf life, the primary effect of the banking
cases has been to react to past crises, rather than deter crises in the
future. Even at that, the cost-effectiveness of the latest crop of
cases is seriously in doubt. Hence, there are serious questions
whether, over the long run, the recent surge in negligence holdings
is a sufficient deterrent to asset substitution problems in banking to
preserve the FDIC's cause of action in its current form.
196. With respect to the latter, see Kenneth E. Scott & Thomas Mayer, Risk and Regu-
lation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L.
REV. 857 (1971):
[While the FDIC, the FSLIC, and the other supervisory agencies have an obvi-
ous interest in minimizing the frequency of failures, they have no corresponding
incentive to assure that insured institutions take as much risk as they should.
To protect their own status, the insuring and regulating agencies have a tenden-
cy to overdo safety; from their point of view there can hardly be too much
safety.
Id. at 873 (footnote omitted).
197. As Professor Roe recently remarked in a related context: "Populist sentiment
against concentrations of economic power seems to have been continuous, but for that
sentiment to succeed in making law, politics also required a catalyst, such as . . . interest
group demands or the Great Depression .... " RoE, supra note 75, at 49.
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IV. A PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
BANK DIRECTOR NEGLIGENCE
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the current system of
state-law negligence claims against bank directors fails to achieve
either of the twin goals of compensation or deterrence. To realize
improvement on either score, it will be necessary to scrap the
current patchwork of state-law negligence claims for a federal bank
director liability claim that is conferred by federal statute.
To be worthwhile, any new cause of action must address the
lack of deterrence-the most serious failing of the current liability
system. Above all, a new cause of action must recognize that the
principal interests served by FDIC suits against bank directors are
federal in nature and consist of preventing losses to the deposit
insurance funds. The current system of state-law rules serves these
interests poorly. To be sure, federal courts applying state law have
expanded bank director liability on the merits over time. Neverthe-
less, state lawmakers have strong incentives to water down bank
director liability law, because liability antagonizes important con-
stituencies while losses fall largely on the federal government. As
the history of the banking cases also shows, courts periodically
revive doctrines such as the business judgment rule and unreason-
ably short state statutes of limitation in order to immunize bank
directors from liability, regardless of their underlying conduct. The
cacophony of state rules compounds this situation by making uni-
form enforcement needlessly difficult.
Hence, any revamped claim for bank director liability must
eschew state law in favor of a federal cause of action. Replacing
outmoded state-law doctrines with federal standards would advance
deterrence by making it harder for law-breaking directors to escape
civil liability for reasons unrelated to their conduct. The business
judgment rule would be eliminated as a defense to proven viola-
tions. To be effective, any new statutory claim also would have to
make clear that the claim accrued to the FDIC directly, rather than
to the agency standing in a failed institution's shoes. Similarly, a
uniform statute of limitations would be necessary to solve the
current problem in which a state statute of limitations may have
run before a conservator or receiver has even been appointed. An
ideal limitations statute would give the FDIC a reasonable time
after appointment of a conservator or receiver-three years would
suffice-during which to file suit, whether or not the institution's
analogous claim had already expired. 9 '
198. Currently, a two-step limitations analysis applies to negligence claims by the FDIC
on behalf of a failed institution in its capacity as conservator or receiver. See FDIC v.
Ashley, 754 F. Supp. 179, 182 (D. Kan. 1990); FDIC v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437,
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To improve deterrence, a new statutory claim must also address
the problem of vague standards of conduct. Many modem bank
director cases have curtailed the business judgment rule in order to
impose liability; other recent bank director cases have given the
business judgment rule full effect. As a result, there is widespread
confusion whether the business judgment rule or the duty of care
takes precedence in federal negligence suits against bank directors.
As this experience shows, the business judgment rule cannot be
combined with a stricter duty of care without doing violence to
both.
The resulting confusion is compounded by the cyclical nature
of the banking industry, which makes it prone to periods of idle
enforcement. Many directors probably assumed from the paucity of
bank director liability cases between 1945 and 1980 that honest but
mistaken lending decisions were protected from liability. But that
assumption proved wrong with the sudden spate of bank director
liability judgments in the past ten years. The result was a clash in
expectations; bank directors thought the business judgment rule was
the standard of conduct, while courts measured their conduct
against an increasingly strict duty of care.'"
Even without the added complication of the business judgment
rule, today's duty of care is so general-i.e., the care that ordinari-
ly prudent directors would take under similar circumstances-that it
is often difficult to know where liability lies. One consequence of
1440 (S.D. Tex. 1990). If the negligence claim was time-barred under the applicable state-
law limitations period before the federal conservator or receiver was appointed, neither the
appointment of a conservator or receiver nor the transfer of that claim to a government
agency in its corporate capacity will revive the claim. Compare FDIC v. Former Officers
and Directors of Metropolitan Bank, 884 F.2d 1304, 1309 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990); FDIC v. Schoenberger, 781 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (E.D. La.
1992); and FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 742 F. Supp. 612, 617 (M.D. Fla. 1990)
with 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(b)(14)(E), 1821(d)(14)(C) (1996 Supp.) (reviving certain expired
state claims for fraud or intentional misconduct). Assuming the negligence claim was not
time-barred on that date, however, a new federal limitations period begins to run either
when the government is appointed conservator or receiver or when the claim accrues,
whichever is later. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(B) (1989 & 1996 Supp.); see also
Schoenberger, 781 F. Supp. at 1158. The limitations period for FDIC negligence claims is
the longer of three years or the period applicable under state law. 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(14)(A)(ii) (1989 & 1996 Supp.); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(14)(B), (C) (1996
Supp.) (modifying statute of limitations for RTC gross negligence claims).
199. A perfect illustration of clashing expectations in the bank loan area appears in the
Seventh Circuit's decision in FDIC v. Vierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993):
Despite the defendant directors' arguments that they were shielded by the busi-
ness judgment rule and that the district court did no more than substitute its
judgment for theirs, the court clearly, and correctly, determined that, at the time
the loans were made, a reasonably prudent director would not have approved
such transactions. Such a methodology . . . only imposes liability for those
transactions that were unreasonable at the time that they were made.
Id. at 1434.
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that generality is that bank director holdings are highly fact-contin-
gent. This compounds uncertainty as to whether these holding are
applicable to other sets of facts. Some directors intentionally ex-
ploit that uncertainty, gambling that they will not be held liable for
aggressive loans. Others complain, often justifiably, that common-
law standards are too vague to enable them to understand their
legal responsibilities.' The problem is exacerbated by bank
regulators' longstanding refusal to issue specific guidelines for
director conduct. '
What is more, those clashing expectations arose in the one
industry that had inched toward a stricter duty of care for years
and that traditionally was associated in the public mind with con-
servatism and financial restraint. Nearly every bank director case
this century that pared back the business judgment rule involved
200. See GARTFN, supra note 42, at 93; Tamar Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of
Care: The American Law Institute's Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 705, 707 (1984) (describing the vagueness of the duty of care standard); cf.
Kraakman, supra note 44, at 887 ("Absolute liability . . . seems best suited to violations
of clear-cut legal rules with little prospect of error in adjudication.").
This sequence of events is somewhat surprising in view of one prominent corporate
law scholar's predictions in the general corporate context. A few years ago, Melvin
Eisenberg posited that directors generally conform their conduct to the standard of due
care, not the business judgment rule. At the same time, he argued, courts refuse to sec-
ond-guess board decisions, using the business judgment rule as the standard of review.
See Eisenberg, supra note 188, at 441. Eisenberg referred to the divergence between the
due care standard of conduct that is addressed to directors and the business judgment rule
that is addressed to lawyers and the courts as "acoustic separation." Id.
But bank director cases in the 1980's resulted in acoustic separation of precisely the
opposite sort. If the theory of acoustic separation held true in banking, one might safely
assume that most directors adhere to prudent conduct. Thus, if the standard of review was
tightened, directors would not need to fear increased liability. But the opposite proved true
in the S&L debacle of the 1980's. See supra notes 149 to 159 and accompanying text
(discussing risky S&L behavior). William L. Cary and Sam Harris related the following
anecdote in this regard:
Casey Stengel became director of the Glendale National Bank. . . . Well, in
typical "Stengelese," Casey reported his delight in serving in that capacity and
his one remark was, "It is fine. If you want to make a loan, you go into a
soundproof room where no one can hear a word you're saying."
Carey & Harris, supra note 12, at 61.
201. See Weinstein, supra note 12, at 1504; FDIC, POCKET GUIDE FOR DIRECTORs
(1988); U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECrOR's BOOK: THE ROLE OF A
NATIONAL BANK DIRECOR (1987); FDIC Statement Concerning the Responsibilities of
Bank Directors and Officers, 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 61,722(A) (Dec. 4, 1992);
FDIC Statement Concerning the Responsibilities of Directors and Officers of Insured De-
pository Institutions, 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) J 61,723 (Nov. 16, 1992). The most
detailed guidelines for directors were issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision. See OF-
FICE OF THRIFt SUPERVISION, DIRECroR INFORMATION GUIDELINES (1989). See also Ger-
ald T. Dunne, Legal Responsibilities of Bank Directors, in THE BANK DIREcTOR 55
(Richard B. Johnson ed., 1974) ("[Courts] have-to borrow a phrase from former Chair-
man Cohen of the SEC---refused to establish 'standards for the sharp shooters to evade'
(quoting from AMERICAN BANKER (Dec. 6, 1968))).
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routine loan decisions rather than extraordinary decisions, such as
mergers or asset sales. Thus, recent experience suggests that serious
problems arise when standards of review are tightened, without
notice, for day-to-day business decisions that are not heavily
lawyered, such as loan approvals. In the meantime, the message
that many 1980's bank directors heard was not that liability rules
were becoming stricter, but that the business judgment rule still
prevailed.' Up through the 1980's, the legal and regulatory sys-
tem thus abjectly failed to communicate the duty of care to bank
directors and to notify them that liability was headed in a stricter
direction." 3
Consequently, it is time to overhaul FDIC actions against bank
directors by replacing the current, vague standard of care with a
statutory standard that defines proscribed conduct with greater
specificity. Courts have already groped toward a solution in this
regard by holding that violations of statutes, rules, supervisory
202. See authorities cited in McCoy, supra note 2, at 1031 n.1 (discussing the business
judgement rule).
203. Academic commentary perpetuated the impression that stricter bank director cases
were a thing of the past and were essentially confined to their facts. In 1968, for exam-
ple, Professor Bishop commented that bank director negligence holdings were essentially
"extinct." See Bishop, supra note 4, at 1096 n.63, 1098-99. This notion has resurfaced in
the literature during the past thirty years. See Cary & Harris, supra note 12, at 61-62
(describing threat of bank director liability as "fictional"); Dyson, supra note 4, at 343-44,
354 (discussing the lack of cases involving the negligence of bank directors); Palmiter,
supra note 4, at 1360 n.22, 1377-78 and citations therein (discussing the modem rejec-
tions of the business judgment rule); Scott, supra note 4, at 129 ("nearly all the decisions
imposing liability . . . antedate the FDIC and FSLIC"); but see, e.g., MICHAEL P.
MAU.OY, TaE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS 230-31 & n.1 (1988) (cases cited therein);
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (NJ. 1981).
Similarly, academic commentators reinforced the impression that the duty of care
lacked bite by arguing that duty of care cases are nothing more than duty of loyalty
rulings in disguise, due to the nearly ubiquitous presence of self-dealing. See Dooley,
supra note 16, 190.
In banking, however, such reductionism is misplaced. As already discussed, duty of
care cases in banking have an independent concern with asset substitution, over and above
self-dealing concerns. See supra note 190. This is apparent from the bank case holdings
that have condemned discrete transactions as negligent despite the absence of conflict of
interest. See RTC v. Rahn, No. 1:92:CV:174, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932, at *35-*39
(W.D. Mich. June 6, 1994); RTC v. Ascher, Civil Action No. 92-B-424, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1827 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 1994), modified on other grounds, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2699 (Feb. 25, 1994); RTC v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351, 355, 359-60 (S.D. Tex.
1993); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 659-60 (Mass. 1935); Bailey v.
O'Neal, 122 S.W. 503, 505 (Ark. 1909); Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 830-31 (NJ.
Eq. 1889); see also Weinstein, supra note 12, at 1501 ("[D]ishonesty was a contributing
factor in only a minority of [S&L] failures."). Similarly, judicial pronouncements about
the duty of care can have significant settlement value in cases with disputed transactions
that are not infected by conflict of interest. This effect is potentially significant. Eighty-
five percent or more of the professional defendants sued by the FDIC and RTC settled
with the plaintiff agency before trial. See FDICIRTC Have Mixed Success Suing Profes-
sionals; Settlements Win Cash, But Courts Are Wary of Cases, BANK BAILOUT LrrG.
NEWS, July 7, 1994, at 2.
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agreements, and orders are negligent per se. The benefit of that
approach is that it uses ascertainable standards of conduct as a
proxy for the old and highly elastic standard of care. The problem
with that approach is that it imports code-based standards into
state-law negligence claims, which are weighted down by other,
often inappropriate doctrinal baggage. Therefore, to implement
code-based standards in any meaningful way, they need to be
transplanted into a new cause of action that is free from inappro-
priately broad defenses.
Hence, a new federal claim should limit FDIC bank director
liability suits to losses caused by negligent, reckless, or knowing
violations of state and federal rules and statutes on bank safety and
soundness. Losses due to negligent, reckless, or knowing disregard
of agency orders, written agency conditions, and written superviso-
ry agreements should also give rise to damages.2" The business
204. In drafting such a statute, a leaf could be taken from the civil money penalty
provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (1989 & 1996 Supp.), which authorize penalties
against institution-affiliated parties, including bank directors, who violate a law, regulation,
certain final and temporary orders, written conditions imposed by federal bank regulators,
or written agreements between institutions and federal bank regulators.
Critics of the current negligence system argue against liability based on simple negli-
gence due to overdeterrence concerns. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 12, at 1501-03.
Harris Weinstein, former Chief Counsel of the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision, has
correctly pointed out that federal bank regulators can only require reimbursement of losses
in cease-and-desist proceedings in case of unjust enrichment or reckless disregard. See id.
at 1502 n.13; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A). Nonetheless, simple negligence liability would
be more lenient than the current Tier 1 civil money penalty provisions, which already
authorize fines on a strict liability basis of up to $5,000 per day. See 12 U.S.C. §
1818(i)(2)(A) (1989 & 1996 Supp.). More importantly, restricting negligence actions to
violations of statutes, rules, and other written provisions would go a long way toward
meeting overdeterrence concerns by providing directors with better notice of their legal
obligations and penalizing them only for violations of provisions that they are required to
obey in any case. Such liability would provide an important added inducement for direc-
tors to seek legal advice and institute internal controls designed to achieve compliance
with the banking laws.
These other possible avenues of monetary recovery raise the important question, aired
by Weinstein, whether damages claims for bank director negligence should just be elimi-
nated as unnecessarily duplicative. See Weinstein, supra note 12, at 1502-03 (arguing that
a simple negligence theory contributes nothing to efforts to ensure honesty on the part of
directors). Damages liability, however, provides an important weapon in the arsenal of
federal bank regulators for several reasons. First, D&O liability policies are not uniform
and many policies that provide coverage for negligence exclude coverage for civil money
penalties and fines. See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 192, at 598-99 (noting that
most insurers exclude fines and penalties). Second, in some circumstances negligence
claims may provide a fuller measure of damages than civil money penalty actions, which
are capped at fixed sums per day "for each day during which [a] violation continues."
See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A). Finally, liability insurers constitute an important added
monitor of bank safety and soundness. Through their pricing policies, negotiations over
the renewal and contents of policies, on-site visits and risk-management training sessions,
D&O insurers can exert significant pressure on insured directors to adopt adequate internal
controls. These factors partially explain why in recent years, the RTC and FDIC preferred
civil damages suits over administrative proceedings in many failed bank and thrift cases.
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judgment rule would not furnish a defense in either case. To avoid
the Erie doctrine's ban on federal common law, any new cause of
action would have to be expressly authorized by federal statute.
Only the FDIC would have standing to sue, either in its corporate
capacity or as conservator or receiver.2"5 In the interest of unifor-
mity, federal courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over such
claims.
A new claim of this sort would have several virtues. It would
alleviate legitimate notice concerns of bank directors by restricting
liability to defined types of conduct that could be ascertained from
codebooks, orders, and agreements in advance. This is not to say
that code-based rules are not open to interpretation. At the very
least, however, a code-based standard would represent an improve-
ment by identifying the topics of conduct that are subject to liabili-
ty. At its best, such a standard would demarcate legal and illegal
acts in a clear and comprehensible fashion.
In turn, clearer conduct standards would boost deterrence in at
least two ways. First, such standards would make it harder for
defendant directors to evade liability by arguing that the standard
of care was a matter of debate. Second, clearer standards would be
easier for regulators, insurers, lawyers, and the banking industry to
communicate to directors (through handbooks, workshops, advice,
and the like) than the current welter of fact-bound common-law
holdings.
Code-based conduct standards would have the added advantage
of substituting regulators' expert judgment for the decisions of lay
judges on matters affecting bank safety and soundness. Further,
such standards would give regulators the flexibility they need to
respond to new conditions, either through rulemaking proceedings
or through legislation. Admittedly, regulators would lose flexibility
to some degree because they would bear the onus to promulgate
conduct rules in advance. Additionally, to trigger liability, regula-
205. One might argue that depositors should be able to sue to the extent of their unin-
sured losses because such suits vindicate depositors' interests in redressing asset substitu-
tion. Such suits (at least in theory) could have the benefit of fuller compensation and
could exert added discipline in case FDIC enforcement became lax. On the other hand,
dual standing could pose potentially serious complications. If depositors and the FDIC
could proceed concurrently, the FDIC's recovery might be threatened by an ensuing rush
to judgment. The costs of defending dual lawsuits might also deplete limited liability
insurance proceeds if defense costs, under the policy, were defrayed from the proceeds. If,
on the other hand, depositors were barred from suit unless the FDIC timely elected not to
sue, there could be long delays in the commencement of litigation (as has been the expe-
rience with EEOC ight-to-sue letters in Title VII employment discrimination claims).
Joinder and interpleader rules, combined with a rule allowing concurrent suits, could solve
some of those problems. However, those procedural devices could not fully redress the
concern that individual depositors might advance interpretations of safety and soundness
laws that were at odds with official interpretations by bank regulators.
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tors would have to adopt conduct rules in the form of regulations
rather than guidelines. The trade-off in increased deterrence, com-
pensation, and fairness, however, would be more than worth the
cost.
Importantly, the adoption of code-based standards would also
inject procedural protections that would help alleviate risk aversion
concerns. Under a code-based system, banks would have a political
opportunity to shape conduct standards through the notice-and-
comment process and through legislation. That input would serve
as a brake on overly cautious rules by regulators and legislators.
Finally, a new federal cause of action would advance the twin
goal of compensation by reducing the FDIC's chances of defeat for
reasons unrelated to the merits. More than in many other tort con-
texts, full compensation probably can never be achieved in bank
director liability suits as a whole.2 That is partially because
D&O liability insurance undercoverage is endemic to the banking
industry, and because directors' personal assets normally fall far
short of what is necessary to compensate losses fully. Nonetheless,
such policies can provide millions of dollars in recoveries and
encourage the banking industry, as a whole, to spread costs. A new
cause of action that was better tailored to the federal interests at
stake would properly result in victories (and hence compensation)
in cases that otherwise might be inappropriately lost.
This proposed solution to asset substitution problems in bank-
ing is highly specific to the banking industry and relies on the
elaborate existing system of federal banking regulation as a source
of standards of conduct. Because asset substitution problems are
endemic to all industries, the question thus arises whether the
banking experience is unique, or instead, has lessons for corporate
law at large. If the latter is the case, is there one unitary solution
or will solutions vary according to industry? It is to these questions
that the next section now turns.
V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LAW
In previous writings on this issue, most writers have dismissed
the banking cases as sui generis, and thus devoid of insights into
asset substitution conflicts generally. When the reasons for the
banking cases are carefully examined, however, it is evident that
the banking cases have a direct (and discomfiting) bearing on debt-
equity strifes at large.
206. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 12, at 1502 (noting that "[t]he current negligence-
based litigation is . . . highly unlikely to recover a significant amount of money").
1996]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Until now, the reasons for the divergent path of the duty of
care in banking have been the product of surmise. Professor Joseph
Bishop assumed that federal deposit insurance eliminated any need
to curtail the business judgment rule. 7 Other commentators have
suggested the same.2"'
Once the economic foundations of the business judgment rule
and the historical evidence are examined, however, it is apparent
that both analyses miss the mark. The fundamental force behind
the contraction of the business judgment rule in banking is the
heightened risk that depositors bear due to information asymmetries
and highly leveraged capital structures-not federal deposit insur-
ance. Even before deposit insurance, high debt-to-equity ratios
(combined with depositors' inability to price risk premiums accu-
rately) gave bank shareholders and directors heightened incentives
to court higher risks, knowing they could foist losses onto deposi-
tors. Moreover, some courts struggled to deal with this problem
decades before deposit insurance was enacted." Thus, while de-
posit insurance perpetuated the problem of wealth expropriation in
banking (Professor Bishop's assumptions to the contrary notwith-
standing), it did not create it.
That being the case, it is wrong to treat the banking precedents
as special, hinging on the presence of deposit insurance. The asset
substitution problem in banking goes much deeper and is based on
general principles of corporate capital structure. As Professor Cof-
fee has recognized, these problems are the same ones all corporate
creditors face, be they bondholders, depositors, or trade credi-
tors. 0 Not surprisingly, then, as average debt-equity ratios rise,
the same asset substitution problems that are characteristic of bank-
ing are cropping up in the corporate world generally.'
207. In 1968, for example, in arguing that decisions imposing liability on directors for
simple negligence largely were restricted to cases involving banks, Professor Bishop com-
mented:
[This class of cases] has been virtually extinct for a quarter of a century, partly
because of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and other New Deal re-
forms, and partly, no doubt, because the trend toward fewer and larger banks
has made inexperienced and gullible bank director scarcer than they used to be.
Bishop, supra note 4, at 1098-99; See also id. at 1096 n.63 (citing cases).
208. See Dyson, supra note 4, at 343-44, 354 (noting falloff in bank director negligence
after World War I); Palmiter, supra note 4, at 1360 n.22, 1377-78 and citations therein
(dismissing bank director negligence cases as a vestige of the period predating federal
deposit insurance); Scott, supra note 4, at 129 (same).
209. See supra notes 72-119 and accompanying text.
210. Coffee, supra note 18, at 45-46, 67.
211. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 159-61 (discussing debt-equity ratios and borrowing
practices); Coffee, supra note 18, at 20-21, 41-42 (discussing corporate financial strate-
gies); McDaniel, supra note 18, at 214 (discussing debt-equity ratios).
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The question, then, is whether bank depositor debt differs in
some other way from long-term corporate debt that makes it more
deserving of legal relief. Obviously, in the absence of deposit
insurance, bank debt to depositors is the very antithesis of long-
term debt. Bank deposits are normally short-term, and the bulk of
those deposits are available on demand. Thus, by virtue of demand
deposits, banks are peculiarly susceptible to runs in a way that in-
dustrial companies are not.
But federal deposit insurance largely solved the problem of
runs that differentiated banks from other industries. As a conse-
quence of deposit insurance, bank debt came more closely to re-
semble long-term corporate debt, because the principal interests at
stake changed from the short-term interests of depositors to the
long-term interests of the federal deposit insurance funds 12 If
anything, deposit insurers have a much longer horizon than corpo-
rate bondholders because deposit insurance guaranties are of indefi-
nite duration and are not traded on the secondary market.
Thus, the economic reasons for the groundswell of director
liability holdings in the banking industry are increasingly character-
istic of corporate America in general. In many cases, corporate
bondholders have difficulty pricing the prospective risk of asset
substitution. This is similarly true for the deposit insurance funds.
And, as in the banking industry, increased leveraging of American
companies makes asset substitution a heightened risk in the general
corporate context. Insofar as these economic problems cut across
most industries, it is a serious mistake to dismiss the banking cases
as aberrant.
Given the common problems that debtholders in banks and
other companies face, is there something distinctive about the
banking context that makes the remedy-tort relief-uniquely suit-
ed to banking? In banking, market remedies are considered inade-
quate for reasons that also apply to the corporate context generally.
Both inside the banking industry and outside, it is often difficult to
build the price of future asset substitution and managerial negli-
gence into the cost of funds with any accuracy. That pricing inabil-
ity, moreover, boosts incentives to engage in asset substitution in
the first place. Concededly, pricing problems are generally worse
for small depositors in the banking industry, because information
gathering is costly and deposit insurance provides a disincentive to
demand a risk premium. This difference, however, is only one of
212. Although deposits over $100,000 per depositor, per financial institution, are not
insured, federal receivers normally favor resolution procedures that protect insured and
uninsured accounts alike. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the
government's preferred methods of bank resolution).
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degree, not kind, because it does not remove the problem of future
asset substitution.
Similarly, diversification does not provide relief, either in bank-
ing or in the market for long-term corporate bonds. The risk of
expropriation cannot be "diversified away" by spreading holdings
among different companies, because that risk is systemic to firms
across the board." ' Thus, while it is true that creditors' invest-
ments are not firm-specific, that distinction is an empty one, be-
cause expropriation is not a risk that diversification can erase.
Last to be considered is the availability of firm exit in the
form of withdrawal of deposits or resale on the secondary market
of corporate bonds. In banking, exit has always presented height-
ened concerns because demand deposits make banks uniquely sus-
ceptible to runs. Consequently, the bank regulatory system is spe-
cifically designed, through a combination of deposit insurance
guarantees and resolution techniques, to discourage mass withdraw-
als triggering runs. In the corporate bond context, of course, runs
are not a problem because the duration of bonds is usually long-
term. Nevertheless, at least in theory, disappointed bondholders can
achieve exit through secondary market resale. If the company is
deteriorating, however, such exit may result in a loss, and exit may
be impossible if the resale market has dried up.214 Accordingly,
market exit does not provide a satisfactory answer in either setting,
insofar as it is undesirable in the banking industry and an incom-
plete remedy for corporate bondholders generally.
In evaluating the advisability of a debtholder claim for negli-
gence, it is also important to explore other forms of legal protec-
tion. One such protection might be to provide debtholders with a
direct voice in corporate governance. In America, however, bond-
holder participation on corporate boards has never been taken seri-
ously.2"5 As for the federal deposit insurance context, debtholder
213. Compare McDaniel, supra note 18, at 239 (stating that risk cannot be eliminated
through diversification) with Coffee, supra note 18, at 50-51 (stating that creditors, unlike
managers, do not deserve retroactive legal protection due to their ability to diversify).
Some might argue that there are unique countervailing policy reasons for discourag-
ing deposit outflows from the banking industry, in view of the banking industry's key
role in facilitating monetary policy and the payment system. See, e.g., E. Gerald Corrigan,
Are Banks Special?, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOUS, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT
5, reprinted in BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 35, at 68, 70-73. Whether
that is true, it is irrelevant here because diversification would not provide significant relief
for expropriation in any case.
214. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 150 ("[e]xit only works with slowly deteriorating
issuers . . ."); see generally Triantis & Daniels, supra note 17, at 1079 (discussing the
concept of exit).
215. Coffee, supra note 18, at 69-70 (noting that bondholder voting rights were incon-
ceivable until recently). This stems from the long-established norm that the board serves
shareholders interests to the exclusion of the interests of bondholders. See Mitchell, supra
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governance would be tantamount to direct government management
of banks. While the government already affects bank management
significantly through supervision and regulation, outright control
would cross over the line into the politically unpalatable. Another
form of protection might consist of distribution rights upon bank-
ruptcy or insolvency. But, although bondholders and federal deposit
insurers have comparable priorities in the event of insolvency,
insolvent estates frequently have too few assets to provide full
relief.216
Unlike depositors, bondholders do have limited rights of action
for breach of trust indentures. Bondholders generally are relegated
to whatever contractual rights could be negotiated in the form of
trust indentures and covenants. But the efficacy of those contractual
provisions has come under serious question in recent years, fueling
calls for bondholder tort remedies.2"
However weak trust indentures and covenants might be, deposi-
tors traditionally have not even had the benefit of contractual
protections.2"8 That state of affairs helped give rise to the increas-
ingly elaborate scheme of deposit insurance and banking regulation
that we know today-a scheme that is plainly more intrusive than
indentures and covenants. Yet notwithstanding this pervasive sys-
tem of banking regulation, the judiciary has grafted onto that struc-
ture an impressive body of case law conferring negligence causes
of action on depositors and their insurers.2 9
note 6, at 1167 n.5, 1171-73.
216. See BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 35, at 662-63. Under FDICIA,
regulators must take "prompt corrective action" whenever a bank's capital is impaired.
Those provisions specifically require regulators to place institutions that have been critical-
ly undercapitalized (generally, where tangible capital is less than two percent of assets) for
270 days into receivership. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831o(a)(2), (b)(1)(E), (c)(3), (h)(3) (Supp.
1996). While the prompt corrective action provisions reduce the danger that bank institu-
tions will operate after insolvency, they do not eliminate it. That danger will remain
where an institution suffers sudden, catastrophic losses or where an institution's disclosure
statements or balance sheets mask critical losses between examinations.
217. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 129-30 (discussing agency theorists' critique of con-
tractual bondholder rights); Brudney, supra note 17, at 1829-30 (discussing the
bondholder's limited role in the negotiation of bond contracts); Mitchell, supra note 6, at
1168 (proposing an expansion of bondholders' rights).
218. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (citing cases).
219. It is no accident that regulation and expanded rights of action went hand-in-hand
in the banking industry. Powerful federal interests, both on Capitol Hill and at federal
banking agencies, have pushed for an overlay of common-law relief in response to public
demands to recover losses incurred by federal taxpayers. In that regard, it is interesting
that even though Congress did not enact an express damages cause of action in FIRREA
or FDICIA, it did virtually nothing (apart from the enactment of § 1821(k), see supra
note 12) to block the courts' phenomenal expansion of state-law duties of care. This is
probably best explained by the fact that in 1989 and 1991 respectively, when FIRREA
and FDICIA were passed, judicial enforcement was at an all-time high. The judiciary's
activism gave Congress the enviable ability to give expanded liability the nod through the
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In short, there is little if any economic reason to prefer tort
relief to deposit insurers over tort relief to bondholders. Why then
the judiciary's activism in the banking area, when it has been loath
to extend similar rights to bondholders? The answer partly lies in
differing judicial perceptions of depositors and bondholders, as well
as in the political imperatives of the federal deposit insurance
system itself.
Starting with the savings bank cases of the 1880's and 1890's,
courts increasingly came to characterize depositors as men and
women of modest means whose life savings were at stake.' This
populist image, which was distinctly at odds with traditional judi-
cial views of corporate debtholders, began to take root when the
working class joined the ranks of bank depositors through the
conduit of savings banks. As a result of the democratization of
bank accountholders, increasing numbers of courts came to regard
depositors not as sophisticated, depersonalized investors who know-
ingly placed their funds at risk, but as individual men and women
who shifted their savings from the mattress to the bank only on
assurances of full repayment."'
simple expedient of inertia, freeing it to fight more pressing battles, particularly the battle
over insurance fund recapitalization.
220. The apotheosis of this view appears in FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S.
426 (1986). In that case, the Supreme Court approvingly quoted language to the effect
that "the people of the United States .. . have a right to expect . . . the establishment
and maintenance of a system of banks in the United States where citizens may place their
hard earnings with the reasonable expectation of being able to get them out again upon
demand." Id. at 433 (quoting 77 Cong. Rec. 3837 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall)).
221. See Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 655 (Mass. 1935) (bank direc-
tors "invite the confidence of the depositing public and must afford the protection thereby
implied") (quotations omitted); Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 89 N.E. 476, 482
(N.Y. 1909) ("A banking corporation occupies a different relation to the public, in that it
invites individuals to submit to it the possession and care of their money and property.
All banking institutions occupy a fiduciary position.'); Jemison v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 25
N.E. 264, 265 (N.Y. 1890) (condemning bank securities dealing as ultra vires because the
savings bank at issue was "designed to encourage economy and frugality among persons
of small means" and was "organized with restrictions and provisions intended to secure
depositors against loss"); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 74 (1880) (bank trustees "invited
depositors to confide to them their savings, and to intrust the safe-keeping and manage-
ment of them to their skill and prudence."); Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 837 (NJ.
Ch. 1889) ("The object of a savings bank is . . . 'to receive and safely invest the sav-
ings of mechanics, laborers, servants, minors and others; thus affording to such persons
the advantages of security and interest for their money, and in this way ameliorating the
condition of the poor and laboring classes, by engendering habits of industry and frugali-
ty.' . . . The failure of a bank of this character entails suffering, produces distrust, and
discourages industry and frugality.") (citations omitted); Marshall v. Farmers' &
Mechanics' Say. Bank, 8 S.E. 586, 590 (Va. 1889) (quoting Hun).
As Professor Mark Roe has noted, a similar populist strain is responsible for "rules
governing the range and size of financial institutions, and their influence in corporate
governance." ROE, supra note 75, at 29-30. In the banking context, Peter Swire concluded
that state and federal governments adopted special bank insolvency rules before 1933 for
somewhat different reasons, specifically concerns over bank panics and depositors' loss of
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This populist image of depositors was driven by concerns about
the devastating financial impact that lost savings would have on
middle- and lower-income Americans. Like most such images, this
image was at best a part-truth, sweeping in wealthy individuals and
corporate depositors who in no way fit the bill. Yet the image has
persisted, due to the pervasiveness of bank depositors in practically
every walk of American life. There is no other industry where
ordinary citizens so ubiquitously serve as lenders. Thus, directors'
prerogatives in banking have been constrained by the most risk-
averse populace of all: those who, by virtue of life circumstances,
are unable to absorb financial risk.
In contrast, in the bondholder context, as Professor Bratton has
pointed out, the perceptions of corporate debtholders are deperson-
alized to a degree that would be considered socially callous in
banking. This is not to say that the perceptions of bondholders are
unitary; their images range from ones of commercial lenders to
impersonal investors protected by their ability to hedge and diversi-
fy.' But bondholders never represented the populist icon that
depositors did, largely because bondholding is predominantly seen,
rightly or wrongly, as the preserve of wealthy individuals and
companies who have the wherewithal to hire savvy financial advi-
sors and absorb losses.
In banking, once the issue was framed as individuals' life
savings hanging in the balance, it was easier for courts to justify
personal liability of potentially crushing proportions against bank
directors. The rise of D&O policies made that justification easier
still. In the corporate bondholder setting, the opposite balance was
struck-largely because the conflict was framed in radically differ-
ent terms that understated the personal harm to bondholders. By
framing the conflict as one in which faceless institutional bond-
holders were pitted against human directors who feared personally
devastating negligence exposure, there was little doubt who would
win.'
The 1933 enactment of federal deposit insurance confirmed the
populist image of bank depositors and infused that image with
formidable new political power in the form of concern for the
federal fisc. As the historical account shows, only a few courts
curtailed the business judgment rule in banking before the Federal
access to their funds. Swire, supra note 27, at 490-92.
222. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 98-100 (discussing different conceptions of corporate
debt-equity relations).
223. Compare Bratton, supra note 1, at 146-48 (arguing that bondholders deserve at
least comparable legal safeguards) with Coffee, supra note 18, at 50-51 (observing that
creditors, unlike managers, have the ability to protect themselves through diversification).
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Deposit Insurance Act was passed.2' But after federal deposit in-
surance was instituted, with memories of the Depression still fresh,
a clear majority of the courts that considered the issue curtailed the
business judgment rule in banking and did so with respect to an
ever-widening circle of bank practices.2" It was only when feder-
al interests were at stake, in the form of financial guaranties for
depositors, that the judiciary decisively shifted its solicitude from
bank directors to depositors and their insurers. This shift was aid-
ed, no doubt, by the litigation muscle of the federal government,
the principal new plaintiff in bank director liability cases, and by
the shift of locus in such cases to federal courts.
Thus, as Professor Bratton has argued in a different context,
the legal safeguards accorded corporate debtholders vary dramati-
cally by industry, according to the political interests at stake and
the forum in which those claims are heard.2' The banking expe-
rience shows that when expropriation in the form of asset substitu-
tion becomes too extreme or extracts systemic costs that are too
high, the judicial system will suspend its normal deference to di-
rectors and seek to forge a solution.
Yet while the political imperatives in the banking industry are
different (and populist) in origin, in today's highly leveraged finan-
cial environment, the asset substitution problems that bondholders,
depositors, and deposit insurers face are often quite similar. Once
that is understood, there is no real reason why today's strict bank-
ing law precedents could not be imported into the general corpo-
rate sphere. The question, then, is whether that case law should be
replicated in cases at large of expropriation through asset substitu-
tion.
The classic fear is that an expanded duty of care benefiting
bondholders would result in undue risk aversion and difficulties in
recruiting directors. As the banking experience shows, such reper-
cussions could be expected in the short term, both because of
disagreements over where to draw the line between wealth maximi-
zation and loss avoidance, and because of difficulties in drawing
that line.
As discussed in Part II, bondholders who complain about
wealth expropriation through asset substitution have three possible
grievances. First, they could complain that the directors substituted
an asset with a lower, positive risk-adjusted value for one with a
higher, positive risk-adjusted value. Second, they could complain
that directors substituted an asset with a positive risk-adjusted value
224. See supra notes 73-117 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
226. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 159-60, 170.
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for one having a negative risk-adjusted value in the shareholders'
eyes. Or third, they could complain that directors invested in assets
that the shareholders normally would view as having a negative
risk-adjusted value, but for distorted incentives created by high
leveraging.
Of these grievances, the second grievance would require the
least modification to the classic business judgment rule (were it to
be honored), because bondholders and shareholders both have an
interest in continued corporate solvency. 7 The second grievance,
of course, is the situation that the minimum rationality rule in Hun
v. Carya and Litwin v. Allen229 was designed to prevent.Y
Redressing the third grievance would entail more intrusion, because
it pits bondholder interests against the interests of shareholders.
Nonetheless, doing so, at least in theory, would not raise risk aver-
sion concerns because the principal interest at stake would be res-
cuing the company from insolvency, the same interest that Hun and
Litwin protect.
By contrast, redressing the first grievance would present clear
overdeterrence concerns. If the riskier investment were successful,
it would boost corporate earnings. That, of course, is why the
classic business judgment rule protects such investments.
If past experience is any guide, differentiating these three
grievances overtaxes the competence of most courts. For instance,
in the "minimum rationality" line of cases illustrated by grievance
two, the judiciary's gaffes in distinguishing potentially profitable
decisions from unprofitable ones made later courts wary of engag-
ing in that inquiry at ally Recognizing decisions that fit griev-
ance three (decisions whose risk-adjusted value would be negative
but for moral hazard effects) is trickier yet. Courts do not have the
econometric tools to make these distinctions. And even if they did,
attempting to make such judgments in hindsight could well exert a
chilling effect on legitimate profit-seeking ventures.
But these problems do not guarantee that courts will abstain
from attempts at common-law regulation of day-to-day operating
decisions altogether. While that largely has been true in corporate
law generally, it has not been true in banking. Rather, in banking,
once the minimum rationality cases were discredited, courts resort-
ed to structural requirements, such as activity bans and risk man-
agement techniques, as proxies for economic analysis. As a result,
227. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1187.
228. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
229. 25 N.Y.S. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
230. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1037-40 (discussing minimum rationality).
231. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1038-39 (discussing problems with Litwin, 25
N.Y.S.2d at 709-728).
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at least in certain instances, the banking cases attempt to redress all
three grievances, including the first. This trend accelerated in the
past half century, as courts were able to assuage their concerns
about competence by shifting responsibility for selecting safeguards
and standards to expert banking regulators. Thus, far from being
deterred by their weak economic analytical skills, courts in banking
cases imposed prophylactic rules that applied not only to decisions
that were hopelessly unprofitable, but also to those with profit
potential. 2
In the general corporate context, however, adopting prophylac-
tic rules across-the-board would be more difficult. The banking
cases primarily regulate one activity in one specific industry-bank
lending-and courts have tested those activity restrictions through
trial-and-error for over one hundred years. Moreover, recent courts
have been substantially aided in that task by the promulgation of
code-based standards of conduct. Expanding the banking precedents
to the general corporate context would mean developing prophylac-
tic rules for a huge assortment of industries, a daunting task that
most courts would decline. To compound matters, courts could
usually not expect the same expert regulatory input that they have
come to expect in the banking industry.
These difficulties allude to an even larger problem with bond-
holder claims: the likely possibility that much effort would be
expended for a rather negligible effect in constraining irrational
business risks. The same factors that caused the duty of care cases
in banking to fall into disuse before the 1980's still persist in the
general corporate sphere today. Traditionally, courts have been
reluctant to expand bondholder rights out of concerns for judicial
competence and overdeterrence of desirable business conductY3
Thus, in the long run (if not the short run), centrifugal forces
would likely cause a bondholder's cause of action for tort relief to
disintegrate.
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss the political
crosswinds for some form of debtholder relief. Already, scattered
courts have expanded the banking approach to other firms or in-
dustries with capital structures similar to those in banking. This can
be seen in the insurance industry, where courts have held that
directors of an insolvent insurer can be held negligent for "unad-
vised or unintelligent" judgments in day-to-day operations." In
232. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1040-77 (describing judicial regulation of potentially
profitable bank actions).
233. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1198 (noting American Law Institute Principles
of Corporate Governance disfavor for bondholder negligence suits out of concerns that
bondholders are overly risk-averse).
234. Holland v. Stenhouse, No. 87 C 3086, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2518, at *2, *12
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the investment company context, courts have allowed disappointed
investors to sue their investment company directors for investments
that lack a business purpose or the benefit of informed judg-
ment. 5 In another important development, courts in New York
and other states have held that directors of companies approaching
insolvency owe creditors a duty to preserve company assets. 6
All three of these situations involve debtholders or beneficiaries
whose interests resemble debt more than equity. In the first two
cases, the real parties in interest-insurance policyholders and
mutual fund investors-have some of the same populist attributes
as depositors. Likewise, the first two situations are ones in which
substantial governmental interests are at stake in the form of gov-
ernmental regulation.
The near-insolvency cases are noteworthy for the entirely dif-
ferent reason that they show growing judicial sensitivity to the
(N.D. 111. March 1, 1991) (directors charged with accepting high-risk business and not
maintaining adequate reserves); accord SeIcke v. Bove, 629 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ill. App.
1994) (insurance company officers could be liable for "failure to make informed judg-
ments" and "failure to exercise due care in arriving at those judgments"); Stamp v.
Batastini, 636 N.E.2d 616, 620-25 (111. App. 1993) (holding that insurance company direc-
tors are liable for "'failure to exercise proper care, skill and diligence") (citations omit-
ted); Lower v. Lanark Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 448 N.E.2d 940 (Ill. App. 1983) (hold-
ing that directors must be "diligent and careful" in the execution of their duties to be
protected by the business judgment rule). See also Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196,
1209-11 (5th Cir, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983) (insurance company directors
are held to a higher duty of care); Matter of Integrity Insurance Co., 573 A.2d 928 (NJ.
App. Div. 1990) (holding that a liquidator may assert claims on behalf of creditors);
Herrmann v. Cissna, 507 P.2d 144, 147-49 (Wash. 1973) (holding that in assuming the
duty of rehabilitating insurance companies, Washington's Insurance Commissioner acted for
the benefit of the public at large and could sue directors of defunct insurer for negli-
gence); James F. Johnson, 4th, The Search for a Deeper Pocket: The Liability of Share-
holders, Officers and Directors of an Insolvent Insurer, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSUR-
ANE COMPANY INSOLVENCY REvisrrED 309, 320-26 (Francine L. Semaya ed., 1989) (dis-
cussing the civil liability of directors and officers of insurance companies); Vincent J.
Vitkowsky & James H. Irish, Liability of Directors and Officers and Accountants of Insol-
vent Insurance Companies, in INSURANCE COMPANY SOLVENCY-CAPITAL ADEQUACY,
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, AND LtiAaLrry IssuEs 101, 120-44, 147-49 (1991).
235. See In re Western World Funding, Inc., 52 Bankr. Rep. 743, 770 (D. Nev. 1985),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Henderson v. Buchanan, 985 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1993)
(business judgment rule is no bar to recovery against investment company directors for
"prolonged failure to exercise informed judgment as well as supervision"); Lutz v. Boas,
171 A.2d 381, 395-96 (Del. Ch. 1961) (holding mutual fund directors grossly negligent
for dereliction in managing fund).
236. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1513-14 nn. 93-97 (citing cases); Mike Roberts, The
Conundrum of Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations, 23 MEM. ST. U. L.
REv. 273 (1993) (discussing the duties of directors of nearly insolvent corporation in light
of then-recent cases); Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of
Directors of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239 (1992) (same). Cf.
Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency
and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1995)
(assessing directorial duties to creditors in light of In re Rego Co., 623 A.2d 92 (Del.
Ch. 1992)).
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asset substitution problems that high debt levels entail. Those cases
are doubly significant because they are not confined to the finan-
cial services industry and do not involve the charged political
symbolism of cases involving small investors. Although the near-
insolvency cases are just one step removed from fraudulent convey-
ance cases in bankruptcy, their significance lies in vesting
debtholders with standing before insolvency and thus before they
have accrued liquidated losses. In this respect, the near-insolvency
cases are even more radical than the banking cases, which limit
creditor relief to instances of actual insolvency.
Thus, debtholder suits for breach of the duty of care are not
the open-and-shut matter they initially seem. Courts have yielded to
pressure to recognize such claims when the right political and
economic factors converge, most notably in financial services in-
dustries marked by small-time investors, high leveraging, and pric-
ing difficulties. 7 The impetus for such suits is likely to be par-
ticularly strong if taxpayer interests are at stake, whether in the
form of government guaranties or otherwise. Even more significant-
ly, the near-insolvency cases show that courts are beginning to
validate asset substitution concerns in situations that are not neces-
sarily politically charged but that are nevertheless marked by worr-
some levels of debt.
The slow but steady expansion of tort protection for corporate
debtholders shows that the duty of care and the business judgment
rule have split along political, industrial, and economic lines to an
extent hitherto not recognized. The future will undoubtedly bring
increased calls for debtholder relief across industry lines. If indus-
trial companies continue to rely heavily on debt financing, and if
courts begin to draw analogies to the banking cases (as some un-
doubtedly will), there will be mounting pressure to extend negli-
gence relief for debtholders to the corporate world generally.
Hence, it is crucial that the spotty history of the banking cases
be understood. The difficulties experienced by eliminating the busi-
ness judgment rule in bank lending suggest that, over the long run,
common-law negligence solutions for asset substitution concerns are
likely to fail. Consequently, rather than push for a stricter state-law
negligence claim whose success is equivocal at best, it is time to
investigate other types of remedies that are better able to strike a
satisfactory balance between shareholder and debtholder interests.
The massive task of assaying such remedies is beyond the
scope of this article. Whatever the remedies, however, the banking
experience suggests that across-the-board remedies for asset substi-
237. See supra notes 220-22, 233-35 and accompanying text.
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tution will not work. Instead, such remedies may vary, depending
on the unique conditions of each industry.
For example, in industries where asset substitution is more
difficult to hide in advance (either because asset sales normally
trigger securities disclosures, or because such sales are illiquid and
thus more likely to come to analysts' attention), there may be less
need for any remedy. The same may be true in industries that
historically have had low levels of debt.
In industries where asset substitution is easier to hide, however,
numerous factors need to be considered in order to craft relief.
Does the industry have moral hazard considerations, such as gov-
ernment insurance, that increase incentives toward asset substitu-
tion? Are asset decisions in the industry normally lay decisions, or
are they heavily lawyered? Is a regulatory system already in place,
and can it police asset substitution adequately without resulting in
overdeterrence? Is the industry one in which expert prophylactic
rules can be formulated rather than relying on common-law courts?
If not, could monitoring systems that are currently weak (such as
the system of indenture trustees) be revamped to provide better
protection to their intended beneficiaries? Does the industry typical-
ly feature multiple classes of debt financing, and if so, should all
classes receive relief or should one class get preference? Would
state law protections be adequate or should federal law take prece-
dence? Finally, are there systemic and/or social policy consider-
ations that favor relief to debtholders in one industry over
debtholders in another?
In sum, the lessons from the banking industry are surprisingly
mixed. On the one hand, the asset substitution concerns that
prompted stricter negligence law in the banking industry are pres-
ent in other industries across-the-board. On the other hand, there is
no one solution to those concerns, and any solutions that are
forged will vary across industries. The banking experience suggests
that the search for a unified grand theory of corporate law may
well be quixotic, at least in certain circumstances. It is worth eval-
uating whether corporate law should respond to unique conditions
in different industries and whether, when it fails to do so, it has
outlived its usefulness.
VI. CONCLUSION: METAPHORS AND MYTH
If one were to characterize the historical path of the business
judgment rule in banking over the past hundred years, it might be
described as the triumph of metaphor over substance. Now that
federal deposit insurance has ended the threat of bank runs, there
are few distinctions of any substance between the economic con-
cerns of depositors and their insurers on the one hand and the
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economic concerns of bondholders on the other. In both cases, the
business judgment rule works against debtholder interests by en-
couraging shareholders to substitute riskier assets for safer ones, the
phenomenon known as asset substitution. Debtholders stand to lose
in such circumstances because if the company's investments fail,
they will bear the brunt of the losses after shareholder equity is
wiped out. Asset substitution is of particular concern where invest-
ments are so burdened with risk that they are statistically likely to
result in losses.
Thus, the asset substitution concerns of corporate bondholders
and bank depositors are quite similar. Nonetheless, the law re-
sponded to the asset substitution concerns of depositors in a radi-
cally different way than it did for corporate bondholders. Over the
years, courts have increasingly sought to alleviate asset substitution
problems at banks by giving deposit insurers and depositors the
right to sue bank directors for breach of the duty of care. The
business judgment rule in banking has been abrogated in major
respects as a result.
As the banking experience shows, the business judgment rule is
splintered along industrial and political lines to an extent not ap-
preciated before. Courts are significantly more inclined to curtail
the business judgment rule in industries backed by federal guaran-
tees and in industries where debtholders are predominated by small
investors, most notably financial services industries. Thus, the
banking cases are shaped by a populist metaphor that corporate
bondholders do not enjoy.
The banking cases also lay to rest the myth that scaling back
the business judgment rule would work unmitigated harm. These
cases provide a wealth of empirical data, hitherto ignored, for
assessing what to now has been left to the imagination. Paradoxi-
cally, history shows that the heightened standard of care has not
had the feared effect of stifling board innovation at banks, at least
in the long run. But at the same time, the banking cases have had
little deterrent effect against businesses practices that any rational
shareholder or debtholder would deem ruinous, because these cases
cyclically succumb to backlash and disuse. For cases that achieve
so little, moreover, they generate enormous litigation costs. Thus,
far from exerting a chilling effect, the problem with the current
bank director liability rules is that they do not accomplish what
they set out to do.
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